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Product assortment selection is among the most critical decisions facing retailers: product
variety and relevance is a fundamental driver of consumers’ purchase decisions and ulti-
mately of a retailer’s profitability. In the last couple of decades an increasing number of
firms have gained the ability to frequently revisit their assortment decisions during a selling
season. In addition, the development and consolidation of online retailing have introduced
new levels of operational flexibility, and cheap access to detailed transactional information.
These new operational features present the retailer with both benefits and challenges.
The ability to revisit the assortment decision frequently over time allows the retailer to
introduce and test new products during the selling season, and adjust on the fly to unex-
pected changes in consumer preferences, and use customer profile information to customize
(in real time) online shopping experience.
Our main objective in this thesis is to formulate and solve assortment optimization mod-
els addressing the challenges present in modern retail environments. We begin by analyzing
the role of the assortment decision in balancing information collection and revenue maxi-
mization, when consumer preferences are initially unknown. By considering utility maxi-
mizing consumers, we establish fundamental limits on the performance of any assortment
policy whose aim is to maximize long run revenues. In addition, we propose adaptive as-
sortment policies that attain such performance limits. Our results highlight salient features
of this dynamic assortment problem that distinguish it from similar problems of sequential
decision making under model uncertainty.
Next, we extend the analysis to the case when additional consumer profile information
is available; our primary motivation here is the emerging area of online advertisement. As
in the previous setup, we identify fundamental performance limits and propose adaptive
policies attaining these limits.
Finally, we focus on the effects of competition and consumers’ access to information
on assortment strategies. In particular, we study competition among retailers when they
have access to common products, i.e., products that are available to the competition, and
where consumers have full information about the retailers’ offerings. Our results shed light
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A retailer’s product assortment has been defined as “the set of products carried in each store
at each point in time” (see [Kok et al., 2008]). Product assortment selection is among the
most critical decisions facing retailers: product variety and relevance is a fundamental driver
of consumers’ purchase decisions, and ultimately of a retailer’s profitability. Assortment
planning has received significant attention from both retailers and academia. See [Kok et
al., 2008] for a review of the theory and practice of assortment planning.
Traditionally, retailers have been constrained to make assortment decisions well in ad-
vance of the selling season, when limited or no information on future demand is available.
Moreover, these assortment decisions are also subject to several operational constraints
such as limited procurement budget, limited shelf space for displaying products, to name a
few. In this traditional setup the assortment planning literature has focused on optimizing
procurement decisions while considering product substitution effects on demand realization
(customers might decide to purchase a different product when their preferred one is unavail-
able). In this context, retailers face the challenge of mapping such procurement decisions
to consumer behavior, as this can be used to deconstruct the complexity of the purchase
decision.
In the last couple of decades we have witnessed substantial changes on the retail industry.
An increasing number of firms have implemented fundamental changes in their supply chain
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architectures that allow them to reduce procurement lead-times significantly. Such firms are
now able to revisit their assortments decisions more frequently during a selling season. This
ability, together with the advances in information technologies, have reduced the impact of
initial procurement decisions on the retailer’s revenues and shifted the focus towards the role
of assortment planning on managing demand throughout the selling horizon. In that regard,
early sales figures might be used to revisit initial assessments of consumer preferences, which
– through assortment optimization – might help in tracking a potentially changing demand
environment with a more flexible and dynamic product offering.
In addition to the above, development and consolidation of online retailing has reduced
retailer operational restrictions that pertain to the assortment planning task. Products are
no longer required to be stocked at each store, shelf space is now limited by the consumer’s
own interest, and the retailer might benefit from centralizing inventory management and
pooling demand. It is within realm of possibility, that in the future, online retailers might
leverage this operational flexibility to enable decisions on a consumer-by-consumer basis.
1.2 Challenges in Assortment Planning
Dynamic Learning of Users Preferences. The ability to revisit the assortment decision
frequently over time allows the retailer to introduce and test new products during the selling
season, and to better track changes in consumer preferences. Such a level of sophistication
in the assortment decision making process increases its complexity substantially; and calls
for the development of more advanced information and decision support systems.
When there is limited or no demand information available prior to the selling season,
retailers need to learn user preferences by dynamically adjusting their product offerings and
observing consumer behavior. Consider the case of fashion retail; each season there is a
need to learn the current fashion trend by exploring with different styles and colors, and to
exploit such knowledge before the season is over. Customers visiting one of these retailers’
stores will only see a fraction of the potential array of products the retailer has to offer, and
their purchase decisions will effectively depend on the specific assortment presented at the
store.
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A fundamental problem arises in this setting. On the one hand, the longer a retailer
spends learning consumer preferences, the less time remains to exploit that knowledge and
optimize profits. On the other hand, less time spent studying consumer behavior translates
into more residual uncertainty in the assortment selection process, which could hamper the
revenue maximization objective. This trade-off is known as exploration versus exploitation.
Availability and use of Profile Information. The use of world-wide-web presents
additional opportunities and challenges. Unlike traditional commerce channels, where cus-
tomers remain largely anonymous, the internet allows collection of profile information at
the consumer level. Such profile information might be provided by the user (e.g., by fill-
ing a subscription or survey), or collected without the consumer’s explicit consent (e.g.,
through internet cookies). This information is invaluable in customizing (in real time) the
consumers’ online shopping experience.
The online advertisement industry has pioneered the use of profile information for tar-
geting purposes. There, the most prevalent business models builds on the cost-per-click
statistic: upon each visit to a publisher’s web-site, users are presented with a customized
assortment of advertisements (henceforth, ads); and advertisers will pay a fee to the pub-
lisher each time their ads are clicked upon. To take advantage of user profiles for real time
customization, one requires sophisticated and automated decision support systems.
Strategic Role of the Assortment Decision. The online commerce channel offers new
opportunities to consumers as well: consumers have access to accurate information about
retailers’ assortments and prices; they can compare retailers’ offerings in real time; and make
purchase decisions, while considering product offerings from all retailers simultaneously.
The way consumers access and use information about the retailers’ offerings plays a
critical role in the way consumer purchase decisions are made, and hence impacts the
manner by which retailers interact and compete. Previous academic work on assortment
competition has focused on the case where access to information is costly. There, consumers
might make purchase decisions based only on partial knowledge about retailers’ offerings,
usually engaging in hierarchical decision processes (for example, they might first decide on
the retailer and then on the product to purchase, or viceversa).
When information about the retailers’ offering is readily available, consumers can form
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preferences over the full set of retailer-product pairs, and make purchasing decisions ac-
cordingly. For example, when several retailers offer the same product, consumers effectively
recognize such a product as being identical and make a choice based on retailer-specific
attributes.
The challenge here is to understand the strategic role of the assortment decision and
the effect of common products, offered by various retailers simultaneously, on competition.
1.3 Consumer Choice Driven Assortment Planning
Our main objective in this thesis is to formulate and solve assortment optimization models
capturing the main features of the challenges identified in Section 1.2. Our first step in
that direction is to specify an underlying model of consumer preferences. In this work we
consider random utility models for consumer choice (see Anderson et al. (1992)). Utility
based choice models assume each consumer assigns a (random) utility to each product; when
offered an assortment, every consumer chooses the option providing him/her the highest
utility, with an outside no-purchase option being available. Discrete choice models are
extensively discussed in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2002), and the estimation
and design of specialized models has been an active area in Marketing (see, e.g., Guadagni
and Little (1983) for an early reference). Kok et al. (2008) provides a detailed review on
the use of consumer choice models in the context of assortment planning.
Next, we describe the different formulations considered in this thesis, each addressing a
different challenge in assortment planning.
1.3.1 Dynamic Learning of Consumer Preferences
In Chapter 2 we focus on the impact of learning consumer behavior via suitable assortment
experimentation, and on doing this in a manner that guarantees revenue maximization over
the selling horizon. For that purpose we consider a population of homogeneous utility max-
imizing customers. Given limited display capacity and no prior information on consumers’
utility, the retailer needs to devise an assortment policy to maximize revenues over the rel-
evant time horizon. By offering different assortments and observing the resulting purchase
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behavior, the retailer learns about consumer preferences, but this experimentation should
be balanced with the goal of maximizing revenues. Our stylized formulation of the dynamic
assortment problem will ignore inventory considerations, additional costs (such as assort-
ment switching costs), operational constraints (e.g. restrictions on the sequence of offered
assortments) and changing demand patterns.
Chapter 2 makes several contributions:
i.) We establish fundamental bounds on the performance of any assortment policy. Specif-
ically, we identify the magnitude of the revenue loss that any policy must incur relative
to that of a retailer with prior knowledge of consumer preferences, and its dependence
on the length of the selling horizon, the number of products, and the capacity con-
straint that limit the number of simultaneous products that can be presented.
ii.) We propose a family of adaptive policies that achieve the fundamental bounds men-
tioned above. These policies identify the optimal assortment of products (the one
that maximizes the expected single sale profit) with high probability while success-
fully limiting the extent of exploration.
Chapter 2 also highlights salient features of the dynamic assortment problem that distin-
guish it from similar problems of sequential decision making under model uncertainty, and
shows how exploiting these features helps to dramatically decrease the complexity of the
assortment problem, relative to using existing non-customized strategies, e.g., from the
multi-armed bandit literature.
1.3.2 Availability and use of Profile Information
Chapter 3 extends the analysis in Chapter 2 to the case when additional profile informa-
tion about consumers is available. Here we are motivated by the emerging area of online
advertisement. The analysis focuses on the impact of learning advertisement effectiveness
via suitable assortment experimentation across different consumer/user profiles, and doing
this in a manner that guarantees revenue maximization over the duration of the underlying
advertisement contracts.
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For that purpose we consider a population of heterogenous (with a priori known class
membership) utility maximizing visitors to a web page. Given no prior information on
their utility, the publisher needs to determine, based on each user’s profile information,
the ad assortment to be displayed. In our setup, users’ click decisions depend, among
other factors, on each of the ads’ mean utility, which we assume is a function of the user’s
profile information. By offering different assortments of ads to different types of users and
observing click decisions, the publisher learns the relationship between mean utilities and
user profiles. Such profile/ad experimentation should be balanced with the goal of revenue
maximization.
Chapter 3 makes several contributions:
i.) We identify the magnitude of the revenue loss that any ad-mix policy must incur
relative to that of a publisher with prior knowledge of consumer preferences. We show
that such gain in revenue is proportional to the (minimum) amount of information
needed to reconstruct the policy used by a publisher with prior knowledge of consumer
preferences.
ii.) We propose a family of adaptive assortment policies that achieve the fundamental
bound mentioned above. These policies focus on identifying, good user segments that
can be best used for purposes of parameter estimation; these are selected so as to
minimize the cost of information gathering. Exploration efforts are then focused
primarily on these segments, at a frequency guided by the fundamental performance
limit mentioned previously.
The results in Chapter 3 shed light on the potential benefits of using information arising
from interactions with a subset of user segments, to better explain consumer preferences
across all user types.
1.3.3 Strategic Role of the Assortment Decision
Chapter 4 steps away from real-time learning of consumer preferences and focuses on study-
ing the effects of competition and consumers’ access to information on assortment strategies.
In particular, we aim to understanding how competition that results from the availability
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of full information about the retailers’ offerings impacts equilibrium behavior. To that end,
we analyze a model of assortment and pricing competition in a duopolistic setting, when
assortment decisions are constrained by limited display capacities and retailers have access
to both common products, i.e., products that are available to both competitors, and exclu-
sive products, i.e., products that are unavailable to competition. We anchor the analysis
around the well-studied Multinomial Logit choice model for consumer demand.
Chapter 4 makes several contributions:
i.) We provide a framework to analyze competition in the presence of informed consumers
when demand is driven by individual utility maximization. This framework enables,
among other things, the possibility of having retailers offer the same products, a pos-
sibility ignored in most of the existing literature. Our results shed light on equilibrium
properties in general and on the implications of the availability of common products
on such properties.
ii.) From a qualitative perspective, we establish a clear connection, in any equilibrium,
between the attractiveness of the offered assortment (this concept is to be defined
formally, but can be thought of as the breadth of an assortment), the profit made
by a retailer, and the attractiveness of the competitor’s assortment. In addition we
establish sharp uniqueness and existence results for two competitive settings: i.) the
case where retailers select only their assortments given exogenously fixed prices; and
ii.) the case where retailers can select both assortments and prices
Chapter 4 shows that the introduction of common products can lead to fundamentally
different properties for the equilibrium set. In addition, the unified framework we propose
is fairly flexible and enables one to analyze different models of competition under a common
approach.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 develops dynamic as-
sortment policies for learning consumer preferences for the case of homogenous consumers.
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Focusing on the online advertisement application area, Chapter 3 extends the results in
Chapter 2 to the case of heterogeneous consumers, when additional consumer profile in-
formation is available. Finally, Chapter 4 studies assortment and price competition when
information about the retailers’ offerings is readily available. Each chapter is designed to
be self-contained. Proofs of the results in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are deferred to appendices





Motivation and main objectives. Product assortment selection is among the most crit-
ical decisions facing retailers. Inferring customer preferences and responding accordingly
with updated product offerings plays a central role in a growing number of industries, es-
pecially for companies that are capable of revisiting product assortment decisions during
the selling season, as demand information becomes available. From an operations perspec-
tive, a retailer is often not capable of simultaneously displaying every possible product to
prospective customers due to limited shelf space, stocking restrictions and other capacity
related considerations. One of the central decisions is therefore which products to include in
the retailer’s product assortment. That is the essence of the assortment planning problem;
see Kok et al. (2008) for an overview. Our interest lies in dynamic instances of the prob-
lem where assortment planning decisions can be revisited frequently throughout the selling
season (these could correspond to periodic review schedules, for example). These instances
will be referred to as dynamic assortment planning problems. Here are two motivating
examples that arise in very different application domains.
Example 1: Fast fashion. In recent years “fast” fashion companies, such as Zara, Mango or
World co, have implemented highly flexible and responsive supply chains that allow them
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to make and revisit most product design and assortment decisions during the selling season.
Customers visiting one of these retailers’ stores will only see a fraction of the potential
products that the retailer has to offer, and their purchase decisions will effectively depend
on the specific assortment presented at the store. The essence of fashion retail entails
offering new products for which no demand information is available, and hence the ability
to revisit these decisions at a high frequency is key to the “fast fashion” business model;
each season there is a need to learn the current fashion trend by exploring with different
styles and colors, and to exploit such knowledge before the season is over.
Example 2: Online advertising. This emerging area of business is the single most important
source of revenues for thousands of web sites. Giants such as Yahoo and Google, depend
almost completely on online advertisement to subsist. One of the most prevalent business
models here builds on the cost-per-click statistic: advertisers pay the web site (a “publisher”)
only when a user clicks on their advertisements (henceforth, ads). Upon each visit, users
are presented with a finite set of ads, on which they may or may not click depending on
what is being presented. Roughly speaking, the publisher’s objective is to learn ad click-
through-rates (and their dependence on the set of ads being displayed) and present the set
of ads that maximizes revenue within the life span of the contract with the advertiser.
The above motivating applications share common features: i.) a priori information on
consumer purchase/click behavior is scarce or non-existent; ii.) products/ads are potentially
substitutes, hence individual product/ad demand is affected by the assortment decision,
which is relevant due to display constraints; iii.) assortment decisions can be taken in a
dynamic fashion during a limited time framework.
When there is limited or no demand information available a priori, retailers must learn
new products desirability/effectiveness by dynamically adjusting their product offering and
observing consumer behavior. A fundamental problem arises in this setting: information
collection must balance the cost associated to it and the benefits coming from having a better
picture of the demand. This is the classical exploration versus exploitation trade-off: on the
one hand, the longer a retailer spends learning consumer preferences, the less time remains
to exploit that knowledge and optimize profits. On the other hand, less time spent on
studying consumer behavior translates into more residual uncertainty, which could hamper
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the revenue maximization objective. Moreover, demand information must be gathered
carefully as product profitability depends on the assortments offered: the retailer/publisher
may learn consumer preferences more effectively by experimenting with a particular set of
assortments.
A comprehensive dynamic assortment policy will balance the aforementioned exploration
versus exploitation trade-off while facing important additional operational considerations:
fast fashion retailers must also consider pricing decisions, inventory replenishment, display
constraints, etc; online publishers must also consider availability of users’ profile informa-
tion, ads’ minimum display requirements, etc.
This chapter aims to isolate the role of assortment planning in balancing information
collection and revenue maximization. We consider a family of stylized dynamic assortment
problems in settings where display capacity is limited. Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2009)
elaborates on the importance of considering displays constraints in assortment planning.
Our formulation of the dynamic assortment problem will ignore inventory considerations,
additional costs (such as assortment switching costs), operational constraints (e.g. restric-
tions on the sequence of assortments offered) and changing demand patterns. It is worth
noting that although most of the operational constraints mentioned above are absent al-
most altogether from the online advertisement problem, they play an important role in
shaping the overall operational strategy of fast fashion retailers. The work of Caro and
Gallien (2007) presents a first attempt to operationalize assortment policies coming from
the analysis of an unconstrained model, like ours.
We assume that product prices are fixed throughout the selling season. Such an as-
sumption is common in the assortment planning literature and facilitates the analysis of
our formulation. While pricing has been studied in the context of choice-based demand with
limited prior information (see, e.g., Rusmevichientong and Broder (2010)), incorporating a
pricing dimension into our formulation would prevent us from gaining insight regarding the
role of assortment experimentation in demand inference.
Our main focus is on the impact of learning consumer behavior via suitable assortment
experimentation, and doing this in a manner that guarantees revenue maximization over
the selling horizon. For that purpose we consider a population of utility maximizing cus-
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tomers: each customer assigns a (random) utility to each offered product, and purchases the
product that maximizes his/her utility. The retailer needs to devise an assortment policy
to maximize revenues over the relevant time horizon by properly adapting the assortment
offered based on observed customer purchase decisions and subject to capacity constraints
that limit the size of the assortment.
Key insights and qualitative results. We consider assortment policies that can only
use observed purchase decisions to adjust assortment choices at each point in time (this will
be defined more formally later as a class of non-anticipating policies). Performance of such
policies will be measured in terms of the expected revenue loss relative to an oracle that
knows the product utility distributions in advance, i.e., the loss due to the absence of a
priori knowledge of consumer behavior. Our objective is to characterize the minimum loss
attainable by any non-anticipating assortment policy.
The main findings of this chapter are summarized below.
i.) We establish fundamental bounds on the performance of any policy. Specifically, we
identify the magnitude of the loss, relative to the oracle performance, that any policy
must incur in terms of its dependence on: the length of the selling horizon; the number
of products; and the capacity constraint (see Theorem 1 for a precise statement).
ii.) We propose a family of adaptive policies that achieve the fundamental bound men-
tioned above. These policies quickly identify the optimal assortment of products (the
one that maximizes the expected single sale profit) with high probability while suc-
cessfully limiting the extent of exploration. Our performance analysis, in Section
2.5.2, makes these terms rigorous; see Theorem 3.
iii.) We prove that not all products available to the retailer need to be extensively tested:
under mild assumptions, some of them can be easily and quickly identified as subop-
timal. In particular, a specific subset of said products can be detected after a small
number of experiments (independent of the length of the selling horizon); see The-
orems 1 and 3. Moreover, we show that our proposed policy successfully limits the
extent of such an exploration (see Corollary 1 for a precise statement).
iv.) We highlight salient features of the dynamic assortment problem that distinguish it
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from similar problems of sequential decision making under model uncertainty, and
we show how exploiting these features helps to dramatically decrease the complexity
of the assortment problem, relative to using existing non-customized strategies, e.g.,
from the multi-armed bandit literature.
On a more practical side, our results establish that an oracle with advance knowledge
of customer behavior only gains additional revenue on the order of the logarithm of the
total number of customers visiting the retailer during the selling season. Moreover, we
establish that this is a fundamental price that any feasible assortment policy must pay.
Regarding the exploration versus exploitation trade-off, we establish the precise frequency
and extent of assortment experimentation that guarantee this best achievable performance.
While in general it is necessary to experiment with inferior products at a precise and critical
frequency that is increasing with the time horizon, for a certain subset of these products
experimentation can be kept to a minimum (a bounded number of trials independent of the
time horizon). This result differs markedly from most of the literature on similar sequential
decision making problems.
The remainder of the chapter. The next section reviews related work. Section 2.3
formulates the dynamic assortment problem. Section 2.4 provides a fundamental limit on
the performance of any assortment policy, and analyzes its implications for policy design.
Section 2.5 proposes a dynamic assortment algorithm that achieves this performance bound,
and Subsection 2.5.3 customizes our proposed algorithm for the most widely used customer
choice model, namely the Logit. Finally, Section 2.6 presents our concluding remarks.
Proofs are relegated to two appendices, A.1 and A.2.
2.2 Literature Review
Static assortment planning. The static planning literature focuses on finding an optimal
assortment that is held unchanged throughout the entire selling season. Customer behavior
is assumed to be known a priori, but inventory decisions are considered; see Kok et al.
(2008) for a review of the state-of-the-art in static assortment optimization. Within this
area, van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) formulate the assortment planning problem using a
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Multinomial Logit model (hereafter, MNL) of consumer choice. Assuming that customers
do not look for a substitute if their choice is stocked out (known as static substitution), they
prove that the optimal assortment is always in the “popular assortment set” and establish
structural properties of the optimal assortment and ordering quantities. In the same setting,
Gaur and Honhon (2006) use the locational choice model and characterize properties of the
optimal solution under static substitution. In a recent paper Goyal et al. (2009) prove that
the assortment problem is NP-hard, in the static setting when stock-out based substitution
is allowed, and propose a near-optimal heuristic solution for a particular choice model; see
also [Mahajan and van Ryzin, 2001], [Honhon et al., 2009] and [Hopp and Xu, 2008].
Our formulation assumes perfect replenishment (and hence eliminates stock-out based
substitution considerations) while considering limited display capacity. Fisher and Vaidyanathan
(2009) studies assortment planning under display constraints and highlights how these arise
in practice. It is important to note that even in this setting the static one-period profit
maximization problem remains NP-hard in general; see Goyal et al. (2009). The work
of Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) identifies a polynomial-time algorithm for the static
optimization problem when consumer preferences are represented using particular choice
models; hence at least in certain instances the problem can be solved efficiently.
Dynamic assortment planning. This problem setting allows revisiting assortment de-
cisions at each point in time as more information is collected about initially unknown
demand/consumer preferences. To the best of our knowledge Caro and Gallien (2007) were
the first to study this type of problem, motivated by an application in fast fashion. In their
formulation, customer demand for a product is exogenous, and independent of demand and
availability for other products. The rate of demand is constant throughout the selling sea-
son, and their formulation ignores inventory considerations. Taking a Bayesian approach
to demand learning, they study the problem using dynamic programming. They derive
bounds on the value function and propose an index-based policy that is shown to be near
optimal when there is certain prior information on demand. Closer to our formulation is
the work by Rusmevichientong et al. (2010). There, utility maximizing customers make
purchase decisions according to the MNL choice model (a special case of the more general
setting treated in the present document), and an adaptive algorithm for joint parameter
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estimation and assortment optimization is developed, see further discussion below.
Related work in dynamic optimization with limited demand information. Uncer-
tainty at demand-model level has been previously studied in revenue management settings.
Araman and Caldentey (2009) and Farias and van Roy (2010), for example, present dy-
namic programming formulations with Bayesian updating of initially unknown parameters.
Closer to our approach to model uncertainty, the work by Besbes and Zeevi (2009) considers
a single product firm that, given an initial inventory, needs to dynamically adjust prices
so as to maximize the cumulative expected revenue over a finite horizon, when demand
function is initially unknown and no prior information is available. In a similar setting,
Rusmevichientong and Broder (2010) analyze the case when demand is driven by a general
parametric choice model.
All studies above focus on the pricing decision problem. It is worth mentioning that
arguments used to establish fundamental limits in performance for the pricing problem do
not apply to our setting, due to the discrete and combinatorial nature of the assortment
decision. Also, the typical solution approach in these studies, which involves evaluating a
finite set of alternatives in order to reconstruct demand function, would be highly ineffi-
cient if applied to the dynamic assortment problem: see the discussion following Theorem
1. Similar formulations of revenue management problems can be found, for example, in
Rusmevichientong et al. (2006) and Lim and Shanthikumar (2007).
Connection to the multi-armed bandit literature. In the canonical multi-armed
bandit problem the decision maker can select in each period to pull a single arm out of a
set of K possible arms, where each arm delivers a random reward whose distribution is not
known a priori, and the objective is to maximize the revenue over a finite horizon. See Lai
and Robbins (1985) and Auer et al. (2002) for a classical formulation and solution approach
to the problem, respectively.
The model of Caro and Gallien (2007) is in fact equivalent to a multi-armed bandit
problem with multiple simultaneous plays. The dynamic programming formulation and
the Bayesian learning approach aims to solve the exploration versus exploitation trade-off
optimally. See also Farias and Madan (2009) for a similar bandit-formulation with multiple
simultaneous plays under more restricted type of policies. In the work of Rusmevichientong
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et al. (2010) the connection is less straightforward. Their proposed algorithm works in
cycles. Each cycle mixes parameter estimation (exploration) and assortment optimization
(exploitation). In the exploration phase order N2 assortments are tested, where N is the
number of products. Parameter estimates based on the exploration phase are fed into the
static optimization problem, which returns order N assortments among which the optimal
one is found with high probability. From there, a standard multi-armed bandit algorithm
is prescribed to find the optimal assortment, and an upper bound on the regret of order
N2 log2 T is established, where T is the length of the planning horizon.
There is a thematic connection between multi-armed bandits and assortment planning
problems, in the sense that both look to balance exploration and exploitation. However,
the fact that product utility does not map directly to retailer revenues in the dynamic as-
sortment problem is essentially what distinguishes these problems. In the bandit setting all
products are ex-ante identical, and only individual product exploration allows the decision
maker to differentiate them. Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that a poorly
explored arm is in fact optimal. This last fact prevents limiting exploration on arms that
have been observed to be empirically inferior. (In their seminal work, Lai and Robbins
(1985) showed that good policies should explore each arm at least order log T times.) In
the assortment planning setting, products are not ex-ante identical, and product revenue is
capped by its profit margin. In Section 2.4 we show how this observation can be exploited
to limit exploration on certain suboptimal products (a precise definition will be advanced
in what follows). Moreover, the possibility to test several products simultaneously has the
potential to further reduce the complexity of the assortment planning problem. Our work
builds on some of the ideas present in the multi-armed bandit literature, most notably the
lower bound technique developed by Lai and Robbins (1985), but also exploits salient fea-
tures of the assortment problem in constructing optimal algorithms and highlighting key
differences from traditional bandit results.
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2.3 Problem Formulation
Model primitives and basic assumptions. We consider a price-taking retailer that has
N different products to sell. For each product i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N}, let ri and ci denote
the price and the marginal cost of product i, respectively. As mentioned in Section 2.1 we
assume both prices and marginal cost are fixed and constant throughout the selling horizon.
For i ∈ N , let wi := ri− ci > 0 denote the marginal profit resulting from selling one unit of
the product, and let w := (w1, . . . , wN ) denote the vector of profit margins. Due to display
space constraints, the retailer can offer at most C products simultaneously.
Let T to denote the total number of customers that arrive during the selling season
after which sales are discontinued. (The value of T is in general not known to the retailer a
priori.) We use t to index customers according to their arrival times, so t = 1 corresponds to
the first arrival, and t = T the last. We assume the retailer has both a perfect replenishment
policy, and the flexibility to offer a different assortment to every customer without incurring
any switching cost. (While these assumptions do not typically hold in practice, they provide
sufficient tractability and allow us to extract structural insights.)
With regard to demand, we will adopt a random utility approach to model customer
preferences over products: customer t assigns a utility U ti to product i, for i ∈ N ∪ {0},
with
U ti := µi + ζ
t
i ,
were µi ∈ R denotes the mean utility assigned to product i, ζ1i , . . . , ζTi are independent
random variables drawn from a distribution F common to all customers, and product 0
represents a no-purchase alternative.
A more general model would consider µi := β
′xi − α ri, where xi denotes the profile
vector of attributes associated to product i, β denotes the vector of part-worths measuring
the relative importance consumers assign to each product attribute, and α measures price
elasticity. In such a setup the retailer might evaluate offering any feasible product design,
and not only the ones initially considered in N . While such a model of consumer preferences
could be analyzed using the techniques presented in this chapter, it would not add to
understanding the complexity of the assortment problem, hence is not pursued in this
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work.
Let µ := (µ1, . . . , µN ) denote the vector of mean utilities. We assume all customers
assign µ0 to a no-purchase alternative; when offered an assortment, customers select the
product with the highest utility if that utility is greater than the one provided by the no-
purchase alternative. For convenience, and without loss of generality, we set µ0 := 0.
The static assortment optimization problem. Let S denote the set of possible assort-
ments, i.e., S := {S ⊆ N : |S| ≤ C}, where |S| denotes the cardinality of the set S ⊂ N .
For a given assortment S ∈ S and a given vector of mean utilities µ, the probability pi(S, µ)






F (x− µj) dF (x− µi), (2.1)
and pi(S, µ) = 0 for i /∈ S. The expected profit r(S, µ) associated with an assortment S





If the retailer knows the value of the vector µ, then it is optimal to offer S∗(µ), the solution




In what follows we will assume that the solution to the static problem is unique (this as-
sumption simplifies our exposition of fundamental performance bounds, and can be relaxed
by redefining S∗(µ) accordingly). Efficiently solving problem (2.2) is beyond the scope of
our work here: we will assume that the retailer can compute S∗(µ) for any vector µ.
Remark 1 (Complexity of the static problem). We note that for specific utility dis-
tributions there exist efficient algorithms for solving the static problem. For example,
Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) present an order N2 algorithm to solve the static problem
when an MNL choice model is assumed, i.e., when F is assumed to be a standard Gumbel
distribution (location parameter 0 and scale parameter 1) for all i ∈ N . This is an impor-
tant contribution given that the MNL is by far the most commonly used choice model. The
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algorithm, based on a more general solution concept developed by Megiddo (1979), can in
fact be used to solve the static problem efficiently for any attraction-based choice model1.
The dynamic optimization problem. We assume that the retailer knows F , the distri-
bution that generate the idiosyncracies of customer utilities, but does not know the mean
vector µ.
The retailer is able to observe purchase/no-purchase decisions made by each customer.
S/he needs to decide what assortment to offer to each customer, taking into account all
information gathered up to that point in time, in order to maximize expected cumulative
profits. More formally, let (St ∈ S : 1 ≤ t ≤ T ) denote an assortment process, with St ∈ S
for all t ≤ T . Let
Zti := 1
{
i ∈ St , U ti > U tj , j ∈ St \ {i} ∪ {0}
}
denote the purchase decision of customer t regarding product i ∈ St, where Zti = 1 indi-
cates that customer t decided to purchase product i, and Zti = 0 otherwise. Also, let Z
t
0 :=
1 {U0 > Uj , j ∈ St} denote the overall purchase decision of customer t, where Zt0 = 1 if cus-
tomer t opted not to purchase any product, and Zt0 = 0 otherwise. Here, and in what follows,
1 {A} denotes the indicator function of a set A. We denote by Zt := (Zt0, Zt1, . . . , ZtN ) the
vector of purchase decisions of customer t. Let Ft = σ((Su, Zu), 1 ≤ u ≤ t) t = 1, . . . , T ,
denote the filtration or history associated with the assortment process and purchase de-
cisions up to (including) time t, with F0 = ∅. An admissible assortment policy pi is a
mapping from past history to assortment decisions such that the associated assortment
process (St ∈ S : 1 ≤ t ≤ T ) is non-anticipating (i.e., St is Ft−1-measurable, for all t). We
will restrict attention to the set of such policies and denote it by P. We will use Epi and Ppi
to denote expectations and probabilities of random variables, when the assortment policy
pi ∈ P is used.
The retailer’s objective is to choose a policy pi ∈ P to maximize the expected cumulative
revenues over the selling season











1These are choice models for which pi(S) = vi/(
∑
j∈S vj) for a vector v ∈ RN+ , and any S ⊆ N . (see, for
example, Anderson et al. (1992))
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If the mean utility vector µ is known at the start of the selling season, the retailer would
find the assortment that maximizes the one-sale expected value, namely S∗(µ), and would
offer it to every customer. The corresponding performance, denoted by J∗(T, µ), is given
by
J∗(T, µ) := Tr(S∗(µ), µ). (2.3)
This quantity provides an upper bound on expected revenues generated by any admissible
policy, i.e., J∗(T, µ) ≥ Jpi(T, µ) for all pi ∈ P. With this in mind we define the regret
Rpi(T, µ) associated with a policy pi, to be




The regret measures to the number of customers to whom non-optimal assortments are
offered by pi over {1, . . . , T}. One may also view this as a normalized measure of revenue
loss due to the lack of a priori knowledge of consumer behavior.
Maximizing expected cumulative revenues is equivalent to minimizing the regret over
the selling season, and to this end, the retailer must balance suboptimal demand exploration
(which adds directly to the regret) with exploitation of the gathered information. On the
one hand the retailer has incentives to explore demand extensively in order to guess the
optimal assortment S∗(µ) with high probability. On the other hand the longer the retailer
explores the less consumers will be offered a supposedly optimal assortment, and therefore
the retailer has incentives to shorten the length of the exploration phase in favor to the
exploitation phase.
Remark 2 (Relationship to bandit problems). One can try to interpret the assortment
problem as a bandit problem in, at least, two ways: envisioning each assortment as an
arm (making rewards dependent across arms); and envisioning each product as an arm
(resulting in a bandit problem with multiple simultaneous plays where rewards are not
directly observable, as only consumer purchase is observed). In that sense, this work shows
the inefficiency of the former approach and shows how to overcome efficiently the obstacles
present in the later approach. It worth noting that regardless the definition of an arm, these
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are a priori distinguishable (due to differences in profit margins), a feature absent in the
classical bandit formulation.)
2.4 Fundamental Limits on Achievable Performance
2.4.1 A lower bound on the performance of any admissible policy
Let us begin by narrowing down the set of “interesting” policies worthy of consideration.




as T → ∞, for every a > 0. In other words, the per-consumer normalized revenue of con-
sistent policies converges to 1 for all possible mean utility vectors. Equation (2.4) restricts
the rate of such convergence in T . Let P ′ ⊆ P denote the set of non-anticipating, consistent
assortment policies.
Suppose the retailer is given a-priori knowledge of the mean utility values only for the
products in the optimal assortment (without revealing the optimality condition of such
assortment). We call a product potentially optimal if it cannot be discarded as suboptimal
solely on the base of such a priori information. That is,
N := {i ∈ N : i ∈ S∗(ν) , ν := (µ1, . . . , µi−1, v, µi+1, . . . , µN ) for some v ∈ R} .
(Note that the definition above does not considers changes in w, the vector of profit margins.)
Similarly, we let N := N \N denote the set strictly suboptimal products.
We will assume the common distribution function F is absolutely continuous with re-
spect to Lebesgue measure on R, and that its density function is positive everywhere. This
assumption is quite standard and satisfied by many commonly used distributions. The
result below establishes a fundamental limit on what can be achieved by any consistent
assortment policy.
Theorem 1. For any pi ∈ P ′, and any µ ∈ RN ,




for a finite positive constant K and all T .
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A explicit expression for the constant K is given in the proof. When all non-optimal
products are strictly-suboptimal, the result suggests that a finite regret may be attainable.
This last observation highlights the importance of strictly-suboptimal product detection,
and hence the inefficiency of a naive multi-armed bandit approach to assortment planning:
treating each possible assortment as a different arm in the bandit setting will result in





, instead of the much smaller
constant (
∣∣N \ S∗(µ)∣∣ /C).
Remark 3 (Implications for design of “good” policies). The proof of Theorem 1,
which is outlined below, suggests certain desirable properties for “optimal” policies: (i.)
non-optimal products that can be made to be part of the optimal assortment are to be
tested on order log T customers; (ii) this type of non-optimal product experimentation is
to be conducted in batches of size C; and (iii.) strictly-suboptimal products (the ones that
cannot be made to be part of the optimal assortment) need only be tested on a finite number
of customers (in expectation), independent of T .
2.4.2 Proof outline and intuition behind Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1 exploits the connection between the regret and testing of suboptimal
assortments. In particular, we will bound the regret by computing lower bounds on the
expected number of tests involving potentially optimal suboptimal products (those in N \
S∗(µ)): each time such a product is offered, the corresponding assortment must be sub-
optimal, contributing directly to the policy’s regret.
To bound the number of tests involving non-optimal products we will use a change-of-
measure argument introduced by Lai and Robbins (1985) for proving an analogous result
for a multi-armed bandit problem, hence our proof establishes a direct connection between
the two areas. To adapt this idea we consider the fact that underlying realizations of the
random variables (product utilities) are non-observable in the assortment setting, which
differs from the multi-armed bandit setting where reward realizations are observed directly.
The argument can be roughly described as follows. Any non-optimal product i ∈ N is in
the optimal assortment for at least one suitably chosen mean utility vector µˆ. When such a
configuration is considered, any consistent policy pi must offer this non-optimal product to
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all but a sub-polynomial (in T ) number of customers. If this configuration does not differ
in a significant manner from the original (made precise in Appendix A.1), then one would
expect such a product to be offered to a “large” number of customers when the original
mean utility vector µ is considered. In particular, we prove that for any policy pi
Ppi {Ti(T ) ≤ log T/Ki} → 0 (2.5)
as T → ∞, where Ti(t) is the number of customers product i has been offered to up until
customer t − 1, and Ki is a finite positive constant. Note that this asymptotic minimum-
testing requirement is inversely proportional to Ki, which turns out to be a measure of
“closeness” of a product to “optimality” (how close the vector µ is to a configuration that
makes product i be part of the optimal assortment). This also has immediate consequences
on the expected number of times a non-optimal product is tested: using Markov’s inequality








The result in Theorem 1 follows directly from the equation above and the connection be-
tween the regret and testing of suboptimal assortments mentioned at the beginning of this
section.
2.5 Dynamic Assortment Planning Policies
This section introduces an assortment policy whose structure is guided by the key ideas
gleaned from Theorem 1. Our policy is based on the idea that product experimentation on
a given assortment should provide information on the performance of the same product on
a different assortment. That is, one should be able to extract product-specific information
from consumer decisions on any assortment including such a product. More formally, our
policy is based on the assumption that one can recover the model parameters for products on
a given assortment by observing purchase probabilities associated to such an assortment.
With this in mind, we introduce the following assumption, which we assume holds true
throughout the rest of this Chapter.
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Assumption 1 (Identifiability). For any assortment S ∈ S, and any vector ρ ∈ RN+
such that
∑
i∈S ρi < 1, the system of equations {pi(S, η) = ρi , i ∈ S} has a unique solution
T (S, ρ) in η ∈ RN such that ηi = 0 for all i /∈ S. In addition p(S, ·) is Lipschitz continuous,
and T (S, ·) is locally Lipschitz continuous in the neighborhood of ρ, for all S ∈ S.
Under this assumption one can compute mean utilities for products in a given assort-
ment based solely on the associated purchase probabilities. This characteristic enables our
approach to parameter estimation: we will estimate purchase probabilities by observing
consumer decisions during an exploration phase and we will use those probabilities to re-
construct a mean utility vector that rationalizes such observed behavior. Note that the
Logit model, for which F is a standard Gumbel, satisfies this assumption.
2.5.1 Intuition and a simple “separation-based” policy
To build some intuition towards the construction of our ultimate dynamic assortment policy
(given in §2.5.2) it is helpful to first consider a policy that separates exploration from
exploitation. The idea is to isolate the effect of imposing the right order of exploration
(suggested by Theorem 2) on the regret. Assuming prior knowledge of T , such a policy
first engages in an exploration phase over dN/Ce assortments encompassing all products,
each offered sequentially to order log T customers. Then, in light of Assumption 1, an
estimator for µ is computed. Based on this estimator a proxy for the optimal assortment
is computed, and offered to the remaining customers. For this purpose consider the set of
test-assortments A := {A1, . . . , AdN/Ce}, where
Aj = {(j − 1)C + 1, . . . ,min {j C,N}} ,
Fix j ≤ |A|. Suppose t − 1 customers have arrived to that point. We will use pˆi,t(Aj) to





i 1 {Su = Aj}∑t−1
u=1 1 {Su = Aj}
,
for i ∈ Aj2, and pˆi,t(Aj) = 0 otherwise. Define pˆt(Aj) := (pˆ1,t(Aj), . . . , pˆN,t(Aj)) to be the
vector of product selection probabilities. For any i ∈ N we will use µˆi,t to estimate µi when






|Aj |+∑t−1u=1 1{Su=Aj} for i ∈ Aj .
Such probability estimates help in overcoming the short term biased associated to MLE estimators.
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customer t arrives, where
µˆi,t := (T (Aj , pˆt(Aj)))i ,
Aj is the unique test assortment in A such that i ∈ Aj , (a)i denotes the i-th component of
vector a. Let µˆt := (µˆ1,t, . . . , µˆN,t) denote the vector of mean utilities estimates.
The underlying idea is the following: when an assortment Aj ∈ A has been offered to
a large number of customers one expects pˆt,i(Aj) to be close to pi(Aj , µ) for all i ∈ Aj . If
this is the case for all assortments in A, by Assumption 1 we also expect µˆt to be close
to µ. With this in mind, we propose a separation-based policy defined through a positive
constant κ1 that serves as a tuning parameter. The policy is summarized for convenience
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 : pi1 = pi(κ1, T, w)
STEP 1. Exploration:
for j =1 to |A| do
Offer Aj to dκ1 log T e customers (if possible). [Exploration]
end for
STEP 2. Exploitation:
for t =dκ1(log T ) |A|e+ 1 to T do








i ∈ Aj ,
0 i /∈ Aj .
[Probability estimates]
Set pˆt := {pˆ1,t(Aj), . . . , pˆN,t(Aj)}.
Set µˆi,t := ηi for i ∈ Aj , where η := T (Aj , pˆt(Aj)). [Mean utility estimates]
end for
Set µˆt := {µˆ1,t, . . . , µˆN,t}.
Offer St := S
∗(µˆt) to customer t. [Exploitation]
end for
Performance analysis. This policy is constructed to guarantee that the probability of
not choosing the optimal assortment after the initial exploration effort, (i.e., the magnitude
of revenue loss during exploitation) balances revenue loss coming from exploration efforts,
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which is order log T . This, in turn, translates into an order (dN/Ce log T ) regret. The next
result formalizes this.
Theorem 2. Let pi1 := pi(κ1, T, w) be defined by Algorithm 1 and let Assumption 1 hold.
There exist finite constants K1 and κ1 (independent of T ), such that the regret associated
with pi1 is accepts the bound
Rpi(T, µ) ≤ κ1dN/Ce log T +K1,
for all T , provided that κ1 > κ1.
Constants K1 and κ1 depend on instance specific quantities (e.g., the minimum opti-
mality gap), but not on the number of products, N , nor on the length of the selling horizon,
T . The proof of Theorem 2 elucidates that K1 is the expected cumulative loss during the
exploitation phase for an infinite horizon setting, while κ1 represents the minimum length
of the exploration phase that makes K1 finite. This tradeoff is balanced by the construction
of the policy pi1. The bound presented in Theorem 2 is essentially the one in Theorem 1,
with N replacing
∣∣N \ S∗(µ)∣∣. This indicates that: (i.) imposing the right order (in T ) of
exploration is enough to get the right dependence (in T ) of the regret; and (ii.) to reach
the fundamental limit one needs to limit exploration on strictly-suboptimal products.
Remark 4 (Selection of the tuning parameter κ1). We have established that the lower
bound in Theorem 1 can be achieved in terms of its dependence on T , for proper choice
of κ1. However, Theorem 2 requires κ1 to be greater than κ1, whose value is not known a
priori. In particular, setting κ1 below the specified threshold may compromise the validity
of the result. To avoid the risk of miss-specifying κ1, one can increase the order of the
minimum amount of exploration to, say, κ1 log
1+α t, for any α > 0. With this, the upper
bound above would read
Rpi(T, µ) ≤ κ1dN/Ce log1+α T +K1,
and the policy becomes optimal up to a logα T -term.
Example 1.a: performance of the Separation-based policy pi1 for MNL choice
model. Consider N = 10 and C = 4, with
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w = (0.98, 0.88, 0.82, 0.77, 0.71, 0.60, 0.57, 0.16, 0.04, 0.02),





have a standard Gumbel distribution, for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 1,
i.e., we consider the MNL choice model. One can verify that S∗(µ) = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
r(S∗(µ), µ) = 0.76. Also, N = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. One can use the test assortments A1 =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, A2 = {5, 6, 7, 8} and A3 = {9, 10} to conduct the exploration phase in the
algorithm described above.
Example 1.b: performance of the Separation-based policy pi1 for multinomial
Probit choice model. Consider N = 6 and C = 2, with
w = (2.0, 1.8, 1.5, 1.4, 1.2, 1.0),





have a standard normal distribution, for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 1, i.e.,
we consider the multinomial Probit choice model. One can verify that S∗(µ) = {1, 2} and
r(S∗(µ), µ) = 1.39. Also, N = {5, 6}. One can use the test assortments A1 = {1, 2},
A2 = {3, 4} and A3 = {5, 6} to conduct the exploration phase in the algorithm described
above.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.1 depict the average performance of policy pi1 for instances
in examples 1.a and 1.b. Simulation results were conducted over 500 replications, using
κ1 = 20, and considering selling horizons ranging from T = 500 to T = 10000. There, graphs
(a) and (b) illustrates the dependence of the regret on T for instances in examples 1.a and
1.b, respectively. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the simulation
results. Two important points are worth noting: the regret is indeed of order log T , as
predicted by Theorem 2; policy pi1 makes suboptimal decisions on a very small fraction
of customers, e.g. in panel (a) it ranges from around 10% when the horizon is 2000 sales
attempts, and diminishes to around 2.5% for a horizon of 10,000. (Recall that the regret is
measuring the number of suboptimal sales.)
From the setting of these examples we observe that A2 and A3 for example 1.a, and A3
for example 1.b, are tested on order log T customers, despite being composed exclusively of
strictly-suboptimal products. That is, the separation algorithm does not attempt to limit
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testing efforts over suboptimal products. Moreover, it assumes a priori knowledge of the
total number of customers, T . The next section proposes a policy that addresses these two
issues.
Figure 2.1: Performance of the separation-based policy pi1.
2.5.2 A refined dynamic assortment policy
To account for strictly-suboptimal product detection it is necessary to be able to “identify”
them a priori, even under partial knowledge of the mean utility vector. For that purpose
we introduce the following assumption
Assumption 2 (Optimal assortment composition). For any vectors µ ∈ RN one has
that
r(S∗(µ), µ) ≤ wi, for all i ∈ S∗(µ).
Assumption 2 states that no product in the optimal assortment has profit margin lower than
the optimal single sale profit. The intuition behind it is that, within an assortment S, if a
product provides a margin lower than the assortment single sale profit, then one is better of
by removing a such product from the assortment. When Assumption 2 holds, the optimal
single sale profit acts as a threshold that separates strictly-suboptimal products from the
rest: any product with margin less than the optimal single sale profit is strictly-suboptimal
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and vice versa. That is,
N = {i ∈ N : wi < r(S∗(µ), µ)} .
Designing test assortments based on product margins translates this into a threshold
over assortments. Consider the set of valid assortments A := {A1, . . . , AdN/Ce}, where
Aj =
{
i((j−1)C+1), . . . , i(min{j C,N})
}
,
and i(k) corresponds to the product with the k-th highest margin in w. Suppose one has
a proxy for r(S∗(µ), µ). One can then use this value to identify assortments containing at
least one potentially optimal product and to force the right order of exploration on such
assortments. If successful, such a scheme will limit exploration on assortment containing
only strictly-suboptimal products.
Remark 5 (Validity of Assumption 2). While Assumption 2 does hold for Luce-type
choice models (the MNL being a special case), it does not hold for general choice models and
its validity have to be study on each case. For example, one can show that if wi ≥ 2wi+1 for
all i ∈ N , Assumption 2 holds true for any noise distribution with increasing (decreasing)
failure rate, provided that µ ∈ RN− (µ ∈ RN+ ).
We propose an assortment policy that, for each customer executes the following logic:
using the current estimate of µ at time t, the static problem is solved and St, the estimate-
based optimal assortment, and rt, the estimate of the optimal value, are obtained. If
all assortments in A containing products with margins greater than or equal to rt have
been tested on a minimum number of customers, then assortment St is offered to the t-th
customer. Otherwise, we select, arbitrarily, an under-tested assortment in A containing
at least one product with margin greater than or equal to rt, and offer it to the current
customer. The term under-tested means tested on less than order log t customers prior to
the arrival of customer t. Note that this logic will enforce the correct order of exploration
for any value of T .
This policy, denoted pi2 and summarized for convenience in Algorithm 2, monitors the
quality of the estimates for potentially optimal products by imposing minimum exploration
on assortments containing such products. The specific structure of A ensures that test
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Algorithm 2 : pi2 = pi(κ2, w)
STEP 1. Initialization:
for t =1 to |A| do
Offer At ∈ A to customer t and set nt = 1. [Initial test]
end for
STEP 2. Joint exploration and assortment optimization:
for t =|A|+ 1 to T do







for i ∈ Aj . [Probability estimates]
Set µˆi,t := ηi for i ∈ Aj , where η = T (Aj , pˆt(Aj)). [Mean utility estimates]
end for
Set St = S
∗(µˆt) and rt = r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt). [Static optimization]
Set N t = {i ∈ N : wi ≥ rt}. [Candidate optimal products]
if (nj ≥ κ2 log t) for all j=1 to |A| such that Aj ∩N t 6= ∅ then
Offer St to customer t. [Exploitation]
else
Select j such that Aj ∩ N̂ t 6= ∅ and nj < κ2 log t.
Offer Aj to customer t. [Exploration]
nj ← nj + 1
end if
end for
assortments do not “mix” high-margin products with low-margin products, thus successfully
limiting exploration on strictly-suboptimal products. The policy uses a tuning parameter
κ2 to balance non-optimal assortment testing (which contributes directly to the regret), and
the probability of choosing the optimal assortment in the exploitation phase.
Performance analysis. The next result characterizes the performance of the proposed
assortment policy.
Theorem 3. Let pi2 = pi(κ2, w) be defined by Algorithm 2 and let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
There exist finite constants K2 and κ2 (independent of T ), such that the regret associated
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with pi2 is accepts the bound
Rpi(T, µ) ≤ κ2d
∣∣N ∣∣ /Ce log T +K2,
for all T , provided that κ2 > κ2.
Theorem 3 implicitly states that assortments containing only strictly-suboptimal prod-
ucts will be tested on a finite number of customers (in expectation); see Corollary 1 below.
Note that this policy attains the correct dependence on both T and N , as prescribed in The-
orem 1 (up to the size of the optimal assortment), so it is essentially optimal. Unlike Theo-
rem 2 we see that the proposed policy successfully limits exploration on strictly-suboptimal
products. The following corollary formalizes this statement. Recall Ti(t) denotes the num-
ber of customers product i has been offered to up to arrival of customer t.
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any assortment Aj ∈ A such that
Aj ⊆ N , and for any selling horizon T
Epi[Ti(T )] ≤ K2,
for all i ∈ Aj, where K2 is a finite positive constant independent of T .
Regarding selection of parameter κ2, note that the argument in Remark 4 remains valid.
Example 1.a continued: performance of the policy pi2 for MNL choice mode. Con-
sider the setting of Example 1.a in Section 2.5.1, for which N = A2 ∪ A3 and S∗(µ) = A1.
Given that the set of test assortments separates products in N from the rest, one would
expect Algorithm 2 to effectively limit exploration on all strictly-suboptimal products.
Example 1.b continued: performance of the policy pi2 for multinomial Probit
choice mode. Consider the setting of Example 1.b in Section 2.5.1, for which N = A3
and S∗(µ) = A1. Given that the set of test assortments separates products in N from the
rest, one would expect Algorithm 2 to effectively limit exploration on all strictly-suboptimal
products.
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Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.2 depict the average performance of policies pi1 and
pi2 for instances in examples 1.a and 1.b, respectively. Simulation results were conducted
over 500 replications, using κ1 = κ2 = 20, and considering selling horizons ranging from
T = 500 to T = 10000. There, graphs (a) and (b) compares the separation-based policy pi1,
given by Algorithm 1, and the proposed policy pi2, in terms of regret dependence on T for
instances in examples 1.a and 1.b, respectively. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence
intervals for the simulation result. The main point to note is that policy pi2 outperforms
substantially the separation-based policy pi1. In particular, for the instance in Example
1.a, the operation of pi1 results in lost sales in the range of 2.5-10% (200-260 customers are
offered non-optimal choices), depending on the length of selling horizon, while for pi2 we
observe sub-optimal decisions being made only about 10-20 times (!) independent of the
horizon. This constitutes more than a 10-fold improvement over the performance of pi1.
In essence, pi2 adaptively identifies both A2 and A3 as strictly-suboptimal assortment with
Figure 2.2: Performance of the refined policy pi2
increasing probability as t grows large. As a result, pi2 exploration efforts are eventually
directed exclusively to the optimal assortment. Since incorrect choices in the exploitation
phase are also controlled by pi2, we expect the regret to be finite. This is supported by the
numerical results displayed in Figure 2.2.
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Remark 6 (Relationship to bandit problems continued). The result in Corollary 1
stands in contrast to typical multi-armed bandit results, where all suboptimal arms/actions
need to be tried at least order log t times (in expectation). In the assortment problem, prod-
uct rewards are random variables bounded above by their corresponding margins, therefore,
under Assumption 2, the contribution of a product to the overall profit is bounded, inde-
pendent of its mean utility. More importantly, this feature makes some products a priori
better than others. Such characteristic is not present in the typical bandit problem.
Remark 7 (Performance of pi2 in absence of Assumption 2). In absence of Assump-
tion 2 it seems impossible to identify strictly-suboptimal products a priori. Instead, one can
modify Algorithm 2 to simply ignore strictly-suboptimal product detection. It can be then
seen from the proof of Theorem 3 that the upper bound remains valid, with N replacing∣∣N ∣∣.
2.5.3 A policy customized to the multinomial Logit choice model
For general utility distributions, choice probabilities depend on the offered assortment in
a non-trivial way, and hence it is unclear how to combine information originating from
different assortments and allow for more efficient use of data gathered on the exploitation
phase. We illustrate how to modify parameter estimation to include exploitation-based
product information in the case of an MNL choice model (we note that all results in this
section extend directly to Luce-type choice models). As indicated earlier, for this model
an efficient algorithm for solving the static optimization problem has been developed by
Rusmevichientong et al. (2010).
MNL choice model properties. Taking F to have a standard Gumbel distribution, then






i ∈ S , for any S ∈ S, (2.6)
where νi := exp(µi), i ∈ N , and v := (v1, . . . , vN ). In what follows, we will use both ν and
µ interchangeably. Given an assortment S ∈ S and a vector ρ ∈ RN+ such that
∑
i∈S ρi ≤ 1,
we have that T (S, ρ), the unique solution to {ρi = pi(S, ν) for i ∈ S , νi = 0 for i ∈ N \ S}
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is given by
Ti(S, ρ) = ρi
1−∑Nj=1 ρj i ∈ S. (2.7)
From (2.6) one can see that solving the static optimization problem is equivalent to finding
the largest value of λ such that ∑
i∈S
vi(wi − λ) ≥ λ, (2.8)
for some S ∈ S. One can check that (2.7) and (2.8) implies that Assumptions 1 and 2 holds,
respectively.
A product-exploration-based assortment policy. We propose a customized version
of the policy given by Algorithm 2, which we refer to as pi3, defined through a positive
constant κ3 that serves as a tuning parameter. The policy, which is summarized below
in algorithmic form, maintains the general structure of Algorithm 2, however parameter
estimation, product testing and suboptimal product detection are conducted at the product-
level. In what follows, the following estimators are used. Suppose t−1 customers have shown





i 1 {i ∈ Su}∑t−1
u=1 Z
u
0 1 {i ∈ Su}
i ∈ N .
The estimate above exploits the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property of the
Logit model, which says that the ratio between purchase probabilities of any two products






, for all products i, j ∈ N ∪ {0} , for all S ∈ S.
As a result, all information collected (both from exploration and exploitation phases) is
used to construct the parameter estimates.
Performance analysis. The tuning parameter κ3 plays the same role as κ2 plays in
Algorithm 2. The next result characterizes the performance of the proposed assortment
policy.
Theorem 4. Let pi3 = pi(κ3, w) be defined by Algorithm 3. There exist finite constants K3
and κ3 (independent of T ), such that the regret associated with pi3 is accepts the bound
Rpi(T, ν) ≤ κ3
∣∣N \ S∗(ν)∣∣ log T +K3,
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Algorithm 3 : pi3 = pi(κ3, w)
STEP 1. Initialization:
Set nj = 0 for all j ∈ N .
Offer S1 = argmax {wj : j ∈ N} to customer t = 1. Set ni = 1.
STEP 2. Joint exploration and assortment optimization:
for t =2 to T do















Set St = S
∗(νˆt) and rt = r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt). [Static optimization]
Set Ot = {i ∈ N : wi ≥ rt , ni < κ3 log t}. [Candidate optimal products]
if Ot = ∅ then
Offer St to customer t. [ Exploitation]
else
Offer St ∈ {S ∈ S : S ⊆ Ot}. [ Exploration]
end if
ni ← ni + 1 for all i ∈ St.
end for
for all T , provided that κ3 > κ3.
Theorem 4 is essentially the equivalent of Theorem 3 for the Logit case, with the excep-
tion of the dependence on the assortment capacity C (as here exploration is conducted on a
product basis), and on the dependence on the set N . The latter matches exactly the order
of the result in Theorem 1: unlike policy pi2, the customized policy pi3 prevents optimal
products from being offered in suboptimal assortments. Since estimation is conducting us-
ing information arising from both exploration and exploitation phases, one would expect a
better empirical performance from the Logit customized policy. Note that the result implic-
itly states that strictly-suboptimal products will be tested on a finite number of customer,
in expectation. The following corollary is the MNL-customized version of Corollary 1.
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Corollary 2. For any strictly-suboptimal product i ∈ N and for any selling horizon T
Epi[Ti(T )] ≤ K3,
for a positive finite constant K3, independent of T .
Regarding selection of parameter κ2, note that the argument in Remark 4 remains valid.
Example 1.a continued: performance of the MNL-customized policy pi3. Consider
the setup of Example 1.a in Section 2.5.1. Note that S∗(ν) = A2, i.e., the optimal assortment
matches one of the test assortments. Moreover, one has that that N = S∗(ν). As a
result, strictly suboptimal detection is conducted in finite time for both policies pi2 and
pi3, and hence any gain in performance for policy pi3 over pi2 is tied in to the ability of the
former to incorporate information gathered during both exploitation and exploration phases.
Figure 2.3 depicts the average performance of policies pi2 and pi3 over 500 replications, using
κ2 = κ3 = 20, and considering selling horizons ranging from T = 1000 to T = 10000. There,
the graph compares the more general policy pi2 to its Logit-customized version pi3, in terms
of regret dependence on T . The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the
simulation result. Customization to a Logit nets significant, roughly 10-fold, improvement
in performance of pi3 relative to pi2. Overall, the Logit-customized policy pi3 only offers
suboptimal assortments to less than a handful of customers, regardless of the horizon of the
problem. This provides picture proof that the regret (number of suboptimal sales) is finite.
In particular, since N = S∗(ν) Theorem 4 predicts a finite regret for any T . This suggests
that difference in performance is mainly due to errors made in the exploitation phase. This
elucidates the reason why the Logit customized policy pi3 outperforms the more general
policy pi2: the probability of error decays much faster in the Logit customized version. If
all previous exploitation efforts were successful, and assuming correct strictly-suboptimal
product detection, the probability of error decays exponentially for the customized policy
(pi3) and polynomially for the more general policy (pi2); see further details in Appendix A.1.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Complexity of the dynamic assortment problem. Theorem 1 provides a lower bound
on the regret of an optimal policy for the dynamic assortment problem. We have shown
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Figure 2.3: Performance of the MNL-customized policy pi3.
that this lower bound can be achieved, up to constant terms, when the noise distribution on
the utility of each customer is known. In particular, we proposed an assortment-exploration
based algorithm whose regret scales optimally in the selling horizon T and exhibits the right
dependence on the number of possible optimal products
∣∣N ∣∣. (In addition our proposed
policies do not require a priori knowledge of the length the selling horizon.)
Comparison of our policy with benchmark results. Our results significantly improve
on and generalize the policy proposed by Rusmevichientong et al. (2010), where an order
(N2(log T )2) upper bound is presented for the case of an MNL choice model. Recall the
regret of our policy exhibits order
∣∣N \ S∗(µ)∣∣ log T performance, and we show that this
cannot be improved upon. We note that the policy of Rusmevichientong et al. (2010)
is a more direct adaptation of multi armed bandit ideas an hence does not detect strict-
suboptimal products and does not limit exploration on them. We illustrate this with a
simple numerical example.
Consider again Example 1.a in Section 2.5.1. Figure 2.4 compares the average perfor-
mance of our proposed policies with that of Rusmevichientong et al. (2010),denoted RSS
for short, over 500 replications, using κ1 = κ2 = κ3 = 20, and considering selling horizons
ranging from T = 1000 to T = 10000. There, the graph in (a) compares the separation-
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based policy pi1 to the benchmark policy RSS, in terms of regret dependence on T . The
graph in (b) compares the separation-based policy pi1, the proposed policy pi2 and its Logit-
customized version pi3 in terms of regret dependence on T . A further analysis behind the
results depicted in Figure 2.4 indicates that the performance of the benchmark behaves
quadratically with log T , while the performance of our proposed policies grow linearly.
Several factors explain the difference in performance. First, we consider a set of roughly
N test assortments while in RSS this set contains roughly N2 items3 As a consequence, order
N2 are tested, resulting in an overall performance proportional to N2. This explains why
even the naive separation-based policy pi1 outperforms RSS. Panel (a) in Figure 2.4 shows
that the RSS policy loses sales on about 20−25% of the customers, while policy pi1 never loses
more than 10%, the loss diminishes as the horizon increases to around 2.5%. Since policies
pi2 and pi3 limit exploration on strictly-suboptimal products, a feature absent in both RSS
and in the naive separation-based policy pi1, they exhibit far superior performance compared
to either one of those benchmarks as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 2.4. Finally, our MNL-
customized policy pi3 uses all information gathered for computing parameter estimates, while
the policy in RSS only uses the information collected during the exploration phase. The
improvement in performance due to this feature is also illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 2.4.
The overall effect is that policy pi3 improves performance by a factor of 200-1000 compared
to RSS, and is able to zero in on the optimal assortment much faster than the benchmark,
with a regret that is bounded independent of the horizon T .
3The dynamic assortment algorithm presented in Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) is based on their clever
solution to the static assortment problem. There, they propose an algorithm (for the static problem) that
identifies rather efficiently (in order N2 operations) a small set of assortments that contains the optimal
one. For that purpose they are required to compute order N2 intersection points for the set of functions
{gi(·) := wi(vi − ·) : i ∈ N}. Their dynamic implementation of the algorithm requires to estimate each
intersection points by testing order N2 assortments (so that each pair of products tested together on at least
one assortment)..
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Motivation. Internet advertising revenues in the United States reached $22.7 billion in
2009. Display-related advertisement –where an advertiser pays an online publisher (web
page) to display a static banner or logo to upcoming visitors– accounted for 35% of such
revenues, up from 33% in 2008 [IAB, 2009]. This emerging area of business is an important
source of revenues for thousands of online publishers.
The most prevalent business model in online advertisement builds on the cost-per-click
(CPC) statistic: advertisers pay the online publisher only when a user clicks on their adver-
tisements (henceforth, ads). The CPC model, which accounted for 59% of industry revenues
in 2009, provides real-time feedback on the performance of online advertisement campaigns
and improves focalization of the marketing efforts (relative to traditional media channels).
Display advertisement contracts are usually the result of a direct negotiation process be-
tween the publisher and the advertiser. As a result, the publisher is entitled to display a
set of ads (related to the marketing campaign) to upcoming visitors, for a certain period of
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time and considering a number of requirements (e.g., budgetary constraints).
Unlike traditional media, where audiences remain largely anonymous, the online setting
allows the publisher to make display decisions on a user-by-user basis. In that regard,
publishers may use all information available at the moment (e.g. profile information) to
customize (in real time) the set of ads to be displayed during a user’s visit. Such profile
information is available to the publisher whether is consciously provided by the user (e.g.,
by filling a subscription or survey) or collected without the user’s explicit consent (e.g., by
the use of internet cookies). This key feature of the online channel presents both potential
benefits and challenges to the publisher. On one hand, customization has the potential to
make the displayed content more relevant to each user, which should result on higher click-
through-rates and hence on higher revenues. On the other hand, real time customization
and profile information collection require the use of more advanced and automated decision
tools.
The publisher’s display decision is further complicated by the high level of uncertainty
associated to operating on a dynamic environment: every time a contract is signed, new
ads become available for display; however, to determine how attractive an ad is to a par-
ticular user, the publisher must display the ad to similar users and observe the associated
click-through-rate (and its dependence on the ad mix being displayed). While this ad
experimentation allows one to recover user preferences, it also involves incurring on an
opportunity cost coming from not displaying ads that are thought to be more profitable.
Hence, a publisher must balance the opportunity cost associated to ad experimentation
with the benefit associated to recovering user preferences. This is the classical exploration
versus exploitation trade-off: on one hand, the longer one explores user preferences the less
time one has to exploit such a knowledge; on the other hand, less time spent on studying
user preferences translates into higher uncertainty on observed click-through-rates, which
might hamper the revenue maximization objective.
Main objectives. This chapter studies a family of stylized problems where a publisher
–facing a stream of heterogeneous utility-maximizing visitors– needs to decide, based on
each user’s profile information, on the bundle of ads to be displayed, so as to maximize
the cumulative revenue derived from the observed click-through-rates. In our setup, user
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click decision depends, among other factors, on each ad’s mean utility, which we assume is
a function of the user’s profile information. In that regard, the key feature of our model is
that we assume user preferences are driven by a set of initially unknown parameters.
Our main objective is to study the impact of learning user preferences on the publisher’s
cumulative revenue; in particular, our focus is on efficient parameter estimation through
adaptive ad-mix experimentation, and its impact on cumulative revenue maximization. To
shed light on this issue, we ignore the effect of ad location on click-through-rates, advertisers’
budgetary constraints and click fraud, among other factors. In addition, we assume user
profile information is collected and classified prior to the user arrival.
Key insights and main contribution. We focus on the set of policies that consider the
visitors’ observable characteristics when selecting the ad bundle to display during his/her
visit. Furthermore, we restrict attention to policies that make such decisions based solely
on additional information collected through the interaction with previous visitors (this will
be defined in Section 3.3 as the class of non-anticipating policies). The publisher would like
to select the policy that maximizes the (expected) cumulative revenue. One can measure
policy performance in terms of the revenue loss experienced relative to the performance of
a clairvoyant publisher with prior knowledge of the model parameters.
The main result in this chapter establishes that a publisher with prior knowledge on
the model parameters gains additional revenue of at most order logarithm of the total
number of visitors during the relevant horizon. In addition, our result establishes that this
additional gain in revenue is proportional to the minimum amount of information needed to
reconstruct the policy used by the clairvoyant publisher. Regarding information collection,
the result sheds light on the benefit of using information coming from displaying an ad
to given set of users segments to explain the ad’s performance on different user types. In
particular, the result suggests an optimal policy should be able to use information collected
through optimal ad-mix display. Finally, our result establishes the precise frequency and
extent of experimentation that guarantees best achievable performance.
On the practical side, we propose a family of adaptive ad-mix policies that achieve the
fundamental bound mentioned above. These policies focus on identifying, for each ad, a set
of user segments to base parameter estimation on; these sets are selected so as to minimize
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the cost of information gathering. Once found, exploration efforts are focalized on such sets
at the frequency suggested by the fundamental performance limit mentioned above. As a
result, these policies quickly identify ad/profile pairs whose performance either do not affect
the optimal display decision, or can be estimated by other means rather than from direct
exploration: in particular, we show that such pairs can be detected after a small number
of visits (independent of the total number of visits during the relevant horizon), hence one
can limit the extent of experimentation on such pairs.
Regarding the exploration versus exploitation trade-off, we quantify the benefit coming
from pooling information across different user profiles. In particular, we provide a sharp
characterization of these benefits in terms of the structure of the full information problem
(this is the problem a clairvoyant publisher will solve to decide on the ad-mix to display to
a given user).
Organization of the chapter. The next section reviews related work. Section 3.3 for-
mulates the publisher’s decision problem. Section 3.4 analyzes informational structure of
the full information benchmark and establishes a fundamental limit on the performance of
any ad-mix policy. Section 3.5 proposes an adaptive ad-mix policy for a specific instance
of the problem and establishes a performance guarantee that matches the performance
limit in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.6 presents our concluding remarks and additional
implementation challenges. Proofs are relegated to two appendices, B.1 and B.2.
3.2 Literature Review
Revenue management in online advertisement. Revenue maximization in the context
of online advertising has been studied from several perspectives in the last few years. Ara-
man and Fridgeirsdottir (2010) study the dynamic pricing problem of an online publisher
facing an upcoming stream of advertisers, with whom s/he might sign cost-per-impression
(CPM) contracts (here the advertiser pays the publisher every time an ad is displayed).
Here, the focus is on managing an uncertain demand for display slots while considering
an uncertainty supply (users’ visits). Fridgeirsdottir and Najafi (2010) studies a similar
problem under the CPC pricing model when advertisers’ requests are originated by an
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advertising network. Similarly, Roels and Fridgeirsdottir (2009) study the publisher’s prob-
lem when prices are exogenously given, and the publisher may accept or reject upcoming
contracts.
The work of Kumar and Sethi (2009) studies the publisher’s dynamic pricing problem
when revenues might be collected from both advertisement and subscription fees. There,
the authors study how to dynamically adjust subscription fees as wells as the size of the
advertisement space so as to maximize total revenues. Radovanovic and Zeevi (2011) study
dynamic allocation of advertisement inventory for the case of reservation-based online ad-
vertisement. Here, advertisers’ requests take the form of target performances (in terms of,
for example, observed click-through-rates) subject to periodic budgetary constraints, and
the publisher needs to decide on the bundle of online advertisement inventory to assign to
each advertiser (assuming fixed prices).
Using a mechanism design approach, Chen (2010) studies the optimal dynamic allocation
of display impressions between guaranteed advertisers (who sign CPM contracts with the
publisher) and advertisers competing on a spot market where impressions are allocated
through periodic share auctions.
It is worth noting that, to best of our knowledge, all the studies above assume click-
through-rates are initially known for any given ad-mix. Instead, we focus on the case where
user preferences are initially unknown, and the publisher must reconstruct a preference
model while maximizing cumulative revenues.
Learning approach to interactive media. Gooley and Lattin (2000) study the prob-
lem of a marketer with limited prior knowledge on user preferences that needs to decide
on the customized set of messages to present to an upcoming stream of heterogeneous con-
sumers. Their formulation is close to ours in that consumers are assumed to make decisions
according to a discrete choice model whose parameters are initially unknown: like in our
model, the publisher has access to profile information before deciding on the ad-mix to be
presented; however, the authors do not provide neither a fundamental performance limit
nor theoretical performance guarantees for the proposed policies. On a similar context, the
work of Merserau and Bertsimas (2007) presents a dynamic programming formulation of
the learning problem of consumer preferences for the case of a single segment of users, when
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display decisions must be taken for batches of consumers.
Regarding the online advertisement application area, Rusmevichientong and Williamson
(2006) develop adaptive policies for keyword selection (in the context of search-based online
advertisement) when click-through-rates are initially unknown. Finally, in a related subject
Radovanovic and Heavlin (2010) study the design of price-experimentation mechanisms in
the context of reservation-based online advertisement. This study discusses the practical and
theoretical challenges associated to reconstructing advertisers’ demand for display inventory
as a function of price.
Connection to assortment planning literature. In some practical settings, the pub-
lisher might have limited or no access to user profile information. A plausible approach in
such instances is to assume that users are homogenous in their preferences. Under such
assumption the publisher’s problem can be casted as a dynamic assortment planning prob-
lem, where a retailer with limited initial knowledge regarding user preferences and limited
display capacity must decide, in a dynamic fashion, on the set of products to display to
upcoming consumers so as to maximize cumulative revenues over a finite selling horizon. In
such a setting users are a-priori identical, so customization of the offerings is not considered.
To the best of our knowledge, Caro and Gallien (2007) were the first to study this prob-
lem, motivated by an application in fast fashion. Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) formulate
the dynamic assortment problem under the hypothesis of utility maximizing consumers
and considering a limit on the assortment size. Using the Multinomial Logit (henceforth,
MNL) framework to model purchase decisions, the authors propose an adaptive algorithm
for joint parameter estimation and assortment optimization. Considering a more general
random utility model, Chapter 2 of this document establishes a fundamental limit on per-
formance that any policy must respect, and provides an adaptive algorithm achieving such
a limit.
A plausible approach to solve the publisher’s problem is to solve a separate dynamic
assortment problem for each user type. Hence, one can use the aforementioned work to
provide a detailed characterization of the performance of an optimal separable policy. We
will use such an approach as a benchmark. Thus, by providing similar results for the
publisher’s problem we are able to identify the benefit of pooling exploration efforts across
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different user profiles.
Connection to Multi-armed bandit literature. Multi-armed bandit problems provide
a suitable framework to study the exploration versus exploitation trade-off in sequential
decision making with incomplete model specification; see Lai and Robbins (1985) and Auer
et al. (2002) for a classical formulation and solution approach to the problem, respectively.
In fact, the solution approaches in both Caro and Gallien (2007) and Rusmevichientong et al.
(2010) map the dynamic assortment problem to equivalent bandit formulations. Similarly,
Abe and Nakamura (1999) study a bandit formulation for scheduling display-based online
advertisement. The work of Pandey et al. (2007) studies a bandit-based approach to match
ads to display slots (across several web pages) from the perspective of a search engine. More
recently, Agarwal et al. (2009) studies a multi-armed bandit formulation for finding the ad
that maximizes the click-through-rate across all users, where performance is evaluated under
dynamic environmental conditions. To best of our knowledge, all studies above disregard
user-level information to customize the display decision.
Leaving the online advertisement literature aside, our work relates to Rusmevichientong
and Tsitsiklis (2010) in the treatment of the linear dependence of the reward distribution on
specific arm attributes. Similarly, the work of Woodroofe (1979) focus on bandit problems
where additional contextual information on reward realizations is available; this resembles
the availability of profile information in our setup. (See Zeevi and Goldenshluger (2011),
Wang et al. (2005) and Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) for different approaches to such contextual
bandit problems.) Back in the realm of online advertisement, Lu et al. (2010) and Klein-
berg et al. (2008) use contextual multi-armed bandit formulations to study ad selection
when strategy sets are metric spaces and payoff functions satisfy Lipschitz conditions with
respect to the respective metrics. Our formulation differs significantly from these bandit
formulations, from how arms and pulls are defined to how we model reward distributions.
3.3 Problem Formulation
Model primitives. We consider an online publisher endowed with a set of N ads which
can be displayed through a unique web-page to upcoming visitors. Limited by the web-page
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layout, the retailer can display at most C ads simultaneously to any given visitor. Each
time a visitor clicks on ad i, the publisher collects a marginal revenue wi > 0, i ∈ N . We let
w := {w1, . . . , wN} denote the vector of revenue margins. We assume each ad is available
for display during a finite horizon, common to all ads.
Let T to denote the total number of visitors during the relevant horizon. (The value of
T is in general not known to the publisher a priori, therefore it will be treated as random.)
We use t to index visitors according to their arrival times, so t = 1 corresponds to the first
arrival, and t = T to the last. We assume that upon each visitor’s arrival, and before making
a display decision, the publisher observes information on the visitor’s profile. Specifically,
we assume that profile information on visitor t, summarized on a d-dimensional vector Xt,
is available instantaneously upon arrival, and hence can be used to customize the displayed
ad selection.
While we make no assumptions on the nature of the information contained on Xt, we do
assume it belongs to a finite set X of possible visitor profiles. (Without loss of generality, we
assume X spans Rd.) In that regard, we assume that the publisher observes the segment to
which a visitor belongs to, rather than a possibly unique set of user’s features. Consequently,
two visitors sharing the same profile are seen as equivalent a-priori. Similarly, a single user
is perceived as a new entity upon each visit, independent of the evolution of his/her profile
information. With this in mind, we will use the terms visitor and user interchangeably.
We assume user profiles X1, . . . , XT form a sequence of i.i.d. random variables drawn
from a distribution G whose domain is X . In that regard, one can see G(x) as the fraction
of the user population sharing the profile x ∈ X , which we assume remains constant during
the relevant horizon.
User click decision. We assume user click decision is driven by utility maximization:
user t assigns a utility U ti to ad i, for i ∈ N ∪ {0}, with
U ti (Xt) := µi(Xt) + ξ
t
i ,
where µi(x) ∈ R denotes the mean utility assigned to ad i by all users sharing the profile
x ∈ X , {ξti : i ∈ N , t = 1, . . . , T} are i.i.d. random variables drawn from a common dis-
tribution F , and ad 0 represents an always-available no-click alternative. We assume F to
be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure in R. During his/her visit, user
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t clicks on the ad with the highest utility (among those displayed) if that utility is greater
than the one provided by the no-click alternative, which we assume is profile-independent.
For convenience, and without loss of generality, we set µ0(x) := 0 for all x ∈ X .
Our discrete-choice approach to click-behavior implicitly assumes that each user clicks
on at most a single ad, and that the location of an ad within a given ad-mix does not impact
its click-through-rate. While the first of these assumptions is a reasonable one (considering
click-through-rates observed in practice), the second one does not typically hold (at least not
for premium locations within a web-page). These assumptions provide sufficient tractability
for analysis purposes, and allow us to extract structural insights.
We complete the specification of the choice model by assuming that µi(x) can be casted
as a parameterized function of the user profile x ∈ X , for i ∈ N . In particular, we assume




x ∈ X , where βi ∈ Rd is a vector of factors associated to ad i ∈ N . Our assumption is
quite general: more complex functions of the user profile can be considered by redefining
the profile vector components (e.g., quadratic functions can be considered by augmenting
the profile vector to include any term of the form xjxi). We let B := {βji} ∈ Rd×N denote
the matrix of factors.
The static optimization problem. Let S := {S ⊆ N : |S| ≤ C} denote the set of all
possible ad-mixes, where here, and in what follows, |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A.
For a given set S ∈ S and a given matrix M ∈ Rd×N , the probability pi(S,M) that a user






F (z −M>j x) dF (z −M>i x), (3.1)
for i ∈ S ∪ {0}, where Mi denote the i-th column of matrix M , and pi(S,M, x) = 0
otherwise. The expected revenue r(S,M, x) associated to displaying ad-mix S ∈ S to a user
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Were the value of B known to the publisher, it would be optimal for him/her to display
S∗(B,Xt) to user t, where
S∗(B, x) ∈ argmax
S∈S
{r(S,B, x)} , (3.2)
for x ∈ X . We will assume throughout this chapter that the solution to the (3.2) is
unique (i.e., |S∗(B, x)| = 1) for all x ∈ X . (This assumption simplifies our construction of
fundamental performance bounds, and can be relaxed without compromising such result:
see proof of Theorem 5). Solving (3.2) for a given profile amounts to find the best ad-
mix over a combinatorial number of possibilities. Such a combinatorial problem in general
hard to solve: we assume the publisher has access to S∗(M,x) for any matrix M and
profile x ∈ X . (We will see S∗(M,x) can be computed efficiently for the case of the model
specification we analyze in Section 3.5.)
The dynamic optimization problem. We assume that the publisher knows the distri-
butions F and G, but does not know the matrix B driving user decisions. That is, the
publisher knows how likely is that an upcoming visitor belongs to a given user segment,
and understands how users with same profile vary in their valuation for the same ad, but
has no prior information on how such a valuation varies across users with different profiles
and across different ads.
Upon a user’s arrival, the retailer observes the user’s profile and, taking into account all
information available at the time, decides on the ad-mix to display during the user’s visit.
More formally, consider the ad-mix process {St ∈ S : 1 ≤ t ≤ T} and let
Zti := 1
{
i ∈ St, U ti > U tj , j ∈ St \ {i} ∪ {0}
}
denote the click decision of user t regarding ad i ∈ St, where Zti = 1 indicates that user t
clicks on ad i, and Zti = 0 otherwise. Similarly, we let Z
t
0 := 1 {U0 > Uj , j ∈ St} denote
the overall click decision of user t, where Zt0 = 1 if user t chooses not to click on any
ad, and Zt0 = 0 otherwise. Throughout this chapter, we let 1 {A} denote the indicator
function of a set A. We let Zt := (Zt0, Z
t
1, . . . , Z
t
N ) denote the decision made by user t and
define Ft as the history associated with the ad-mix process {Su : 1 ≤ u < t}, click decisions
{Zu : 1 ≤ u < t}, user profiles {Xu : 1 ≤ u < t}, and the profile Xt, for t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (with
F0 = ∅).
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We say an ad mix process is non-anticipating if each of its elements is determined solely
on the basis of information collected through interaction with previous visitors (and the
user profile), i.e., St is Ft-measurable, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. An admissible ad-mix policy pi
provides a mapping from past history and user profiles to S such that the induced ad-mix
process is non-anticipating. We restrict attention to the set of such policies, and denote
it by P. We use Epi and Ppi to denote expectations and probabilities of random variables
when the ad-mix policy pi ∈ P is used.
The publisher’s objective is to choose a policy pi ∈ P to maximize Jpi(T,B), the expected












Consider the case of publisher that knows upfront the value of the matrix B: such a
publisher would display S∗(B,Xt) to user t, for all t ≤ T . Let J∗(T,B) denote the expected
cumulative revenue achieved by such a publisher, throughout the interaction with all T users,
i.e.,
J∗(T,B) := T Ex {r(S∗(B, x), B, x)} .
This quantity provides an upper bound on the expected revenue generated by any admissible
policy, i.e., J∗(T,B) ≥ Jpi(T,B) for all pi ∈ P. For any T > 0, we define Rpi(T,B) to be the
cumulative expected revenue loss associated to following policy pi instead of the one used
by the clairvoyant publisher. That is,
Rpi(T,B) := J∗(T,B)− Jpi(T,B).
The regret associated to policy pi can be viewed as a measure of revenue loss due to the lack of
prior knowledge on the parameters governing user preferences. We see that the publisher’s
maximization objective is equivalent to that of regret minimization. In that regard, the
publisher objective is to gather enough information to reconstruct the clairvoyant solution
(with increasing probability), and doing it so while losing the smallest possible revenue in
the process.
The next section focuses on characterizing the minimum amount of information required
to solve (3.2) exactly, and on establishing fundamental limits on the revenue loss associated
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to policies that balance the cost of information collection and immediate revenue maximiza-
tion in an optimal fashion.
3.4 Fundamental Limit on Achievable Performance
We begin by characterizing the minimum information necessary to recover the solution to
the static optimization problem. After that, we focus on how to collect such information
while minimizing the revenue loss.
Information requirements. Fix x ∈ X and let N (x) include any ad i that can be made




i ∈ N : ∃M ∈ Rd×N s.t. i ∈ S∗(M,x) , M−i = B−i
}
,
where M−i denotes the matrix M with column i removed. Suppose µi(x) is known for all
i ∈ S∗(B, x): in order to verify the optimality of S∗(B, x) one must know the value of µi(x)
for all i ∈ N (x). In contrast, mean utilities of ads outside N (x) do not affect the optimality
of S∗(B, x). One concludes that, in order to solve (3.2) correctly, one needs to reconstruct
the mean utilities only for ads in N (x).
In addition, we argue that the solution to (3.2) can be recovered even if there is not
complete certainty about the underlying parameters: by the absolute continuity of F with
respect to Lebesgue measure on R one has that the click probabilities given in (3.1) are
continuous functions of the model parameters. This, together with our assumption on the
uniqueness of the solution to the static problem, implies that
Λ :=
{
M ∈ Rd×N : S∗(x,M) = S∗(x,B) , x ∈ X
}
,
has a non-empty interior, hence one can recover the clairvoyant’s solution by displaying
S∗(M,x) to users with profile x ∈ X , as long as M is not too far (M ∈ Λ) from B.
Fix i ∈ N and define X (i) as the set of profiles for which ad i is potentially optimal.
That is,
X (i) := {x ∈ X : i ∈ N (x)} ,
for i ∈ N . In order to recover the clairvoyant’s solution, one might as well solve (3.2) using
a matrix M such that M>i x ≈ β>i x for all x ∈ X (i), for all i ∈ N (more precisely, M ∈ Λ).
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Efficient information gathering. Any good ad-mix policy must collect enough informa-
tion on ad i to (approx.) reconstruct µi(x) for all x ∈ X (i), i ∈ N . Consider a set E ⊆ X :





for all i ∈ N , for some finite constants {αy : y ∈ E}, where span {A} refers to the linear
span (linear hull) of the set A2. Hence, a good policy might focus on approximating µi(x)
only for x ∈ E, provided that X (i) ⊆ span {E}, i ∈ N .
Consider now the cost of information collection. For ad i ∈ N , define O(i) as the set of
profiles in X for which ad i is optimal. That is
O(i) := {x ∈ X : i ∈ S∗(B, x)} ,
for i ∈ N . It is easy to see that O(i) ⊆ X (i), for all i ∈ N . Fix i ∈ N and consider a profile
x ∈ O(i): information on ad i might be collected without incurring in revenue loss (in
expectation) if one displays ad-mix S∗(B, x) to users with profile x. Hence, a good policy
might collect sufficient information to approximate µi(x) for all x ∈ O(i) while keeping
revenue loss to a minimum.
Suppose ad i ∈ N is such that X (i) ⊆ span {O(i)}; information collected on profiles
in O(i) is enough to reconstruct the solution to the static problem when B−i is known.
Moreover, such information might be collected without incurring in revenue loss. On the
other hand, when ad i ∈ N is such that span {O(i)} ⊂ X (i), information collection is likely
to incur in revenue loss, as information collected on profiles in O(i) does not suffice to
reconstruct the solution to (3.2) even when B−i is known. Here, one would expect a good
policy to minimize the revenue loss associated to information collection outside O(i).
Next, we present a fundamental limit on what can be achieved by any good ad-mix
policy and connect such a result to the intuition on minimum information requirements and
efficient information gathering developed here.
1This follows from assuming that mean utilities are affine functions of the profile vector, and the fact
that any vector spanned by E can be written as a linear combination of profiles in E. Our approach can
extend to more general parametric functions by augmenting the profile vector definition.
2The linear span of a set A = {v1, . . . , va} is defined as span {A} := {v1λ1 + . . .+ vaλa : λ ∈ Ra}.
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3.4.1 A lower bound on the performance of any admissible policy




as T →∞, for every a > 0. In other words, the frequency at which a consistent policy offers
the optimal assortment to upcoming visitors converges to 1 for all possible values for M . The
restriction in (3.3) imposes a uniform bound on the grow rate of the regret across all possible
factor matrices. Let P ′ ⊆ P denote the set of non-anticipating, consistent ad-mix policies.
We restrict our attention to consistent policies; this prevents us from considering policies
that perform well for specific values of B by mere chance. The result below establishes a
fundamental limit on what can be achieved by any consistent ad-mix policy.







for a finite positive constants Ki, i ∈ N .
The regret of a policy is directly related to its ability to reconstruct the solution to the
static optimization problem. In that regard, this result establishes an asymptotic lower
bound on the number of suboptimal display decisions that any consistent policy must take
(in expectation). Moreover, such a bound is derived by establishing a series of lower bounds
on the number of times each ad is displayed in an suboptimal display. In that regard, our
result asserts that ad i ∈ N must be displayed in a suboptimal display to at least order
Ki log T users. Moreover, from proof of Theorem 5 one has that Ki will be proportional
(we will be precise in the proof outline below) to rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}, were rank {A}
denotes the maximal number of linearly independent elements in the set A.
The above is aligned with the discussion in the previous section: rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}
is precisely the minimum number of profiles that, in addition to the ones in O(i), allow to
reconstruct the mean utility of ad i for all profiles in X (i). In that regard, the result above
asserts that the regret associated to a good policy follows from revenue losses incurred while
collection information on those profiles.
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Connection to previous results in Dynamic Assortment Planning. The pub-
lisher’s problem for the case when X = {x1} corresponds to an instance of the dynamic as-
sortment planning problem. There, a single optimal assortment (ad-mix) must be recovered
by collecting information from the interaction with homogenous consumers (visitors). In
Chapter 2 we show that the regret in this setting is at least of order (|N (x1)− S∗(B, x)|) log T .
Such a lower bound coincides with the one in Theorem 5, however our result suggests the
inefficiency of solving the publisher problem by decomposing it into X assortment problems:
such an approach will result in a performance bound of order
∑
x∈X (N (x)−S∗(B, x)) log T .
In particular one has that
∑
i∈N






(N (x)− S∗(B, x)).
The comparison above quantifies the value of combining information collected through inter-
action with some type of users to explain the clicking behavior of a larger set of visitors. For
example, suppose B is such that S∗(B, x) ⊂ N (x) for all x ∈ X , and that rank {O(i)} = d
for all i ∈ N , then one has that
∑
i∈N
rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}} = 0 < |X | ≤
∑
x∈X
|N (x) \ S∗(B, x)| ,
and hence, while Theorem 5 suggests a finite revenue loss is attainable, revenue loss under
the (myopic) separable approach will be at least of order |X | log T .
Remark 8 (Implications for design of “good” policies). The early analysis in this
section, together with the result in Theorem 5 suggest a number of properties that good
policy should have. First, one might reconstruct the solution to the static optimization
problem by collecting information on ad i when displayed to users with profiles spanning
X (i); moreover, these profiles should include those on which product i is optimal. Second,
information collected on profiles for which ad i is not optimal must be collected through
interaction with at most order (log T ) users; in addition, the number of profiles on which
information is to be gathered must be kept at the minimum possible. We use these properties
in Section 3.5 to design an efficient ad-mix policy.
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3.4.2 Proof outline for Theorem 5
We bound the regret of any consistent policy by computing a lower bound on the expected
number of suboptimal displays for each ad i ∈ N , thus the lower bound in Theorem 5 is
presented as a sum of individual contributions made by each ad in N . For computing the
lower bound associated to a given ad we use a change-of-measure argument introduced by
Lai and Robbins (1985) for proving an analogous result for a multi-armed bandit problem.
The argument can be roughly described as follows. If X (i) ⊆ span {O(i)} for ad i ∈ N ,
then optimal display of the ad is sufficient to collect all information (related to the ad)
necessary for recovering the solution to (3.2). If this is not the case, then one can find an
alternative factor-matrix such that: i) it only differs from the original matrix B on the
factors associated to ad i; ii) mean utilities for profiles in O(i) remain unchanged; and iii)
ad i is optimal for at least one profile outside O(i). When such alternative factor-matrix is
considered, any consistent policy must display ad i to order T users with profiles outside
O(i). These are users for which ad i is optimal under the alternative factor-matrix but it is
not under the original configuration. We show that this later fact implies that, under the
original configuration, ad i must be displayed to at least order log T (in expectation) users
with profiles outside O(i), and that such display is proportional to the distance between the
alternative and original factor-matrices (we formalize this notion of proximity in the proof
of Theorem 5). In particular, we prove that for any consistent policy pi
Ppi {Ti ≤ log T/Hi} → 0 (3.4)
as T →∞, where Ti denotes the total number of users with profiles outside O(i) to which
ad i is displayed to, and Hi is a finite positive constant proportional to the distance between
the alternative and original configurations. Each constant Ki in Theorem 5 is derived (up
to a scale factor) by minimizing Hi across alternative configurations that increases the set






The result in Theorem (5) follows directly from the equation above, the maximum size
of any ad-mix, and the connection between revenue loss and suboptimal display of ads in
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N . Note that when ki := rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}} > 0 one can find at least ki profiles
{x1, . . . , xki} such that, for any k ≤ ki there exists an alternative factor-matrix such that,
in addition to the conditions above, only xk (among these ki profiles) adds to O(i). Hence,
by the argument above, one expects that ad i will be tested on order log T users with profile
xk, hence one can argue that Ki will be proportional to ki.
3.5 The Proposed Dynamic Ad-mix Policy
This section builds on the insight derived from the proof of Theorem 5 to design an ad-
mix policy attaining (essentially) such a performance. To keep things concrete, we will
anchor our analysis around the well known MNL model which arises when F is a Gumbel
distribution. Later, in Section 3.6, we explain how our analysis (proposed policy and its
performance guarantee) extends to the case of more general distribution functions (under
some mild regularity assumptions).
Next, we first identify the main challenges in ad-mix policy design. Then, we explain
our approach to face such challenges. Finally, we propose an ad-mix policy and show it is
optimal in a precise mathematical sense.
Multinomial Logit choice model. Taking F to have a standard Gumbel distribution is
equivalent to say that each user makes his/her clicking decision according to a MNL choice
model. While the MNL model admits some deficiencies that are well documented (see,
e.g., Kok et al. (2008) for a discussion of those in the context of assortment planning), it
is central to the existing literature in fields such as economics, marketing and operations
research.
We initially consider the MNL specification for several reasons. First, one can derive
a closed form expression for (3.1). In particular, for S ⊆ N and x ∈ X one has that (see









for i ∈ S, and pi(S,B, x) = 0 otherwise. Second, one can use (3.5) to describe both
N (x) and the solution to (3.2) in a precise manner, for all x ∈ X . Third, there is an
efficient algorithm to solve the static optimization problem for the MNL specification; see
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[Rusmevichientong et al., 2010]. Finally, we make use of the independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) property of the MNL model to estimate the model parameters efficiently
by combining information coming from displaying different ad-mixes to different users. All
these elements facilitate the performance analysis of the proposed algorithm.
3.5.1 Main implementation challenges
Fix i ∈ N . Any consistent policy should collect information on ad i over a set of profiles E(i)
allowing the reconstruction of its mean utility for all profiles for which ad i is potentially
optimal. Moreover, such set E(i) should be as small as possible while still including profiles
for which ad i is optimal. Unfortunately, such a set can only be identified on the basis of
knowledge of B, which is initially unknown.
One can see that is possible for parameter estimation to affect information collection
efforts, which at the same time will condition parameter estimation. Hence, one risks
entering into a vicious circle where failing to approximate the model parameters will result
on failing to recover the problem structure which might deepen the error in parameter
estimation. The challenge here is to simultaneously estimate model parameters and guide
exploration efforts in such a way that both B and X (i) are correctly approximated.
Regarding the extent of the exploration efforts, Theorem 5 hints on the amount of infor-
mation any consistent policy should base parameter estimation on: suboptimal exploration
must be conducted on at most order log T users. Unfortunately, the total number of visitors
T is, in most instances, initially unknown. This feature prevents the use of ad-mix policies
that separate exploration and exploitation a priori. (For that purpose one would need to
know upfront the amount of information to collect.) The challenge here is to devise a policy
that will perform well (in the sense of Theorem 5) for any realization of T .
3.5.2 Preliminaries
Parameter estimation. Fix i ∈ N . Suppose we want to estimate βi based on the
information collected through interacting with the first t−1 visitors. In particular, we look
for a vector βˆi explaining ad i’s click-through-rates for users with profiles on a set E(i) ⊆ X
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(we explain how to select E(i) later on this section). From (3.5) we have that
pi(S,B, x) = exp(β
>
i x) p0(S,B, x), (3.6)
for all S ⊆ S and x ∈ X . We use this property to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For x ∈ X and i ∈ N one has that
Epi
{∑t−1




s=1 1 {Xs = x , i ∈ Ss , Zs0 = 1}
} = exp(β>i x).
According to Lemma 1, for i ∈ N one has that
βi ∈ Λi :=
βˆ ∈ Rd : log
 Epi
{∑t−1




s=1 1 {Xs = x , i ∈ Ss , Zs0 = 1}
}
 = βˆ>x , x ∈ E(i)
 ,
for any E(i) ⊆ X such that rank {E(i)} ≤ d. In addition, suppose E(i) is such that
X (i) ⊆ span {E(i)}, for all i ∈ N , and take βˆi ∈ Λi arbitrarily, i ∈ N : one has that
Bˆ := (βˆ1, . . . , βˆN ) ∈ Λ, thus one can recover the solution to the static problem by solving
(3.2) using M = Bˆ (i.e., S∗(B, x) = S∗(Bˆ, x) for all x ∈ X ).
With this in mind, and assuming E(i) is properly chosen, we will estimate B by con-
structing a proxy for Λi, from which we will choose βˆi, for all i ∈ N . More precisely, we
use the estimate Bˆ := {βj,i}, were
βˆi ∈
{
βˆ ∈ Rd : log
( ∑t−1
s=1 1 {Xs = x , Zsi = 1}∑t−1
s=1 1 {Xs = x , i ∈ Ss , Zs0 = 1}
)
= βˆ>x , x ∈ E(i)
}
. (3.7)
Estimation set selection. We aim to select a set of profiles E(i) that: (i) is contained in
X (i); and (ii) explains the mean utility of ad i for all profiles in X (i), for all i ∈ N . The
next lemma characterizes N (x) for all x ∈ X , for the MNL model.
Lemma 2. For each i ∈ N one has that
N (x) = {i ∈ N : wi ≥ r(S∗(B, x), B, x)} .
Estimating X (i) requires not only to guess the optimal ad-mix S∗(B, x) but also to
approximate its (expected) revenue. While the former might be recovered by solving (3.2)
using any matrix in Λ, the later can only be approximated. In that regard, a policy might
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be able recover X (i) only if there is a minimum separation between profit margins and
optimal expected revenues. We introduce the following assumption, which we assume holds
throughout the rest of this chapter.
Assumption 3. The matrix B is such that |wi − r(S∗(B, x), B, x)| > 0 for all i ∈ N and
x ∈ X .




x ∈ X : wi ≥ r(S∗(Bˆ, x), Bˆ, x)
}
. (3.8)
We select E(i) (used for estimating Bˆ) so that it spans Xˆ (i). The idea here is the following:
if enough information is collected for estimation one would expect βˆ>i x to be close to its
real value, for all x ∈ span {E(i)}, in particular one would have that βˆ>i x is close to its
real value for all i ∈ S∗(Bˆ, x), for all x ∈ X ; hence r(S∗(Bˆ, x) would be close to its real
value, and from the optimality of S(B, x) one will have that X (i) ⊆ Xˆ (i). This implies that
continuous improvement on parameter estimation will translate into improvement on the
selection of the estimation sets.
Given Xˆ (i) there are many possible choices for E(i): ours will prioritize inclusion of
profiles where ad i has been displayed the most. The idea here is that, if the overall scheme
works, one should identify the solution to (3.2) with increasing probability, thus ad i should
be displayed to users with profiles in O(i) on a linear fashion, and as a consequence some
of such profiles will become part of E(i).
Length of exploration. Theorem 5 suggests that parameter estimation should be based
on interaction with order log T users. Since T is initially unknown, we aim to perform
parameter estimation for user t based on the interaction with order log t users. Our policy
considers a variation of the doubling trick (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006)) where
time (visitors) is partitioned into intervals of exponentially increasing length, and were the
suggested amount of information is collected within each interval. For n ≥ 0 we define
τ(n) = inf {t ≥ 1 : κ log t ≥ n} ,
where κ is an arbitrarily chosen (for now) positive and finite constant. During the n-th
interval, encompassing users τ(n) to τ(n + 1) − 1, we look to collect information on ad i
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from the interaction with at least n+ 1 users with profile x, for each profile x ∈ E(i), and
for each ad i ∈ N .
3.5.3 The Proposed Ad-mix Policy
Our proposed ad mix policy attempts to reconstruct the problem’s structure at specific mo-
ments in time, using all information available at those times. Specifically, the policy updates
parameter estimates and estimation sets at the beginning of each user interval. Parameter
estimates are used to (probably) maximize revenue collection throughout the correspondent
user interval. In addition, our policy collects a minimum amount of information on each
ad for profiles on the newly computed estimations sets, preparing the ground for updating
parameter estimates at the beginning of the next user interval. Next, we elaborate on how
our policy implements the ideas above.
At the beginning of the n-th user interval, model parameters are re-estimated and used to
update a proxy for each X (i), which will drive information collection during the n-th inter-
val. Starting from arbitrarily chosen matrix Bˆ0 and initial estimation sets
{
E0(i) : i ∈ N},
each one spanning X , our policy executes the following steps at the beginning of the n-th
interval, n ≥ 1:
(a) Parameter estimate Bˆn is computed according to (3.7), using estimation sets En(i),
i ∈ N . In addition, estimates are chosen so that x ∈ span{En−1(i)} for each ad i in
S∗(Bˆn, x), for all x ∈ X .
(b) Using Bˆn, we select each En(i) to span Xˆ n(i) (computed as in (3.8)), prioritizing most
displayed profiles.
Step (a) above updates model parameters at the beginning of the n-th interval: such an
update will be computed with information on n user interactions (for each add/profile pair)
with high probability; in addition, such an update is selected so that ads though to be
optimal for a given profile during the n-th interval have the correspondent mean utility
estimates computed using information on n user interactions. Step (b) computes the new
estimation set for each ad i ∈ N ; exploration efforts during the n-th interval will be directed
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to collect enough information on such profiles; specific details about the selection of En(i)
are shown in Algorithm 4.
Within the n-th interval, we select the ad-mix to display during the visit of user t as
follows:
(i) We select any ad i that has been displayed to less than n + 1 users with profile Xt,
provided that Xt ∈ En(i), i ∈ N .
(ii) If no ad is found in the step above, then we display S∗(Bˆn, Xt).
Step (i) above aims to collect enough information to update model parameters at the
beginning of the next (n + 1-th) user interval. Step (ii) exploits the information collected
during the first n− 1 user intervals by offering a probably optimal ad mix.
The proposed policy is summarized for convenience in Algorithm 4. There, Ti(t, x)
denotes the number of users with profile x ∈ X to whom ad i ∈ N has been displayed to




1 {i ∈ St , Xt = x} ,
for i ∈ N , x ∈ X and t ≥ 1. The tuning parameter κ controls the extent of information
collection on estimation sets.
3.5.4 Performance Analysis
The next result characterizes the performance of the proposed ad-mix policy.
Theorem 6. Let pi = pi(w, κ) be defined by Algorithm 4. Then, the regret associated to pi




rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}
)
log T +K,
provided that κ ≥ κ, where κ and K are finite positive constants.
The constants K and κ depend on instance specific quantities, such as minimum opti-
mality gaps for the solution to (3.2), but not on the size of product set N , or total number
of users T . Proof of Theorem 6 portraits K as an upper bound on the expected cumulative
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Algorithm 4 : pi = pi(w, κ)
STEP 1. Initialization:
Set E0(i) := E ⊆ X , for all i ∈ N , with E such that X ⊆ span {E} and rank {E} ≤ d.
Set B0 ∈ Rd×N with βj,i = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d and i ∈ N .
Set n = 1.
STEP 2. Joint Exploration and Optimization:
for t = 1 to T do
Set F :=
{
i ∈ N : Xt ∈ En−1(i) , Ti(t,Xt) < n
}
[Candidates for exploration]
if F 6= ∅ then
Display St ⊆ F , with St ∈ S. [Exploration]
else
Display St ∈ S(Bˆn−1, Xt). [Exploitation]
end if
if t = τ(n) then
Set Bˆn ∈ Rd×N to be any solution to
log
( ∑t−1
s=1 1 {Xs = x , Zsi = 1}∑t−1
s=1 1 {Xs = x , i ∈ Ss , Zs0 = 1}
)
= βˆ>i x , x ∈ En−1(i) , i ∈ N ,
such that i /∈ S∗(Bˆn, x) for all x /∈ span{En−1(i)}, i ∈ N . [Estimation]
for i ∈ N do
Set Xˆ ni :=
{
x ∈ X : wi ≥ r(S∗(Bˆn, x), Bˆn, x)
}
. [Interesting profiles]
Set En(i) := {x1, . . .} such that [Estimation sets]
i) xl ∈ Xˆ ni , for all l,
ii) xl /∈ span {x1, . . . , xl−1}, for all l, and
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revenue loss due to errors while reconstructing the solution to (3.2), while κ relates to the
minimum exploration intensity that makes K finite when T →∞.
The performance guarantee in Theorem 6 matches the performance limit provided in
Theorem 5 up to an scaling factor: the regret associated to the proposed policy can be
expressed as the sum of individual contributions made by every ad i ∈ N , each of them
being order log T and proportional to the minimum number of profiles (in addition to those
on which the ad is optimal) from which one needs to collect information to recover the
solution to the static optimization problem.
The analysis performed in the proof of Theorem 6 reveals an important feature of the
proposed policy: it bases parameter estimation on a right set of profiles with increasing
probability. That is, our policy identifies both X (i) and O(i) with increasing probability,
for all i ∈ N . As a consequence, revenue loss due to suboptimal exploration is kept at
the minimum possible (in expectation). This means that our policy successfully limits
exploration of ad i on user profiles for which the ad is not potentially optimal (i.e., profiles
outside X (i)), for all i. In addition, the analysis implies that information coming from
optimal display of each ad is used for parameter estimation with increasing probability.
Remark 9 (Selection of the tuning parameter κ). Theorem 6 requires one to select κ >
κ, however our characterization of κ (see proof of Theorem 6) depends on the factor-matrix
B, which is initially unknown. Thus one faces the risk of selecting κ < κ, compromising
the validity of the performance guarantee. One can avoid such a risk by redefining
τ(n) = inf {t ≥ 1 : κ(log t)α ≥ n} ,




rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}
)
(log T )α +K,
independent of the value of κ, and pi becomes optimal up to an order (log T )α−1-term.
3.5.5 Numerical Illustration
In this section we illustrate the results established so far by means of a simple numerical
example. We consider the case of N = 4 and set w = {0.63, 0.59, 0.56, 0.60}. User profiles
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Profile x1 x2 x3
S∗(B, x) {1, 2} {2, 3} {2, 4}
r(S∗(B, x), B, x) 0.587 0.546 0.578
Table 3.1: Solution to static optimization problem for the numerical example.
Ad 1 2 3 4
O(i) {x1} {x1, x2, x3} {x2} {x3}
X (i) {x1, x2, x3} {x1, x2, x3} {x2} {x1, x2, x3}
rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}} 1 0 0 1
Table 3.2: Minimum suboptimal experimentation for each ad.





 , x2 =
 0.5
0.5




We set the display capacity C = 2, and set the model parameter B to be
B =
 −1.30 2.00 2.75 3.00
3.00 2.00 2.75 −1.30
 ,
i.e., β>1 = (−1.30 3.00).
Static optimization. Table 3.1 depicts the solution to the static optimization problem
and the optimal expected revenue, for each profile in X . We use Lemma 2 to quantify the
theoretical contribution each ad makes to the regret. According to this information, summa-
rized in Table 3.2, our results predict that the regret associated to the proposed policy will be
of order log T , due to suboptimal display of ads i = 1, 4. (There, rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}
quantifies the amount of suboptimal experimentation required to recover the solution to
(3.2), for ad i ∈ N .)
Proposed policy performance. Figure 3.1 depicts the average performance of policy
pi(w, κ) over 500 replications, using κ = 25, and considering T = 1 to T = 100000. There,
graphs (a) and (b) illustrate the regret of the proposed policy as a function of T and log T ,
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respectively. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the simulation results.
From panels (a) and (b) we observe that the associated regret is indeed of order log T , as
predicted.

































Figure 3.1: Performance of the proposed policy pi(w, κ).
In this example, the proposed policy makes suboptimal display decisions on a small
fraction of users, ranging from around 10% when the total number of visitors is T = 1000,
to around 0.5% when the total number of visitors is T = 100000. (Recall that the regret
relates to the number of users to whom a suboptimal ad-mix is displayed to.)
Figure 3.2 provides further information on the performance of the proposed policy on
this example. There, graph (a) depicts display of ad 3 outside X (3) as a function of T . The
graph in (b) shows total number of visitors to whom suboptimal ad-mixes are displayed to,
as a function of T . The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the simulation
results. In panel (a) we observe that pi(w, κ) successfully limits display of ad 3 to users with
profiles x1 and x3 (i.e., with profiles outside X (3)). Panel (b) shows the number of users
to whom a suboptimal ad-mix is displayed to, when in exploitation phase. Thus, one can
argue that the regret in Figure 3.1 scales with T exclusively due to suboptimal information
collection.
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Figure 3.2: Display of suboptimal ad-mixes.
Quality of parameter estimation. Policy pi(w, κ) focuses exploration efforts into iden-
tifying a matrix M ∈ Λ, and not necessarily on approximating B. For example, in our
numerical illustration one only needs to estimate β>3 x2 rather than β3 itself (X (3) = {x2}).
This fact can be observed, for example, in the output of the algorithm for an arbitrary
replication: after T = 100000 visitors one has that βˆ>3 = (5.465 0.000); while βˆ3 is not
close to β3 componentwise, one has that β
>
3 x2 = 2.75 ≈ 2.73 = βˆ>3 x2.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has studied the optimization problem faced by a publisher deciding on the
(customized) ad-mixes to display to a heterogeneous stream of upcoming visitors, when click
decisions are driven by utility maximization and model parameters are initially unknown.
We have established fundamental limits of performance for any consistent policy, and we
have proposed a family of ad-mix policies attaining such a performance limit for a particular
instance of the problem, namely when users make decisions according to a MNL model.
Complexity of the publisher problem. Theorem 5 provides a lower bound on the regret
every consistent policy must incur on. Such result is derived under mild assumptions and
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is valid for any absolutely continuous (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure in R) distribution function
F . Our analysis of the lower bound links revenue loss to suboptimal information collection
necessary to reconstruct the full information solution, given by (3.2). In particular, our
bound predicts that finite revenue loss might be attainable when displaying the optimal
ad-mix to each visitor provides enough information to reconstruct the solution to the static
optimization problem.
In the practical side, we have shown that the theoretical lower bound in Theorem 5 can
be achieved, up to constant terms, when idiosyncratic shocks to user utility are Gumbel
distributed. In particular, we proposed an ad-mix policy whose regret scales optimally with
the number of visitors, and exhibits the right dependence on the problem structure. We
did this by exploiting properties of the MNL model that allowed us to estimate the model
parameters by combining information coming from the display of different ad-mixes.
A more general ad-mix policy. We see several challenges in designing a policy for an
arbitrary distribution function F . Most discrete choice models do not allow for closed form
expression for the click probabilities in (3.1). This does not only affect parameter estimation
but also prevents us from characterizing N (x) for any profile x ∈ X . An ad-mix policy must
be able to identify the set of profiles for which an ad is potentially optimal, so information
collection efforts can be correctly focalized.
A more general ad-mix policy, for which the performance guarantee in Theorem 6 still
applies, can be easily devise by imposing the following identifiability restrictions on the
distribution function F .
Assumption 4 (Identifiability). For any ad mix S ∈ S, profile x ∈ X and vector ρ ∈ RN+
such that
∑
i∈S ρi < 1 one has that;
(i) the system of equations
{
pi(S,M, x) = ρi , i ∈ S , M>x = η
}
has a unique solution
T (S, ρ) in η ∈ RN such that ηi = 0 for all i /∈ S;
(ii) p(S, ·, x) is Lipschitz continuous, and T (S, ·) is locally Lipschitz continuous in the
neighborhood of ρ, for all S ∈ S;
(iii) for any matrix M ∈ Rd×N and profile x ∈ X one has that
r(S∗(M,x),M, x) ≤ wi, for all i ∈ S∗(M,x).
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Assumptions 4 (i) and (ii) ensure that parameter estimation is possible and that the
interior of Λ is not empty. Assumption 4 (iii) allows one to characterize N (x) through
Lemma 2, for all x ∈ X . When Assumption 4 hold true, one can modify our proposed
policy so parameter estimates are based on the display of fixed ad-mixes (covering E(i)
rather than on individual ad display. This will limit the amount of information used for
estimation purposes (in particular, it will require to separate parameter estimation for
profiles in O(i) from that for profiles in X (i) \ O(i)), nevertheless one will have that the
same arguments in proof of Theorem 6 will apply, despite such modifications.
Comparison of our policy with benchmark results. As advanced in Section 3.4,
our policy improves on a naive dynamic assortment approach to the publisher’s prob-
lem. By exploiting the relationship between mean utilities across different user profiles,
our policy keeps overall exploration efforts to a bare minimum; this results on signifi-
cant gains (in terms of revenue) when compared to an approach that separates the pub-
lisher problem across user segments. In that regard, the performance guarantee in The-
orem 6 indicates that the relative revenue gap between the performance of our policy
and the coming from an optimal dynamic assortment approach to the problem is of or-
der
(∑









Motivation and main objectives. Assortment planning and pricing decisions are funda-
mental drivers of consumers’ purchase decisions and ultimately of a retailer’s profitability.
Retailers face significant challenges to understand the mapping from such decisions to con-
sumer behavior as this mapping should synthesize complex aspects of purchase decisions
such as, for example, substitution behavior, consumers’ collection and aggregation of infor-
mation, consumer heterogeneity, and the effect of competition. In particular, consumers’
access and use of information about the retailers’ offerings play a critical role with respect
to the way consumers purchase decisions are made. If access to information is costly, con-
sumers might make purchase decisions based only on partial knowledge about retailers’
offerings. In cases in which obtaining such information does not require significant effort
and cost, which is often true for online retailers, consumers can form preferences over the
full set of retailer-product pairs, and make purchasing decisions accordingly. For example,
when retailers offer the same product, consumers will select the retailer to buy from based
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on retailer-specific attributes, such as price.
Once the mapping between offerings and purchase decisions is at hand, retailers face the
additional challenge of making appropriate assortment and pricing decisions and the latter
is often further complicated by the presence of operational constraints such as limited shelf
space, stocking restrictions and other capacity related considerations.
The objective of this chapter is to study equilibrium behavior in assortment and pricing
competition in the presence of informed consumers, i.e., when consumers have full informa-
tion regarding retailers’ offerings. In particular, we aim at understanding how the competi-
tion that results from the availability of such information impacts equilibrium behavior. To
that end, we analyze a model of assortment and pricing competition in a duopolistic setting,
when assortment decisions are constrained by limited display capacities and retailers have
access to both common products, i.e., products that are available to both competitors, and
exclusive products, i.e., products that are unavailable to competition. We anchor the anal-
ysis around the well studied Multinomial Logit choice model for consumer demand. While
the Logit model admits some deficiencies that are well documented (see, e.g., Kok et al.
(2008) for a discussion of those in the context of assortment planning), it is central to both
the existing assortment literature and practice, and as a result serves as a good starting
point to study competition in the presence of informed consumers.1
Summary of main contributions. We consider two competitive settings: i.) the case
where retailers select only their assortments given exogenously fixed prices; and ii.) the case
where retailers can select both assortments and prices. The main findings of this chapter
can be summarized as follows.
i.) When prices are exogenously given and retailers have access only to exclusive products,
we show that an equilibrium always exists (see Theorem 7) and provide a bound on
the number of equilibria (see Theorem 8 and the discussion that follows). In addition,
we establish that, when multiple equilibria exist, retailers will always prefer the same
equilibrium, as laid out in Proposition 2.
1We note here that in cases where assortment information is costly, a model where customers would first
decide on a retailer and then on the product to purchase (such as a nested Logit) might be more appropriate.
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ii.) When prices are exogenously fixed and retailers have access to both common and
exclusive products, we provide sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium. In
addition, we show that in the general case, it is now possible that an equilibrium fails
to exist or that the number of equilibria grows exponentially with the retailers’ display
capacity.
iii.) When retailers compete in both assortment and price decisions, we prove that at most
one equilibrium exists. We show that the existence of an equilibrium is driven by the
number of exclusive products (in comparison to the display capacity) that retailers
have. In particular, we identify the only possible equilibrium candidate and provide
a simple procedure to confirm or invalidate its equilibrium status. For the case where
only exclusive products are available, an equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist.
These results are summarized in Theorem 9.
Many of the results for the setting with exclusive products can be generalized to the
case of an arbitrary number competing retailers and we comment on this point throughout
this chapter.
The current work contributes to the existing assortment and pricing literature on various
fronts. From a modeling point of view, we provide a framework to analyze competition in the
presence of informed consumers when demand is driven by individual utility maximization.
This framework enables among other things the possibility of having retailers offer the
same products, a possibility ignored in most of the existing literature. The current work
sheds light on equilibrium properties in general and on the implications of the availability of
common products on such properties. From a qualitative perspective, it shows, for example,
that, starting from an equilibrium, the introduction of a new product to the set of available
products of both retailers may lead to a situation where no equilibrium exists. For the
case of assortment-only competition with exclusive products, the chapter establishes a clear
connection, in any equilibrium, between the attractiveness of the offered assortment (this
concept will be defined more formally in Section 4.4 but can be thought of as the breadth
of an assortment), the profit made by a retailer, and the attractiveness of the competitor’s
assortment. More precisely, the results show that the higher the attractiveness of the
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offered assortment, the lower the profit achieved, and the higher the attractiveness of the
competitor’s assortment, in equilibrium. In particular, the results indicate that in general,
competition will lead to a broader assortment offering, i.e., a retailer that faces competition
will offer a broader set of products than if s/he were operating as a monopolist with the
same display capacity. At the same time, when multiple equilibria exist, the above implies
that both retailers will prefer, among all equilibria, the one that minimizes the overall
attractiveness of the product assortments.
From a methodological viewpoint, the analysis builds on the idea of computing best
responses via a simple problem transformation. Such an approach has been previously
used in various settings when faced with a combinatorial optimization problem with a
rational objective function. It was, for example, used by Dantzig et al. (1966) for finding
the minimal cost to time ratio cycle in a network, by Megiddo (1979) for computational
complexity results on the optimization of rational objective functions, and more recently by
Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) in the closely related context of monopolistic assortment
optimization with Logit demand. The current work leverages this transformation to present
a unified framework for the analysis of both the cases of assortment-only and assortment
and price competition. This framework enables one to derive a crisp characterization of
equilibrium properties and can be used to analyze extensions to the original model, as
illustrated in Section 4.6.
The remainder of the chapter. The next section reviews related work. Section 4.3
formulates the model of assortment and price competition. Section 4.4 studies assortment-
only competition, where prices are fixed exogenously, while Section 4.5 focuses on joint
assortment and price competition. Finally, Section 4.6 presents possible extensions and
some associated challenges. Proofs are relegated to Appendix C
4.2 Literature review
A key building block in any assortment optimization problem lies in the definition of the
process through which customers choose among a selection of products. In this work we
focus on the multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model. Discrete choice models are extensively
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discussed in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2002), and the estimation and design
of specialized models has been an active area in Marketing (see, e.g., Guadagni and Little
(1983) for an early reference).
In the current work, both assortment and pricing decisions are considered in a compet-
itive environment. We begin by reviewing the relevant literature on assortment planning
before focusing on the existing literature on competitive models.
Assortment Optimization. The key challenges associated with assortment optimization
often stem from i.) the need to account for substitution effects when introducing products in
an assortment; and ii.) the presence of operational constraints captured through the costs
associated with different assortments or display constraints.
The problem of assortment planning has often been studied in conjunction with inven-
tory decisions, starting with the work of van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999). In the latter,
considering a Logit demand model and assuming customers do not look for a substitute if
their choice is stocked out (known as static substitution), the authors show that one can
significantly simplify the assortment problem as there are only a limited number of can-
didates to consider for the optimal assortment. Maddah and Bish (2007) study a similar
model, where in addition, the retailer could select prices; see also Aydin and Ryan (2000)
for a study in the absence of inventory considerations. In a similar setting as the one in
van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), Gaur and Honhon (2006) analyze the implications of the
alternative modeling of demand through a location choice model, building on the early work
of Hotelling (1929), on the broad conclusions obtained under Logit demand.
The case of customers looking for substitutes if their choice is stocked out, known as
stock-out based substitution, was studied in conjunction with inventory decisions by Smith
and Agrawal (2000) and Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001). In this setting, Goyal et al. (2009)
showed that the assortment problem is in general NP-Hard and proposed near-optimal
heuristics for a particular choice model.
In the present work, we do not consider inventory decisions and assume that products
that are included in a retailer’s assortment are always available when requested; hence
stock-out based substitution does not arise. In particular, we focus on the case where the
retailers have display constraints. Such a setting with Logit demand and fixed prices in
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a monopolistic context has been studied in Chen and Hausman (2000), where the authors
analyze mathematical properties of the problem and in Rusmevichientong et al. (2010),
where the authors provide an efficient algorithm for finding an optimal assortment. Fisher
and Vaidyanathan (2009) also study assortment optimization under display constraints and
highlight how such constraints arise in practice. In the absence of display constraints, the
assortment problem arises in the network revenue management literature; see Gallego et al.
(2004) and Liu and van Ryzin (2008) for results under the MNL model. When demand is
generated by a mixture of Logit (also referred to as a latent class model), Miranda et al.
(2009) show that the assortment optimization problem is NP-Hard (see also Rusmevichien-
tong et al. (2009)).
Alternative consumer choice models have been considered in the assortment planning
literature; for example, Cachon et al. (2005) study assortment decisions when consumers
might search across different stores for additional products and illustrate the consequences
of failing to incorporate consumer search in the assortment optimization. In a similar mod-
eling spirit but with a computational focus in the context of network revenue management,
Gallego (2010) incorporates the possibility that consumer choice may depend on the prod-
ucts that are not offered. A detailed review of the literature on monopolistic assortment
optimization and of industry practices can be found in Kok et al. (2008).
Competitive environment. Our work builds on the monopolistic studies above to de-
rive conclusions in competitive settings, where the literature is less extensive. As in the
case of monopolistic studies, locational choice models have also been considered (see, e.g.,
Alptekinoglu and Corbett (2008)) but most of the studies are anchored around the Logit
model and some of its extensions, as is the present one.
Price competition under choice models has been studied and is still an active area of
research. Anderson et al. (1992) study oligopoly pricing for single-product firms under Logit
demand and study pricing and assortment depth for multi-product firms in a duopoly with a
nested Logit demand, restricting attention to symmetric equilibria. When firms offer a single
product and customer choice is described by an attraction model, Bernstein and Federgruen
(2004) establish existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for profit maximizing firms and
Gallego et al. (2006) generalize this result for different cost structures. For the Logit
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model, Konovalov and Sa´ndor (2009) provide guarantees for the existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium for affine cost functions when firms may have multiple products. Allon et
al. (2010) provide conditions that ensure existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under
MNL demand with latent classes.
Misra (2008) studies joint assortment and price competition of retailers offering exclusive
products with MNL demand and in the presence of display constraints, and conducts an
empirical study to analyze the impact of competition on assortment size and prices. The
analytical results obtained focus on best response analysis but do not provide equilibrium
existence or uniqueness results. We also refer the reader to Draganska et al. (2009) for an
empirical investigation of assortment and pricing strategies in oligopolistic markets.
Additional dimensions of competition as well as alternative consumer choice models have
also been analyzed. Hopp and Xu (2008) study joint pricing, service rates and assortment
competition under MNL demand with random market size and operational costs associated
with the assortment size. They show existence of an equilibrium and provide sufficient con-
ditions for uniqueness. Cachon et al. (2008) analyze how consumer search (across retailers)
may influence equilibrium assortments and prices, focusing on symmetric equilibria. Cachon
and Ko¨k (2007) study price and assortment competition for retailers offering two categories
when basket shopping consumers are present, with an emphasis on the impact of centralized
category management. Recently, Ko¨k and Xu (2010) investigate assortment competition
under a hierarchical customer choice model, a nested MNL, focusing on the differences in
the properties of best responses for the cases where customers choose a product by first
selecting a brand or by first selecting a category.
It is worth noting that, to the best of our knowledge, all the competitive studies above
focus on the case where firms offer exclusive products. We will show that the introduction
of common products can lead to fundamentally different properties for the equilibrium set.
In addition, the unified framework we propose is fairly flexible and enables one to analyze
different models of competition under a common approach.
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4.3 Model
We next describe the operational setting in which retailers compete and the demand model
considered, and then present two competitive settings: one where retailers compete on
assortments when prices are predetermined and one where retailers compete on both as-
sortments and prices.
4.3.1 Operational setting
We consider duopolistic retailers that compete in product assortment and pricing decisions.
We will index retailers by 1 and 2, and whenever we use n to denote a retailer’s index, we
use m to denote her/his competitor’s (e.g., if n = 1, then m = 2).
We assume retailer n has access to a subset Nn of products, from which s/he must select
her/his product assortment. In addition, we assume that, due to display space constraints,
retailer n can offer at most Cn ≥ 1 products. Such display constraints have been used and
motivated in previous studies (see, e.g., Rusmevichientong et al. (2010), Misra (2008), and
Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2009)). Without loss of generality, we assume that Cn ≤ |Nn|,
where here and in the remainder of the chapter, |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A.
We will let N denote the set of all products, i.e., N = N1 ∪ N2, and denote its elements
by {1, . . . , S}. For each product i in N , we let ci ≥ 0 denote the marginal cost resulting
from acquiring a unit of the product, which will be assumed constant and common to both
retailers.
We will say that product i is exclusive to retailer n if it belongs to Nn but not to Nm;
we denote the set of exclusive products for retailer n by Nn \ Nm, where here and in all
that follows, A \ B := A ∩ Bc stands for the set difference between sets A and B, and the
complement of a set is taken relative to N . Similarly, we say that product i is common if
it is available to both retailers, i.e., if i belongs to N1 ∩N2.
For n in {1, 2}, we define Sn to be the set of feasible assortment selections for retailer
n, i.e.,
Sn := {A ⊆ Nn : |A| ≤ Cn} .
We also let An and pn := (pn,1, . . . , pn,S) denote the assortment selection and vector of prices
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offered by retailer n, respectively. Note that we include all products in N for notational
convenience but it should be clear that the only prices that will matter in this vector are
those that correspond to the assortment selection of the retailer. Additionally, we say that
retailer n offers a full-capacity assortment if |An| = Cn, and that an assortment is exclusive
if it consists only of exclusive products.
4.3.2 Demand model and retailers’ objective
We assume that customers have perfect information about product assortments and prices
from both retailers. For a given assortment decision An in Sn made by retailer n, we assume
that customer t assigns a utility Un,i(t) to buying product i in An from retailer n, and utility
Un,0(t) to not purchasing any product, where
Un,i(t) := µi − αpn,i + ξti , n = 1, 2
Un,0(t) := µ0 + ξ
t
0.
In the above, the µi’s are finite and deterministic parameters representing an adjusted mean
utility assigned to product i, and α > 0 is a parameter of price sensitivity. We assume{
ξti : i ∈ N ∪ {0}
}
are independent Gumbel distributed random variables with location
parameter 0 and scale parameter 1. Note that these random variables, which represent
idiosyncratic shocks to utility, are independent of the retailer n and hence we are implicitly
assuming that consumers do identify the fact that products are identical. In the current
setting, since the mean utilities (µi’s) and costs (ci’s) are assumed not to depend on the
retailers, the same product will always generate the same utility for a consumer if offered
at the same price. However, it is worth noting that the case of retailer-dependent mean
utilities or costs can be analyzed using the same techniques we use throughout this work.
We do not pursue this analysis to keep the notation as simple as possible. For convenience,
and without loss of generality, we set µ0 := 0.
Customers are utility maximizers; customer t computes the best option from each re-
tailer, in in argmax {Un,i(t) : i ∈ An ∪ {0}}, for n ∈ {1, 2}, and then selects option i that
belongs to argmax {U1,i1(t), U2,i2(t)}. As noted above, utility maximization may be attained
simultaneously at a single product offered by both retailers at the same price. In such a
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case, we assume customers select any of the retailers, with equal probability.
For i = 1, ..., S, define the attraction factor of product i when offered at price p as follows
νi(p) := e
µi−αp.
We will refer to the sum of attraction factors over products in a given assortment as the
attractiveness of such an assortment.
The above setup leads to MNL demand where the customers’ consideration set is ob-
tained after eliminating options that are strictly dominated, i.e., products that are offered
at a lower price at another retailer. In particular, one can show that for given assortment
and price decisions {(An, pn) : n = 1, 2}, the probability that a customer elects to purchase
product i in An from retailer n, qn,i, is given by
qn,i(An, pn, Am, pm) :=
νi(pn,i)
(










where 1{·} denotes the indicator function and
δn,i(pn, pm) :=

1 if pn,i < pm,i,
1
2 if pn,i = pm,i,
0 if pn,i > pm,i,
defines the split of product i’s market share between the retailers (when offered by both)
as a function of the prices. The expected profit per customer for retailer n, is then written
as pin(An, pn, Am, pm) :=
∑
i∈An(pn,i − ci) qn,i(An, pn, Am, pm), or, equivalently
pin(An, pn, Am, pm) =
∑
i∈An\Am(pn,i − ci) νi(pn,i) +
∑









Each retailer’s objective is to maximize her/his expected profit per customer, given the
competitors’s decisions.
4.3.3 Competition in product assortment and pricing decisions
Assortment-only competition. In this setup, prices are predetermined and not under
the control of retailers, and these compete through their assortment selection. This setting
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is relevant when, e.g., prices are determined by the manufacturers/service providers and
not the retailers. Given retailer m’s assortment decision, retailer n selects an assortment so
as to maximize her/his expected profit per customer subject to the display constraint on
the number of products that can be offered. Mathematically, the problem that retailer n
solves can be written as follows
max
An∈Sn
{pin(An, pn, Am, pm)} . (4.1)
Problem (4.1) is a combinatorial problem where the retailer attempts to find the best set of
products to offer among all the possible assortments in Sn. We say that a feasible assortment
An is a best response to Am if An maximizes the profit per customer for retailer n, i.e., if
An solves problem (4.1). Given that there is a finite number of feasible assortments, there
always exists at least one best response for every assortment Am in Sm. For n = 1, 2, let
Bn(Am) denote the set of best responses to Am, i.e., the set of assortments that achieve
the maximum value for problem (4.1). We say that an assortment pair (A1, A2) is an
equilibrium if An belongs to Bn(Am) for n = 1, 2. Formally, this corresponds to the concept
of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Joint assortment and price competition. In this setting, retailers can decide on both
the products to include in their assortments and the prices at which to offer them in a
simultaneous fashion. In such a case, given an assortment selection Am offered by retailer
m with a corresponding vector of prices pm, retailer n’s objective is to maximize its expected
profit per customer, which can be formalized as follows.
sup
An∈Sn, pn∈RS
{pin(An, pn, Am, pm)} . (4.2)
Problem (4.2) now combines continuous decision variables (prices) and discrete ones (as-
sortments). As in the previous case, we will say that an assortment-price pair (An, pn) is
a best response to (Am, pm) if (An, pn) maximizes the profit per customer for retailer n,
i.e., if (An, pn) solves problem (4.2). With some abuse of notation, for n = 1, 2, we also
let Bn(Am, pm) denote the set of all such solutions, i.e., the best response correspondence.
(When problem (4.2) admits no solution, the latter set is empty.) We say that a 4-tuple
(A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium in assortment and price decisions if (An, pn) belongs to
Bn(Am, pm) for n = 1, 2.
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It is worth noting that while we pursue simultaneous assortment and price competition,
there are settings where pricing decisions might only be made after assortment decisions
are taken by both firms. The framework we use enables one to also analyze sequential
competition and we comment on the type of results this leads to in Section 4.6.
4.4 Assortment-only Competition: Main Results
We consider retailers competing in assortment decisions when product prices are exoge-
nously given. We start the analysis by studying the problem of computing the best response
correspondence Bn(·), for n = 1, 2. We assume throughout this section that all products
have a non-negative profit margin. Note also that while we do not impose any particular
relationship between the µi’s, the product prices pn,i’s and the costs ci’s, the analysis will
of course apply to cases where such a relationship exists.
Best response correspondence. The analysis of the best response correspondence will
rely on a simple equivalent formulation of the profit maximization problem. This idea of
focusing on such an equivalent formulation when faced with a combinatorial problem with
an objective function in the form of a ratio has previously been used in various settings
as mentioned in the introduction. The reader is in particular referred to Gallego et al.
(2004) and Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) for applications to monopolistic assortment
optimization with Logit demand. The treatment that follows accounts for the appropriate




















It is easy to see that Problems (4.1) and (4.3) are equivalent in the following sense: the
optimal values for both problems are equal and an assortment is optimal for problem (4.1)
if and only if it maximizes the left-hand-side of (4.4) when λ is equal to the maximal
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value. Hence the value of problem (4.3) is the maximal expected profit that retailer n
can achieve given its competitor’s assortment, Am. Fix λ ∈ R and let Sλ(Am) denote
the set of optimal solutions to the maximization on the left-hand-side of (4.4). One could
solve (4.3) (and hence (4.1)) by computing Sλ(Am) for all possible values of λ, and then
selecting any assortment in Sλ∗(Am), where λ∗ corresponds to the highest value of λ for
which pin(a, pn, Am, pm) ≥ λ holds, for a in Sλ(Am). This observation will prove useful in
the equilibrium analysis we conduct for this setting, as well as throughout the rest of the
chapter. We now outline how to compute Sλ(Am). To that end, for i ∈ Nn, we define
θi(λ) :=
 (pn,i − ci − λ) νi(pn,i) if i ∈ Nn \Am,(δn,i(pn, pm)(pn,i − ci)− λ) νi(min{pn,i, pm,i}) + λνi(pm,i) otherwise.
(4.5)















Now, one can solve for Sλ(Am) by ordering the products in Nn according to the correspond-
ing values of θi(λ), from highest to lowest, and selecting the maximum number of products
in the assortment (up to Cn) with positive values of θi(λ).
Product ranking. Note that the product ranking according to the θi’s (and hence the
selected assortment) will vary depending on the value of λ and on which products are
included in the competitor’s assortment Am. This last observation implies that, for a fixed
value of λ, a product that is not “appealing” (i.e., a product that is not included in a best
response) if not offered by the competitor might become appealing when the latter offers
it. This can be seen from (4.5); indeed, if, for example, retailer n offers the lowest price
for product i, θi(λ) increases by a factor of λνi(pm,i) when product i is offered by retailer
m. This gain can be interpreted as the value of profiting from product i without having
to expand the consideration set of customers. In addition, as already highlighted for a
monopoly in Rusmevichientong et al. (2010), such a ranking for an optimal value of λ need
not coincide with the ranking of the profit margins.
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4.4.1 The case of exclusive products
This section studies the case of retailers having only exclusive products, i.e., N1 ∩ N2 = ∅.
We begin by specializing the best response computation to this setting, and then study
equilibrium behavior.
Best response properties. In this setting, since retailers cannot offer common products,
(4.3) can be written as
max
{














Note that the inner maximization in (4.6) does not depend on the competitor’s assortment,
Am, and hence neither does the collection
{Sλ(Am) : λ ∈ R}. In addition, the solution
to (4.6) (and hence retailer n’s profit) depends on Am only through
∑
i∈Am νi(pm,i). For





For given assortment offerings, A1 and A2, this quantity is related to the market share
of retailer n as the latter is given by En(An)/(1 + E1(A1) + E2(A2)). Define λn(e) to be
the retailer n’s expected profit per customer when retailer m offers assortment Am with
attractiveness e. That is
λn(e) := max
{




(pn,i − ci − λ) νi(pn,i)
}
≥ λ(1 + e)
}
.






(pn,i − ci − λn(e)) νi(pn,i)
}
. (4.7)
The next result establishes monotonicity properties of the best response correspondence
in terms of attractiveness and profit level.
Proposition 1 (best response properties). Suppose that N1 ∩N2 = ∅.
i.) Retailer n’s best response profit is decreasing in the attractiveness of its competitor’s
assortment, i.e., λn(e) is decreasing in e.
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ii.) The attractiveness of retailer n’s best response assortments is non-decreasing in the




En(a) : a ∈ an(e′)
} ≤ min {En(a) : a ∈ an(e)} .
Proposition 1 i.) states that a retailer’s (optimized) profits will decrease if the com-
petitor increases the attractiveness/breadth of its offerings, which is in line with intuition.
Proposition 1 ii.) provides an important qualitative insight: if one retailer increases the
attractiveness of the products it is offering, then so will the other one. In particular, it
implies that if one compares a retailer with capacity C1 operating in a duopoly with a
monopolist with the same capacity, then the one operating in a duopoly will offer a set of
products with higher attractiveness than the monopolist (whose assortment attractiveness
corresponds to the attractiveness of the best response of the retailer operating in a duopoly
when the competitor does not offer any product). As we will see next, this result plays a
key role in characterizing the set of equilibria in this scenario.
The conclusions of Proposition 1 are usually obtained in the context of supermodular
games. However, it is worth noting that, in general, it is not clear whether one could
obtain a supermodular representation of the assortment game with the exception of the
case where margins are equal across products. (In the latter case, the game can be seen to
be log-supermodular on the discrete lattice of possible attractiveness levels induced by all
feasible assortments.) However, once properties outlined in Proposition 1 are at hand, one
can establish existence and ordering of equilibria in a similar fashion as is usually performed
for supermodular games, which we do next.
Equilibrium behavior. The following result guarantees that an equilibrium exists.
Theorem 7 (equilibrium existence). Suppose that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅. Then there always exists
an equilibrium in assortment decisions.
Theorem 7 establishes the existence of an equilibrium, but leaves open the possibility
of having multiple equilibria. While there might indeed exist multiple equilibria, we show
next that if such a case occurs, both retailers will prefer the same equilibrium.
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Proposition 2 (best equilibrium). Suppose that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅ and that multiple equilibria
exist. Then, among these equilibria, retailer n receives maximal profits in the one that
minimizes the attractiveness En(An), n = 1, 2. Moreover, both retailers prefer the same
equilibrium.
In other words, when multiple equilibria exist, retailers would prefer to select the one
with the least breadth of offerings. The result is a direct consequence of the relationship
between profit level and attractiveness of the offering, established in Proposition 1 i.). We
note that Proposition 1, Theorem 7 and Proposition 2 can be generalized to an arbitrary
number of retailers and we briefly indicate how one might do so in the proofs of those
results.
We next focus on the question of uniqueness of an equilibrium and more generally the
number of equilibria that may exist. As a prelude to that analysis, we first consider the
following example.
Example 1. Consider a setting where N1 = {1, 2, 3}, N2 = {4, 5, 6}, and α = 1, pn,i = 1
for n = 1, 2, µi = 1, for i = 1, . . . , 6. Setting C1 = C2 = 1 and ci = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 6, one
gets that any pair (i1, i2) in N1 × N2 constitutes an equilibrium in assortment decisions.
However, in each equilibrium (A1, A2), one has En(An) = 1 and pin(An, pn, Am, pm) = 1/3,
for n = 1, 2. This situation stems from the fact that retailer n is indifferent between the
competitor offering Am or A
′
m, provided that Em(Am) = Em(A
′
m).
Hence, one can have situations in which while there may be many equilibria, some of
these share very important properties, which motivates the following definition.
Definition 1 (equivalent equilibria for assortment competition). We say that two equilibria,




2) are equivalent if En(An) = En(A
′
n), for n = 1, 2. Otherwise, we say
that two equilibria are fundamentally different.
Note that two equilibria are equivalent if each retailer offers assortments with the same
attractiveness level and hence, each retailer collects the same profits in both of them.
A bound on the number of equilibria. We will restrict attention to fundamentally
different equilibria. These are generated by best response assortments with different attrac-
tiveness levels. Let En denote the set of attractiveness levels of all possible best response
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assortments offered by retailer n, i.e.,
En := {En(a) ∈ R+ : a ∈ an(e) , e ≥ 0} , for n = 1, 2.
The next proposition introduces a bound on the number of fundamentally different equilib-
ria, based on the cardinality of these sets.
Theorem 8 (bound on the number of equilibria). Suppose that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅. Then there
are at most |E1|+ |E2| − 1 fundamentally different equilibria.
A priori, a trivial bound on the number of fundamentally different equilibria is the
number of combinations of best response attractiveness levels, |E1| |E2|. Theorem 8 provides
a significantly sharper bound. The proof of Theorem 8 relies on the strong monotonicity
property established in Proposition 1 ii.), which enables one to eliminate a large number of
candidates in the set of possible equilibria.
Corollary 3 (Sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium). Suppose that all products
offered by a given retailer have the same margin, i.e., pn,i− ci = rn for all i ∈ Nn, n = 1, 2,
where r1 and r2 are given positive constants. Then, all equilibria are equivalent.
This result follows from the fact that when margins are equal across products, |En| = 1
for n = 1, 2. In particular, {an(e) : e ∈ R+} = Pn(Nn, Cn), where for n = 1, 2 and a set of








Pn(Z,C) will be referred to as the C-popular sets of products and a set in Pn(Z,C) is
formed by min{C, |Z|} products in Z with the highest attraction factors. The above, in
conjunction with Theorem 8 yields that all equilibria are equivalent (i.e., there is a unique
equilibrium in the fundamentally different sense).
We illustrate below that the bound of Theorem 8 can be applied in other important
cases and also show that the bound cannot be improved upon in general.
Case of monotonic margins. Suppose that a higher attraction factor is synonymous with
a higher profit margin, i.e., that νi(pn,i) ≥ νj(pn,j) if and only if pn,i− ci ≥ pn,j − cj , for all
i, j ∈ Nn, n = 1, 2. Recalling the definition of the θi’s in (4.5) and of an(e) in (4.7), for a
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given e ∈ R, one has that assortments in an(e) consist of some subset of the products with
highest θi(λ(e)), which implies that
{an(e) : e ∈ R+} ⊆ {Pn(Nn, C) : 1 ≤ C ≤ Cn} .
The latter set of assortments, is commonly referred to as the set of popular assortments; see,
for example, van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999). Hence, one has that |En| ≤ Cn for n = 1, 2
and, by Theorem 8, there exist at most C1 + C2 − 1 fundamentally different equilibria.
There are other cases of interest that can be analyzed. One of these was recently studied
in Rusmevichientong et al. (2010) in the context of assortment planning for a monopolist.
There, a number of assumptions (detailed below) are introduced with the purpose of limiting
the cardinality of En by limiting the number of different product rankings (based on the
θi(λ)’s) one could obtain for all values of λ.
Case of distinct customer preferences and intersection points. For n = 1, 2, for i < j in
Nn, define
In(i, j) := (pn,i − ci)νi(pn,i)− (pn,j − cj)νj(pn,j)
νi(pn,i)− νj(pn,j) .
Suppose products are such that νi(pn,i) 6= νj(pn,j) for i 6= j, and that In(i, j) 6= In(i′, j′) for
any (i, j) 6= (i′, j′), for n = 1, 2. Under this assumption, when one varies λ, the θi(λ)-based
ranking of products changes by swapping at most two consecutively ranked products. This
limits the number of possible assortments in an(e) for any e, which limits the cardinality
of En. Under such assumptions, Rusmevichientong et al. (2010), Theorem 2.5 show that
|En| ≤ Cn(|Nn|−Cn+1), hence the number of fundamentally different equilibria is bounded
by C1(|N1| − C1 + 1) + C2(|N2| − C2 + 1)− 1.
Theorem 8 provides an upper bound on the number of equilibria one may sustain. The
next example shows that such a bound is tight for the case of monotonic margins.
Example 2 (matching bound). Consider the case where νi(pn,i) 6= νj(pn,j) for all i, j in
Pn(Nn, Cn), n = 1, 2. Let in = Pn(Nn, 1), for n = 1, 2. Suppose that for all j in Nn \ {in},
pn,j − cj = rn, where
r1 :=
(p1,i1 − ci1) ν1,i1(p1,i1)
1 + ν1,i1(p1,i1) + E2(P2(N2, C2))
and r2 :=
(p2,i1 − ci2) ν2,i2(p2,i2)
1 + ν2,i2(p2,i2) + E1(P1(N1, 1))
.
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In other words, for each retailer, all products except the one with the highest attraction
factor have the same profit margin, and the latter is strictly lower than that of the former.
This is an instance of a problem with monotonic margins. In such a case, as shown above,
the set of all possible best response attractiveness levels for retailer n, En, is exactly the set
of popular assortments.
Given the construction of profit margins above, it is possible to show that when retailer
1 selects the assortment P1(N1, 1), retailer 2 is indifferent between all the popular assort-
ments, i.e., B2(P1(N1, 1)) = {P2(N2, C) : 1 ≤ C ≤ C2}. Similarly, when retailer 2 selects
the largest popular assortment P2(N2, C2), retailer 1 is indifferent between all popular as-
sortments, i.e., B1(P2(N2, C2)) = {P1(N1, C) : 1 ≤ C ≤ C1}. This, in conjunction with the
increasing property of the best response attractiveness in the competitor’s attractiveness
(see Proposition 1 ii.)) implies that
(P1(N1, 1), A), A ∈ {P2(N2, C) : 1 ≤ C ≤ C2} and (A,P2(N2, C2)), A ∈ {P1(N1, C) : 1 ≤ C ≤ C1} ,
are all fundamentally different equilibria. Hence, the number of fundamentally different
equilibria is given by |E1| + |E2| − 1 = C1 + C2 − 1, which matches the bound in Theorem
8.
Computing the set of fundamentally different equilibria. We have not addressed
the issue of computing the equilibria so far. It can be shown that, in general, one can build
on efficient procedures available to compute optimal assortments of a monopoly (see, e.g.,
Rusmevichientong et al. (2010)) in order to compute all fundamentally different equilibria
in an efficient manner. In particular, it is possible to construct a superset of all possible
best responses {Sλ(Am) : Am ∈ Am, λ > 0} which would yield a set of candidate equilibria.
In turn, one may conduct an efficient search across all candidate equilibria by using the
monotonicity properties established in Proposition 1.
4.4.2 The case of both exclusive and common products
We now turn to the case when retailers may offer the same products in their respective
assortments, i.e., when N1 ∩N2 is not empty. We provide sufficient conditions for existence
of an equilibrium but show that in general the key structural results derived in Section
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4.4.1 will fail to hold. In particular, we show that i.) an equilibrium may fail to exist; and
ii.) the set of fundamentally different equilibria might have a number of elements growing
exponentially with C1 and C2, even in the special case of equal margins for all products.
Example 3 (non-existence of equilibrium). Consider a setting with two retailers, each
having access to the three same products N1 = N2 = {1, 2, 3}, and with display capacities
C1 = 2, C2 = 1. Suppose that prices and costs are uniform across products and retailers
and given by pn,1 = pn,2 = pn,3 = p > 1 and c1 = c2 = c3 = p − 1 for n = 1, 2, and that
the mean utilities are such that ν1(p) = 1.1, ν2(p) = 1.01, ν3(p) = 1. Table 4.1 depicts the
rewards for each retailer for feasible pairs of assortment decisions (A1, A2). There, each
entry corresponds the profit of retailer 1 and retailer 2 (in that order).
A1
{1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
A
2
{1} (0.262, 0.262) (0.354, 0.325) (0.355, 0.323) (0.502, 0.177) (0.500, 0.177) (0.489, 0.268)
{2} (0.325, 0.354) (0.251, 0.251) (0.336, 0.332) (0.516, 0.162) (0.511, 0.246) (0.500, 0.168)
{3} (0.323, 0.355) (0.332, 0.336) (0.250, 0.250) (0.513, 0.243) (0.516, 0.161) (0.502, 0.166)
Table 4.1: Illustration of non-existence of equilibrium in the setup of Example 3.
One can verify that no equilibrium exists. Intuitively, the latter stems from the fact that
retailer 1, with a capacity of 2, will always prefer to incorporate in its assortment the product
that retailer 2 is offering, while retailer 2 prefers to offer an exclusive product. Recalling
the discussion following the definition of θi(λ) in (4.5), the current example illustrates how
a product gains in appeal (measured by θi) when offered by the competitor. In this setting,
this prevents the possibility of an equilibrium.
While the previous example shows that one may not ensure in general the existence
of an equilibrium in assortment decisions, the next result provides sufficient conditions for
existence of an equilibrium, exists in this scenario.
Proposition 3 (sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence). Suppose that one of the
following two conditions is satisfied:
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i.) N1 = N2 = N , C1 = C2 = C and pi − ci = r for all i ∈ N .
ii.) Cn ≥ |Sn|, n = 1, 2, and p1,i = p2,i for all i ∈ N .
Then, an equilibrium in assortment decisions is guaranteed to exist.
Condition i.) essentially says that as long firms have only common products, and those
have the same profit margin, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. So the combination of
exclusive and common products, in conjunction with different product margins seems to be
a driver of the potential failure for an equilibrium to exist. Condition ii.) ensures that both
retailers operate without any capacity constraints. In such a case, it is always possible to
construct an equilibrium in which both retailers offer all common products. Indeed, when
one retailer does so, it is always optimal for the competing retailer to also do so and given
this, the equilibrium analysis boils down to the selection of exclusive products, for which
an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by the analysis of Section 4.4.1.
In the cases where an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, the implications of the intro-
duction of common products on the number of equilibria still remains. The example below,
for which condition i.) in Proposition 3 holds, shows that the number of equilibria may be
exponential in the capacities of the retailers.
Example 4 (exponential number of equilibria). Consider the following setup. Suppose
that the set of available products is common to both retailers (N1 = N2) and has S = 2C
elements, where C1 = C2 = C, that all products are priced at the same uniform price p,
that their marginal cost is zero, and that the µi’s are ordered so that












This condition corresponds to assuming that the maximum share any retailer can achieve
(under any scenario) is below 25%. Under the setup above, we show that if retailer 2 offers
an arbitrary selection of products A2, then the best response of retailer 1 is to offer the
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set of C products with the highest νi’s in N1 \ A2, i.e., to offer the remaining C products.
















Given any assortment offered by retailer 2, A2, the revenues of retailer 1, λ, are bounded
by the revenues of a monopolist (with display capacity C), i.e., λ ≤ p(∑Ci=1 νi(p))(1 +∑C
i=1 νi(p))
−1. This, in conjunction with the market share condition above, implies that
λ ≤ p/4.
For any products j in N1 \A2 and j′ in A2, given that νj′(p) < (3/2)νj(p), it will always
be the case that νj(p)(p − λ) ≥ (3/4)νj(p)p > νj′(p) p/2. Hence θj(λ) > θj′(λ) and the
best response of retailer 1 to A2 will never include any product in A2. In addition, since
λ ≤ p/4, retailer 1 will always include the remaining C products in N1.
Given the above, it is possible to verify that any pair of assortments (A1, A2) that
belongs to the set
EQ := {A1 ⊆ N , A2 = N \A1 : |A1| = C}
is an equilibrium. It is also possible to see that one can choose the νi(p)’s so that all
equilibria are fundamentally different. In particular, the cardinality of EQ is given by (2CC ).
This illustrates that in general, even when prices are uniform, the number of fundamentally
different equilibria may be exponential in the capacities of the retailers in contrast with
what was observed in the case of exclusive products (see Corollary 3).
It is also worth noting that each firm will prefer a different equilibrium in this exam-
ple (each retailer prefers the equilibrium where s/he offers the products with the highest
attraction factors), in stark contrast with the case of exclusive products, where both firms
always prefer the same equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
4.5 Joint Assortment and Price Competition: Main Results
We now turn attention to the case where in addition to assortment decisions retailers also
set prices for the products they offer. We follow a parallel exposition to that of Section 4.4,
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by first studying the best response correspondence before separating the analysis for the
case of exclusive products and that of both exclusive and common products. Without loss
of generality, we assume throughout this section that prices are restricted to be greater or
equal than ci for any product i.
Best response correspondence. Fix an assortment Am in Sm and corresponding price
vector pm. Retailer n’s best response to (Am, pm) consists of the assortment-price pairs
solving Problem (4.2). We will establish that problem (4.2) is equivalent, in some sense,
to a problem where the relevant decision is reduced to the retailer’s assortment. For that
purpose, define for any assortment A in Sn and any λ > 0,
p∗n,i(A, λ,Am, pm) :=
 1α + ci + λ if i ∈ A \Am,min{ 1α + ci + λ, pm,i} if i ∈ A ∩Am. (4.9)
Loosely speaking, p∗n,i is the optimal price for product i when assortment A is offered and




eµi−(ciα+1), for i in N .
As in the previous section, for n = 1, 2 and a set of products Z ⊆ Nn, we define sets of








i.e., a set in P˜n(Z,C) is formed by C products in Z with the highest value of ν˜i. Note that
the definition of the C-popular sets matches the one provided in (4.8) when prices are set
as in (4.9) and no product is offered by both retailers simultaneously.
2More formally, any sequence {pkn : k ≥ 1} such that pkn,i < p∗n,i for all i in A and k ≥ 1 and pkn → p∗n
yields profits that converge to the supremum in (4.2) as k → ∞ and An is fixed to A. (4.9) can be seen
to be an expression of “equal margins” across offered products, with the modifications to account for the
possibility of common products. Such a property has previously appeared in various related settings; see,
e.g., Anderson et al. (1992).
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Lemma 3. Problems (4.2) and (4.10) are equivalent in the following sense: the optimal
values for both problems are equal and an assortment is optimal for problem (4.2) if and
only if it maximizes the left-hand-side of (4.11) when λ is equal to the supremum value, λ∗.
Moreover, for any maximizing assortment a in Sn, for any sequence
{
pk : k ≥ 1} of prices
such that pkn,i < p
∗
n,i(a, λ




k, Am, pm) = λ
∗.
Hence, one has that the optimal solution to (4.10) and the corresponding assortments
that maximize the left-hand-side of (4.11) represent the optimal profit and the optimal
assortments, respectively3. When offering any maximizing assortment a in Sn one can
get arbitrarily close to achieve the profit level of λ∗ by pricing products in a just below
p∗n(λ∗, a, Am, pm). Fix λ ∈ R and let Sλ(Am, pm) be the solution set to the inner maximiza-
tion in (4.11). For i ∈ Nn define
θi(λ) :=
 ν˜ie−λα if i ∈ Nn \Am,νi(p∗n,i)(p∗n,i − ci − λ) + λ νi(pm,i) if i ∈ Nn ∩Am. (4.12)
As in the case of assortment competition (see the discussion immediately following (4.3)),
one can solve for Sλ(Am, pm) by selecting the products with highest positive values of θi(λ).
From (4.12) one observes that θi(λ) is always non-negative, for i ∈ Nn. As a result, one can
show that elements of Sλ(Am, pm) are necessarily full-capacity assortments, for any λ > 0.
This is formalized in the next result.
Lemma 4. Both retailers will always offer full-capacity assortments in an equilibrium.
3One notes that when retailers offer a product i in common, optimal profits are not achieved unless
pn,i = pm,i = ci due to the discontinuity of profits when pn,i = pm,i > ci.
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In other words, a retailer will always benefit from including an additional product into
its assortment. This contrasts with the case of assortment-only competition where retailers
may not want to offer the maximal number of products. Hence, the ability to modify prices
enables retailer n to always have Cn products that can be included in an optimal assortment.
4.5.1 The case of exclusive products
This section studies the case of retailers having only exclusive products, i.e., N1 ∩N2 = ∅.

















Note that the inner maximization in (4.13) does not depend on (Am, pm), hence neither
does the collection of all best response candidates
{Sλ : λ ∈ R} (hence we suppress its
dependence on Am and pm). From (4.12) one has that
{Sλ : λ ∈ R} = P˜n(Nn, Cn), i.e.,
the assortment best response is always formed by the Cn most attractive products (in terms
of the ν˜i’s), independent of the competitor’s decisions, for n = 1, 2. Note that, for a given
λ > 0, all Cn-popular sets of Nn will provide the same attractiveness. This justifies the





where a is any assortment in P˜n(Nn, Cn). With this, (4.13) reduces to
max
{








With the optimal value to the problem above, λ∗, one can compute optimal prices for any
equilibrium assortment a in P˜n(Nn, Cn) through p∗n,i = 1/α+ ci + λ∗.
Equilibrium behavior. From (4.14) above, one observes that all assortments in P˜n(Nn, Cn)
are essentially equivalent for purposes of equilibrium computation. The next definition is
the equivalent of Definition 1 adapted to the current setting.
Definition 2 (equivalent equilibria for joint assortment and price competition). We say that








2) are equivalent if for n = 1, 2,
∑
i∈An ν˜i =




Otherwise, we say that two equilibria are fundamentally different.
As in section 4.4, retailers offer assortments with the same attractiveness level and collect
the same profits in equivalent equilibria4. The next proposition establishes existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium in this setting.
Proposition 4 (equilibrium existence and uniqueness). Suppose that N1 ∩N2 = ∅. Then,
there always exists an equilibrium. Moreover, all equilibria are equivalent, and characterized
by retailer n offering any assortment a in P˜n(Nn, Cn), and charging pn,i = 1α + ci + λn, for
i ∈ a, where (λ1, λ2) is the unique solution to the system of equations
Vne
−λnα = λn(1 + αVme−λmα), n = 1, 2. (4.15)
For the existence result, one can use similar monotonicity properties as those established
in Proposition 1. Uniqueness (in the fundamentally different sense) follows from the fact
all assortments in P˜n(Nn, Cn) have the same attractiveness, in equilibrium. Recall from
Theorem 7 and Corollary 3 that there is a unique equilibrium (in the fundamentally different
sense) when margins are equal across products offered by a given retailer and exogenously
fixed. In the current setting, a similar conclusion is obtained; however, it is worth noting
that while margins are necessarily equal across products offered by a given retailer, the
margins are endogenously determined. We note that Proposition 4 can be generalized to
an arbitrary number of retailers and we indicate how one may do so in the proof. We also
observe that (λ1, λ2), the solution to (4.15), is such that λ1 ≥ λ2 if and only if V1 ≥ V2, i.e.,
the retailer with the broader assortment (better products in terms of Vn) will achieve the
highest profit, in equilibrium.
The analysis of best responses in this setting has already appeared in the literature
(see, e.g., Misra (2008)). The result above complements such an analysis by establishing
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, but also illustrates along the way the general
applicability of the framework we use.
4Note that this is also true when retailers offer overlapping product sets. This is a consequence of Lemma
5 that appears in Section 4.5.2.
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4.5.2 The case of both exclusive and common products
We now consider the case where retailers have overlapping product sets, i.e., N1 ∩ N2 6= ∅.
We first establish properties that any equilibrium must satisfy, which will limit the set of
candidates when searching for equilibria.
Lemma 5. Suppose |Nn| > Cn for some n = 1, 2, and that (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium.
Then A1 ∩ A2 = ∅. Moreover, it is necessarily the case that at least one retailer offers an
exclusive assortment, i.e., An ∩Nm = ∅ for some n = 1, 2.
Lemma 5 states that, as long as a retailer has more products to select from than what
s/he can offer, no product will be offered by both retailers simultaneously in equilibrium.
This stems from the fact that if a product is offered by both retailers in equilibrium, then it
is necessarily priced at cost and the above retailer will always benefit by substituting it for
a different product. At an intuitive level, the second part of the Lemma is a consequence
of the fact that if both retailers want to offer common products, then both of them will
want to offer the same common products, which is not possible in equilibrium. Hence, the
only possibility is that a single retailer selects products from the pool of common products.
Note that is a consequence of the intense price competition the retailers engage in for
common products. As soon as such competition is softened, then retailers may offer the
same products in equilibrium. The latter may occur if prices are fixed as in Section 4.4 or
when a minimum price is imposed by manufacturers as discussed in Section 4.6.
The result above motivates the following definition. For (n, k) in {1, 2} × {1, 2}, we let
N kn :=
 Nn \ Nk if n 6= k,Nn otherwise.
Equilibria in which only retailer n offers products in N1 ∩N2 must also be equilibria when
retailer n is restricted to offer products in N nn and retailer m is restricted to offer products in
N nm. Since these scenarios correspond to cases of exclusive products, Proposition 4 ensures
that all equilibria are equivalent in the latter case. Also, we know that such equilibria can




ν˜i, n = 1, 2, k = 1, 2 ,
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where a corresponds to any assortment in P˜n(N kn , Cn). For k = 1, 2, let (λk1, λk2) be the




1 + αV kme
−λkmα
)
, n = 1, 2,
and define the set of 4-tuples of type k as
CEk :=
{
(A1, p1, A2, p2) : An ∈ P˜n(N kn , Cn) , pn,i = ci + λkn +
1
α
, i ∈ An , n = 1, 2
}
.
CEk contains all the equivalent equilibria associated with the case where retailer 1 and 2
are restricted to select products in Sk1 and Sk2 , respectively. Lemma 5 in conjunction with
the above discussion implies that in the absence of such restrictions, the set of equilibria is
contained in CE1 ∪ CE2 as long as |Nn| > Cn for some n = 1, 2. The next result provides a
characterization of equilibrium behavior.
Theorem 9 (equilibrium existence and uniqueness). All equilibria are necessarily equiva-
lent. In addition, we have the following characterization.
i.) Suppose Cn ≤ |Sn \ Sm| for at least one n in {1, 2}. Then, all candidates in CE1∩CE2
are equilibria and only one of CE1 \ CE2 or CE2 \ CE1 can contain an equilibrium.
ii.) Suppose Cn > |Sn \ Sm| for n = 1, 2.
a) If Cn = |Sn| for n = 1, 2, then there exists a unique equilibrium.
b) If Cn < |Sn| for some n in {1, 2}, then there is no equilibrium.
The first part of Theorem 9 describes a setting in which at least one retailer has an
ample set of exclusive products to select from (i.e., Cn ≤ |Sn \ Sm|). When both retailers
prefer to offer exclusive assortments rather than offer common products, then CE1 ∩ CE2 is
necessarily non-empty and an equilibrium always exists. When common products have the
potential to increase the profit of a retailer, it is not possible to guarantee existence of an
equilibrium, however, one can show that the set of candidate equilibria can be restricted
to at most one of CE1 \ CE2 or CE2 \ CE1. We provide in Proposition 5 and the discussion
that follows a procedure to first identify which set may contain an equilibrium and second
to verify whether an equilibrium exists.
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The second part of Theorem 9 establishes existence and uniqueness results in setting
where no retailer has an ample set of exclusive products to select from, i.e., no retailer can
offer a full-capacity and exclusive assortment. In particular, an equilibrium will only exist
if retailers do not have any option with regard to what products to offer (case ii.)b) when
selecting a full-capacity assortment. (Recall that retailers necessarily offer full-capacity
assortments in equilibrium (see Lemma 4).) In such a case, it is established in the proof
of Theorem 9 that the unique equilibrium is such that each retailer offers all products and
prices product i in N1 ∩ N2 at pn,i = ci and product i in Nn \ Nm at pn,i = ci + 1/α+ λn,














, n = 1, 2.
Now, if retailers have some flexibility when selecting a full-capacity assortment (case ii.)b)),
then no equilibrium can be sustained. Indeed, in any equilibrium, at least one product
would need to be offered by both retailers (since Cn > |Sn \ Sm| for n = 1, 2). However,
each retailer would want to deviate from such a scenario by replacing a product offered
by both retailers (which is necessarily offered at its marginal cost in equilibrium) by either
another common product that s/he is not currently offering (and charging a slightly lower
price than the competitor), or by an exclusive product that is not currently being offered.
It is worth noting that the absence of equilibrium is driven by the intense price competition
the retailers engage in for common products, and when such competition is softened then
some candidate equilibria may become sustainable (see, e.g., Proposition 3 for an illustration
when prices are fixed).
Checking equilibrium existence. While Theorem 9 solves the issue of equilibrium
uniqueness, existence is guaranteed only if CE1 ∩ CE2 6= ∅. When the latter condition
fails to hold one is left with the task of checking which of CE1 \ CE2 or CE2 \ CE1 contains
equilibria, if any. The next proposition provides a procedure to eliminate one of the candi-
date sets. Before stating the result, we note that it will always be the case that V nn ≥ V nm
for some n in {1, 2}.
Proposition 5 (elimination of equilibrium candidates). Take n in {1, 2} such that V nn ≥
V nm. If a ∩ Nn 6= ∅ for some a in P˜m(Nm, Cm), then no candidate in CEn \ CEm is an
CHAPTER 4. PRODUCT ASSORTMENT AND PRICE COMPETITION WITH
INFORMED CONSUMERS 98
equilibrium. Otherwise, no candidate in CEm \ CEn is an equilibrium.
Note that the procedure above does not require the computation of actual equilibria in
the candidate sets.
Suppose that CEn \ CEm is a valid candidate for containing equilibria, after checking
the condition above. Note that it must be the case that retailer n offers common products
in any element of the candidate set. To check whether all elements of CEn \ CEm are
equilibria or not, it is sufficient to evaluate the impact of a single deviation starting from
a single candidate equilibrium. One needs to evaluate the impact of retailer m offering the
most attractive common product instead of the least attractive exclusive product currently
offered. More formally, if CEn \ CEm remains a valid candidate for containing equilibria,
any of its elements is an equilibrium if and only if










where j is the index of the most attractive product in N1 ∩ N2 (i.e., j = argmax{ν˜i : i ∈
N1 ∩N2}) and jm is the index of the least attractive product in any assortment Am offered
by retailer m in any candidate equilibrium (i.e., j
m
= argmin {ν˜i : i ∈ Am}). The condition
in (4.16) follows from comparing θj(λ
n
m) and θjm
(λnm) and noting that θj(λ
n
m) ≥ θi(λnm) for
all i ∈ Nm \ Am and θj
m
(λnm) ≤ θi(λnm) for all i ∈ Am. Such a comparison determines
whether Anm maximizes the left-hand-side of (4.11).
4.6 Extensions and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has studied equilibrium behavior for retailers competing in assortment and
pricing. For both the cases of assortment-only and joint assortment and pricing, a crisp
characterization of equilibrium properties has been presented, highlighting the role that
the presence of common products may have on such properties. The framework outlined
to analyze equilibrium properties can be used to study other extensions of the setting
presented, as we illustrate next.
Minimum profit margins. In the assortment and price competition setting that preceded,
no constraints have been imposed on the prices charged by the retailers. This introduced
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the possibility of intense Bertrand-like price competition and was a key driver of the result
that ensured that at most one equilibrium existed (in the fundamentally different sense)
and that firms may not offer the same products in equilibrium.
Here, we discuss an important extension where retailers must collect a minimum margin
from the sale of some products. It is often the case that minimal prices are imposed
directly or indirectly by manufacturers through, e.g., a Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail
Price (MSRP). We highlight some of the implications of such constraints on the results of
Section 4.5. A summary of the main steps that could be taken to adapt part of the earlier
analysis to the current setting is presented in Appendix C.3.
At a qualitative level, the two extreme cases where minimum margins are relatively small
or high are very informative with regard to the type of modifications to expect. Recall from
(4.9) that whenever a product is offered and its price is selected in an unconstrained fashion,
its profit margin is always greater than 1/α. Hence, if the minimum margins are small (lower
than 1/α), then the results for joint price and assortment competition of Section 4.5 would
not be affected. In contrast, when the minimum margins are very high, it will always be
optimal for the retailers to price at the minimum margin, and hence the retailers would
essentially be facing fixed prices. In such a case, the retailers’ joint price and assortment
problem would reduce to an assortment-only problem, and the analysis and results of Section
4.4 would hold. Hence, in general, the analysis of the minimum profit margins case will
build on both Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Overall, the above discussion, in conjunction with that appearing in Appendix C.3,
illustrates that, in general, multiple price and assortment equilibria can be sustained in the
presence of minimal profit margins and those may enable retailers to operate at equilibria
where some products are present in both assortments.
Extensions to an arbitrary number of retailers. The analysis has focused on a duopoly
of retailers. It is worth noting that many of the results can be generalized to the case of
an arbitrary number of retailers. In particular, for the case of assortment-only competition
with exclusive products, Proposition 1, Theorem 7 and Proposition 2 admit parallel results
with an arbitrary number of retailers. For the case of assortment and price competition with
exclusive products, the conditions that an equilibrium must satisfy laid out in Proposition
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4 can also be generalized to the case of an arbitrary number of retailers and existence and
uniqueness can also be established. For the case of both exclusive and common products,
the number of possible configurations becomes difficult to summarize, however, one observes
that it is possible to exhibit sufficient conditions in particular configurations of interest such
as in Proposition 3 ii.) to ensure existence of an equilibrium.
The case of sequential competition. While Section 4.5 has focused on the case of
simultaneous assortment and price competition, the approach taken in the current work
can also be used to analyze the case where firms compete first on assortments and then on
prices. In such a setting, one can solve for equilibria in a backward fashion and establish that
there always exists an equilibrium (for both the cases of exclusive and common products)
and one can provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the uniqueness of such an
equilibrium, which essentially says that the set of Cn-popular products for each retailer
should not intersect. In particular, this condition is satisfied for the case of exclusive
products and the unique equilibrium coincides with the unique equilibrium when retailers
select actions simultaneously.
Additional generalizations and challenges. In the case of assortment-only competition,
the analysis only relied on the attraction form of the demand model. However, the particular
Logit assumption played a key role in the joint assortment and pricing analysis. It is worth
noting the challenges one faces under more general models. For example, under mixed Logit
demand, while under some conditions, for a given assortment, existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium in prices can be guaranteed (see Allon et al. (2010)), the assortment-only
problem becomes intractable, as highlighted in Rusmevichientong et al. (2009) where it is
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Proof of Results in Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Main Results
Proof of Theorem 1. The lower bound is trivial when N = S∗(µ), so assume S∗(µ) ⊂ N .





1 {i ∈ Su} , t ≥ 1.
Similarly, for n ≥ 1 define ti(n) as the customer to whom product i is offered for the n-th
time,
ti(n) := inf {t ≥ 1 : Ti(t+ 1) = n} , n ≥ 1.
For i ∈ N \ S∗(µ), define Θi as the set of mean utility vectors for which product i is in the
optimal assortment, but that differs from µ only on its i-th coordinate. That is,
Θi :=
{
ν ∈ RN : νi 6= µi , νj = µj ∀ j ∈ N \ {i} , i ∈ S∗(ν)
}
.
We will use Eνpi and Pνpi to denote expectations and probabilities of random variables, when
the assortment policy pi ∈ P is used, and the mean utilities are given by the vector ν. Let




[log (dF (x− µi)/dF (x− νi))] dF (x− µi).
This quantity measures the “distance” between Pµpi and Pνpi. We have that 0 < Ii(µ‖ν) <∞
for all ν 6= µ, i ∈ N \ S∗(µ). Fix i ∈ N and consider a configuration ν ∈ Θi. For n ≥ 1
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i − µi)/dF (U ti(u)i − νi))
]
.
Note that Li(·) is defined in terms of utility realizations that are unobservable to the retailer.
Define δ(η) as the minimum (relative) optimality gap when the mean utility vector is given
by η ∈ RN ,
δ(η) := inf {1− r(S, η)/r(S∗(η), η) > 0 : S ∈ S} . (A.1)
Fix α ∈ (0, 1). For any consistent policy pi one has that for any  > 0,
Rpi(T, ν) ≥ δ(ν)Eνpi {T − Ti(T )}
≥ δ(ν)
(
T − (1− )Ii(µ‖ν) log T
)
Pνpi {Ti(T ) < (1− ) log T/Ii(µ‖ν)} ,
and by assumption on pi Rpi(T, ν) = o(Tα). From the above, we have that




Ti(T ) ≤ (1− )Ii(µ‖ν) log T , Li(Ti(T )) ≤ (1− α) log T
}
.




















dF (Uui − νi)


















≥ exp(−(1− α) log T )Pµpi {βi} .
From (A.2) one has that Pνpi {βi} = o(Tα−1). It follows by (A.2) that as T →∞
Pµpi {βi} ≤ Pνpi {βi} /Tα−1 → 0. (A.3)
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Indexed by n, Li(n) is the sum of finite mean identically distributed independent random
variables, therefore, by the strong law of large numbers (SLLN).
lim sup
n→∞


















Ii(µ‖ν) log T , Li(Ti(T )) >
(1− )
1− α log T
}
= 0.







Ii(µ‖ν) log T )
}
= 0.
Finally, defining the positive finite constant Hµi := inf {I(µ‖ν) : ν ∈ Θi}, it follows that
lim
T→∞
Pµpi {Ti(T ) ≥ (1− ) log T/Hµi )} = 1.






















Eµpi [Ti(T )] .
where (a) follows from the non-optimal assortments contributing at least δ(µ) to the regret,
and (b) follows by assuming non-optimal products are always tested in batches of size C,
discarding products in N . Thus
T∑
u=1
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Combining the above with (A.4) we have that, asymptotically,







Taking K1 := δ(µ) mini∈N\S∗(µ)
{
(Hµi )
−1} gives the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the result in 3 steps. First, we compute an upper bound
on the probability of the estimates deviating from the true mean utilities. Second, we
address the quality of the solution to the static problem, when using estimated mean
utilities. Finally, we combine the above and analyze the regret. For purposes of this
proof, let P denote probability of random variables when the assortment policy pi1 is used,
and the mean utilities are given by the vector µ. With a slight abuse of notation define
pi := {pi(Aj , µ) : Aj ∈ A s.t. i ∈ Aj}, for i ∈ N , and p := (p1, . . . , pN ).
Step1. Define T j(t) to be the number of customers Aj has been offered to, up to customer




1 {Su = Aj} , j = 1, . . . , |A| .
We will need the following side lemma, whose proof is deferred to Appendix A.2.





(Zui − pi(Aj , µ)) 1 {Su = Aj}
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ T j(t) , T j(t) ≥ n
}
≤ 2 exp(−c()n),
for a positive constant c() <∞.
For any vector ν ∈ RN and set A ⊆ N define ‖ν‖A = max {νi : i ∈ A}. Consider  > 0
and fix t ≥ 1. By Assumption 1 we have that for any assortment Aj ⊆ A
‖µ− µˆt‖Aj ≤ κ()‖p− pˆt‖Aj , (A.5)
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2 112
for some constant 1 < κ() <∞, whenever ‖p− pˆt‖Aj < . We have that, for n ≥ 1,
P
{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj >  , T j(t) ≥ n} = P{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj >  , ‖p− pˆt‖Aj ≥  , T j(t) ≥ n}+
P
{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj >  , ‖p− pˆt‖Aj <  , T j(t) ≥ n}
≤ P{‖p− pˆt‖Aj ≥  , T j(t) ≥ n}+
P
{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj >  , ‖p− pˆt‖Aj <  , T j(t) ≥ n}
(a)
≤ P{‖p− pˆt‖Aj ≥  , T j(t) ≥ n}+
P
{‖p− pˆt‖Aj > /κ() , T j(t) ≥ n} (A.6)














(Zsi − pi(Aj , µ)) 1 {St = Aj}
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ T j(t)/κ() ,
T j(t) ≥ n} (A.7)
(c)
≤ 2 |Aj | exp(−c(/κ())n), (A.8)
where (a) follows from (A.5), (b) follows from the definition of pˆi,t, and (c) follows from
Lemma 6.
Step 2. Fix an assortment S ∈ S. By the Lipschitz-continuity of p(S, ·) we have that, for
t ≥ 1,
max {|pi(S, µ)− pi(S, µˆt)| : i ∈ S} ≤ K‖µ− µˆt‖S ,
for a positive constant K <∞, and therefore
|r(S, µ)− r(S, µˆt)| ≤ ‖w‖∞K C‖µ− µˆt‖S . (A.9)
From here, we conclude that
r(S∗(µˆt), µ) ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)− ‖w‖∞K C‖µ− µˆt‖S∗(µˆt)
≥ r(S∗(µ), µˆt)− ‖w‖∞K C‖µ− µˆt‖S∗(µˆt)
≥ r(S∗(µ), µ)− 2‖w‖∞K C‖µ− µˆt‖(S∗(µ)∪S∗(µˆt)).
As a consequence, if
‖µ− µˆt‖(S∗(µ)∪S∗(µˆt)) < (2‖w‖∞K C)−1δ(µ)r(S∗(µ), µ)
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then S∗(µ) = S∗(µˆt), where δ(µ) is the minimum (relative) optimality gap (see (A.1) in
proof of Theorem 1). This means that if the mean utility estimates are uniformly close to
the underlying mean utility values, then solving the static problem using estimates returns
the same optimal assortment as when solving the static problem with the true parameters.
In particular we will use the following relation:
{S∗(µ) 6= S∗(µˆt)} ⊆
{‖µ− µˆt‖(S∗(µ)∪S∗(µˆt)) ≥ (2‖w‖∞K C)−1δ(µ)r(S∗(µ), µ)} . (A.10)
Step 3. Let NO(t) denote the event that a non-optimal assortment is offered to customer
t. That is
NO(t) := {St 6= S∗(µ)} ,
Define ξ := (2‖w‖∞K C)−1δ(µ)r(S∗(µ), µ). For t ≥ |A| dκ1 log T e one has that
P {NO(t)}
(a)















2 |Aj |T−κ1c(ξ/κ(ξ)), (A.11)
were (a) follows from (A.10) and (b) follows from (A.8). Considering κ1 > c(ξ/κ(ξ))
−1





≤ |A| dκ1 log T e+
∞∑




≤ |A|κ1 log T +K1
= dN/Ceκ1 log T +K1,
for a finite constant K1. Setting κ1 = c(ξ/κ(ξ))
−1 gives the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof follows the arguments of the proof of Theorem 2. Steps
1 and 2 are identical.
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Step 3. Let NO(t) denote the event that a non-optimal assortment is offered to customer
t, and G(t) the event that there is no forced testing for customer t. That is,
NO(t) := {St 6= S∗(µ)} ,
G(t) :=
{
T j(t) ≥ κ2 log t , j ≤ |A| such that ‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)
}
. (A.12)
Define ξ := (2‖w‖∞K C)−1δ(µ)r(S∗(µ), µ). We have that
P {NO(t) , G(t)}
(a)
≤ P{‖µ− µˆt‖(S∗(µ)∪S∗(µˆt)) > ξ , G(t)}






{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj > ξ , T j(t) > κ2 log t}+∑
j :Aj∩∈S∗(µ) 6=∅
P









{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj > ξ , G(t)} ,
where: (a) follows from (A.10); (b) follows from the fact that Assumption 2 guarantees
wi ≥ r(S∗(ν), ν) for all i ∈ S∗(ν) for any vector ν ∈ RN ; and (c) follows from (A.8).
Fix j such that Aj ∩ S∗(µ) 6= ∅. For such an assortment we have that
P
{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj > ξ , G(t)} ≤ P{‖µ− µˆt‖Aj > ξ , T j(t) ≥ κ2 log t , G(t)}+
P
{
T j(t) < κ2 log t , G(t)
}
.
The first term on the right-hand-side above can be bounded using (A.8). For the second
one, note that
{
T j(t) < κ2 log t , G(t)
} ⊆ {‖w‖Aj < r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)}, and that
‖w‖Aj − r(S∗(µ), µ)δ(µ)/2
(a)




≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)− ‖w‖∞KC‖µ− µˆt‖S∗(µˆt),
where: (a) follows from Assumption 2; (b) follows from the definition of δ(µ); and (c) follows
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2 115
from (A.9). The above implies that
{‖w‖Aj < r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)} ⊆ {‖µ− µˆt‖S∗(µˆt) > ξ}, i.e.,
P
{
T j(t) < κ2 log t , G(t)
} ≤ P{‖w‖Aj < r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)}








2 |Ak| t−c(ξ/κ(ξ))κ2 ,
where the last step follows from (A.8). Using the above we have that
P {NO(t) , G(t)} ≤
∑
j:Aj∩S∗(µˆt)6=∅
2 |Aj | t−c(ξ/κ(ξ))κ2 +
∑
j :Aj∩∈S∗(µ)6=∅




≤ 2C2(2 + C)t−c(ξ/κ(ξ))κ2 . (A.13)
Consequently, we have that
P {NO(t) , G(t)c} ≤
∑
Aj∈A




P {St = Aj , G(t)c}+
∑
j : ‖w‖Aj<r(S∗(µ),µ)
P {St = Aj , G(t)c} .





P {Su = Aj , G(u)c} ≤ dN/Ce (κ2 log T + 1) . (A.14)
To analyze the second term, fix j such that ‖w‖Aj < r(S∗(µ), µ), and define L(t) as the last
customer (previous to customer t) to whom the empirical optimal assortment (according to
estimated mean utilities) was offered. That is
L(t) := sup {u ≤ t− 1 : G(u)} ,
with G(u) given in (A.12). Note that L(t) ∈ {t− b|A|κ2 log tc, . . . , t− 1} for t ≥ τ , where
τ is given by
τ := inf
{
u ≥ 1 : log(u− b|A|κ2 log uc) + κ−12 > log u
}
.
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Consider t ≥ τ and u ∈ {t− b|A|κ2 log tc, . . . , t− 1}. Then
P {St = Aj , G(t)c , L(t) = u} ≤ P
{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt) , G(t)c , L(t) = u}
≤ P{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt) , G(t)c , G(u)}
= P
{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt) , G(t)c , G(u), NO(u)}+
P
{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt) , G(t)c , G(u), NO(u)c}
≤ P {NO(u) , G(u)}+
P{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt) , T k(t) ≥ κ2 log t ,
∀ k s.t. Ak ∩ S∗(µ) 6= ∅},
where the last step follows from the fact that offering S∗(µ) to customer u implies (from
G(u)) that T j(u) ≥ κ2 log u, and therefore (for t ≥ τ) that T j(t) ≥ κ2 log t, for all j such
that Aj ∩S∗(µ) 6= ∅. The first term in the last inequality can be bounded using (A.13). For
the second, observe that
r(S∗(µ), µˆt)− ‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µ), µ)− ‖w‖∞KC‖µ− µˆt‖S∗(µ) − ‖w‖Aj ,










{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt)} ⊆ {‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µ), µˆt)} ⊆ {‖µ− µˆt‖S∗(µ) > δr(S∗(µ), µ)} .
Define the event Ξ =
{‖w‖Aj ≥ r(S∗(µˆt), µˆt) , T k(t) ≥ κ2 log t , ∀ k s.t. Ak ∩ S∗(µ) 6= ∅}
and δ¯ := δr(S∗(µ), µ). One has that
P {Ξ} ≤ P
{












2 |Ak| t−c(δ¯/κ(δ¯))κ2 .
Using Lemma 7 , we have that, when κ2 > c(δ¯/κ(δ¯)),




≤ C2(2 + C) (t− b|A|κ2 log tc)−c(ξ/κ(ξ))κ2 + C2t−c(δ¯/κ(δ¯))κ2 .
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2 117
Since the right hand side above is independent of u, one has that
P {St = Aj , G(t)c} ≤ C2(2 + C) (t− b|A|κ2 log tc)−c(ξ/κ(ξ))κ2 + C2t−c(δ¯/κ(δ¯))κ2 , (A.15)



































C2(2 + C) (t− b|A|κ2 log tc)−c(ξ/κ(ξ))κ2 + C2t−c(δ¯/κ(δ¯))κ2
(b)
≤ d∣∣N ∣∣ /Ceκ2 log T +K2,
for a finite constant K2 < ∞, where: (a) follows from (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15); and (b)





provides the desired result.
Proof of Corollary 1. Fix i ∈ N , and fix j = {k ≤ |A| : i ∈ Ak}. We have that
Epi[Ti(T )] ≤ τ +
T∑
t=τ+1
P[NO(t) , G(t)] + P[St = Aj , G(t)c]
≤ K2,
for a finite constant K2, where we have used the summability of the terms in (A.13) and
(A.15). This completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is an adaptation of the one for Theorem 3, customized
for the MNL choice model. However, we provide a explanation version of each step with
the objective of highlighting how the structure of the MNL model is exploited.
Step 1. We will need the following side lemma, whose proof is deferred to Appendix A.2.










1 {i ∈ Su}
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥  Ti(t) , Ti(t) ≥ n
}
≤ 2 exp(−c()n),
for j ∈ {i, 0} and a positive constant c() <∞.
Consider  > 0 and fix t ≥ 1 and i ∈ N . Define % = 1/2 (1 + C‖w‖∞)−1. From
Assumption 2 we have that p0(S, µ) ≥ 2%, for all S ∈ S. For n ≥ 1 define the event
Ξ := {|νi − νˆi,t| >  , Ti(t) ≥ n}. We have that





i 1 {i ∈ Su}∑t−1
u=1 Z
u
0 1 {i ∈ Su}
− νi







i 1 {i ∈ Su}∑t−1
u=1 Z
u
0 1 {i ∈ Su}
− νi
∣∣∣∣∣ >  ,∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
u=1
(Zu0 − E {Zu0 }) 1 {i ∈ Su}







(Zu0 − E {Zu0 }) 1 {i ∈ Su}







(Zui − Zu0 νi)1 {i ∈ Su}








(Zui − E[Zui ])1 {i ∈ Su}







(Zu0 − E[Zu0 ])1 {i ∈ Su}
∣∣∣∣∣ > %/(2νi)Ti(t) , Ti(t) ≥ n
}
+ 2 exp(−c(%)n)
≤ 2 exp(−c(%/2)n) + 2 exp(−c(%/(2νi))n) + 2 exp(−c(%)n).
where: (a) follows from Lemma 7 and from the fact that∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
u=1










(Zu0 − E[Zu0 ])1 {i ∈ Su}
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ %Ti(t),
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when
∣∣∣∑t−1u=1 (Zu0 − E {Zu0 }) 1 {i ∈ Su}∣∣∣ < %Ti(t); and (b) follows from the fact that EZui =
νiEZu0 , for all u ≥ 1 such that i ∈ Su, i ∈ N . For  > 0 define
c˜() := min {c(%/2) , c(%/(2‖ν‖N )) , c(%)} .
From above we have that for  > 0
P {|νi − νˆi,t| >  , Ti(t) ≥ n} ≤ 6 exp(c˜()n), (A.16)
for all i ∈ N .
Step 2. Consider two vectors υ, η ∈ RN+ . From (2.8), for any S ∈ S one has∑
i∈S
υi(wi − r(S, υ)) = r(S, υ)∑
i∈S
ηi(wi − r(S, υ)) ≥ r(S, υ)− C‖w‖∞‖υ − η‖S∑
i∈S
ηi(wi − (r(S, υ)− C‖w‖∞‖υ − η‖S) ≥ r(S, υ)− C‖w‖∞‖υ − η‖S
This implies that
r(S, η) ≥ r(S, υ)− C‖w‖∞‖η − υ‖S . (A.17)
From the above we conclude that
{S∗(νˆt) 6= S∗(νˆt)} ⊆
{‖ν − νˆt‖S∗(ν)∪S∗(νˆt) ≥ (2‖w‖∞C)−1δ(ν)r(S∗(µ), µ)} , (A.18)
were δ(ν) refers to the minimum optimality gap, in terms of the adjusted terms exp(µ).
Step 3. Let NO(t) denote the event that a non-optimal assortment is offered to customer
t, and G(t) the event that there is no “forced testing” on customer t. That is
NO(t) := {St 6= S∗(ν)} ,
G(t) := {Ti(t) ≥ κ3 log t , ∀ i ∈ N such thatwi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt)} .
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Define ξ := (2‖w‖∞C)−1δ(ν)r(S∗(µ), µ). We have that
P {NO(t) , G(t)}
(a)
≤ P{‖ν − νˆt‖(S∗(ν)∪S∗(νˆt)) > ξ , G(t)}





P {|νi − νˆi,t| > ξ , Ti(t) ≥ κ3 log t}+
∑
i∈S∗(ν)





P {|νi − νˆi,t| > ξ , G(t)}
where: (a) follows from (A.18); (b) follows from the fact that Assumption 2 guarantees
wi ≥ r(S∗(η), η) for all i ∈ S∗(η) and for any vector η ∈ RN ; and (c) follows from (A.16).
Fix i ∈ S∗(ν). We have that
P {|νi − νˆi,t| > ξ,G(t)} ≤ P {|νi − νˆi,t| > ξ , Ti(t) ≥ κ3 log t}+ P {G(t), Ti(t) < κ3 log t} .
The first term above can be bounded using (A.16). Regarding the second one, note that
{G(t) , Ti(t) < κ3 log t} ⊆ {wi < r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt)}, and that
wi − r(S∗(ν), ν)δ(ν)/2
(a)




≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt)− ‖w‖∞C‖ν − νˆt‖S∗(νˆt),
where (a) follows from Assumption 2, (b) follows from the definition of δ(ν), and (c) follows
from (A.17). The above implies that {wi < r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt)} ⊆
{‖ν − νˆt‖S∗(νˆt) > ξ}, i.e.,
P {Ti(t) < κ3 log t , G(t)} ≤ P {wi < r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt), G(t)}




P {|νj − νˆj,t| > ξ , G(t)}
≤ 6Ct−κ3c˜(ξ),
where the last step follows from (A.16). Using the above we have that
P {NO(t) , G(t)} ≤ 6C(1 + C)t−κ3c˜(ξ). (A.19)
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From here, we have that
P {NO(t) , G(t)c} ≤
∑
i :wi<f∗(S∗(ν),ν)
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c}+
∑
i :wi≥f∗(S∗(ν),ν)





P {i ∈ St , G(t)c}+
∣∣N ∣∣ (κ3 log T + 1) .+∑
i∈S∗(µ)
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c}
where (a) follows from the specification of the policy. Fix i such that wi < r(S
∗(ν), ν), and
define L(t) as the last customer (previous to customer t) to whom the empirical optimal
assortment, according to estimated mean utilities, was offered. That is
L(t) := sup {u ≤ t− 1 : G(u)} .
Note that L(t) ∈ {t− bNκ3 log tc, . . . , t− 1} for t ≥ τ , where τ is given by
τ := inf
{
u ≥ 1 : log(u− bNκ3 log uc) + κ−13 > log u
}
.
Consider t ≥ τ and u ∈ {t− bNκ3 log tc, . . . , t− 1}. Then
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c , L(t) = u} ≤ P {wi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt) , G(t)c , L(t) = u}
(a)
≤ P {wi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt) , G(t)c , G(u)}
≤ P {G(u), NO(u)}+ P {wi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt) , G(t)c , G(u), NO(u)c}
(b)
≤ 6C(1 + C)u−κ3c˜(ξ) +
P {wi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt) , Tj(t) ≥ κ3 log t ∀ j ∈ S∗(ν)} ,
where (a) follows from {L(t) = u} ⊆ {G(u)}, and (b) from (A.19) and the fact that offering
S∗(ν) to customer u implies (from G(u)) that Tj(u) ≥ κ3 log u and therefore (from t ≥ τ)
that Tj(t) ≥ κ3 log t, for all j ∈ S∗(ν). From (A.17) we have that
r(S∗(ν), νˆt)− wi ≥ r(S∗(ν), ν)− ‖w‖∞C‖ν − νˆt‖S∗(ν) − wi.
Define δ := inf
{
(‖w‖∞C)−1 (1− wi/r(S∗(ν), ν)) > 0 : i ∈ N
}
. From the above, we have
that
{wi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt)} ⊆ {wi ≥ r(S∗(ν), νˆt)} ⊆
{‖ν − νˆt‖S∗(ν) > δr(S∗(ν), ν)} .
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Define δ¯ := δr(S∗(ν), ν), and the event Ξ = wi ≥ r(S∗(νˆt), νˆt) , Tj(t) ≥ κ3 log t ∀ j ∈ S∗(ν).
It follows that





{|νi − νˆt,i| > δ¯ , Ti(t) ≥ κ3 log t}
≤ 6Ct−κ3c˜(δ¯).
Using the above one gets that, when κ3 > c˜(ξ)
−1
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c , L(t) = u} ≤ 6C(1 + C)u−κ3c˜(ξ) + 6Ct−κ3c˜(δ¯)
≤ 6C(1 + C)(t− bNκ3 log tc)−κ3c˜(ξ) + 6Ct−κ3c˜(δ¯).
Since the right hand side above is independent of u, one has that
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c} ≤ 6C(1 + C)(t− bNκ3 log tc)−κ3c˜(ξ) + 6Ct−κ3c˜(δ¯), (A.20)
for all i ∈ N such that wi < r(S∗(ν), ν), and t ≥ τ .
Now fix i ∈ S∗(µ), and consider t ≥ τ , u ∈ {t− bNκ3 log tc, . . . , t− 1} and κ3 > c˜(ξ)−1.
Then
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c , L(t) = u} ≤ P {Ti(t) < κ3 log t , G(t)c , L(t) = u}
(a)
≤ P {Ti(t) < κ3 log t , G(u)}
≤ P {G(u), NO(u)}+ P {Ti(t) < κ3 log t , G(u) , NOc(u)}
(b)
≤ 6C(1 + C)u−κ3c˜(ξ)
≤ 6C(1 + C)(t− bNκ3 log tc)−κ3c˜(ξ),
where (a) follows from {L(t) = u} ⊆ {G(u)}, and (b) from (A.19) and the fact that offering
S∗(ν) to customer u implies (from G(u)) that Ti(u) ≥ κ3 log u and therefore (from t ≥ τ)
that Ti(t) ≥ κ3 log t. Since the right hand side above is independent of u, one has that
P {i ∈ St , G(t)c} ≤ 6C(1 + C)(t− bNκ3 log tc)−κ3c˜(ξ), (A.21)
for all i ∈ S∗(µ) and t ≥ τ .
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P {NO(t) , G(t)c}
(a)




∣∣N \ S∗(µ)∣∣κ3(log T + 1) + τ +
6C |N ∪ S∗(µ)|
∞∑
t=τ
(1 + C)(t−κ3c˜(ξ) + (t− bNκ3 log tc)−κ3c˜(ξ)) + t−κ3c˜(δ¯)
(b)
≤ ∣∣N \ S∗(µ)∣∣κ3 log T +K3,
for a finite constant K3 <∞, where (a) follows from (A.19), (A.20) and (A.21), and (b) uses





provides the desired result. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Fix i ∈ N . We have that
Epi[Ti(T )] ≤ τ +
T∑
t=τ+1
P[NO(t) , G(t)] + P[i ∈ St , G(t)c]
≤ K3 <∞,
for a finite constant K3, where we have used the summability of the terms in (A.19) and
(A.20). This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Auxiliary Results










φ(θ) := logE {exp(θ (Zui − pi(Aj , µ)))} = −θpi(Aj , µ)+log(pi(Aj , µ) exp(θ)+1−pi(Aj , µ)),
and Aj ∈ A such that i ∈ Aj . One can check that Mt(θ) is an Ft-martingale, for any θ > 0


















APPENDIX A. PROOF OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2 124





(Zui − pi(Aj , µ)) 1 {Su = Aj} ≥ T j(t) , T j(t) ≥ n
}
.
Let ψ(t) denote the choice made by the t-th user. Using the above one has that







1 {Su = Aj} (Zui − pi(Aj , µ)− )
)











1 {ψ(u) = i} (φ(2θ)− 2θ)
)











1 {ψ(u) = i} (φ(2θ)− 2θ)
)
; Ti(t) ≥ n
})1/2
,
where: (a) follows from Chernoff’s inequality; (b) follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz in-
equality and (A.22); and (c) follows from the properties of Mt(θ). Note that when  <









c() := φ(2θ∗)/2− θ∗ < 0.









E {exp(−2c()Ti(t)); Ti(t) ≥ n}
≤ exp(−c()n).





(Zui − pi) 1 {Su = Aj} ≤ −T j(t) , T j(t) ≥ n
}
≤ exp(−c()n).
The result follows from the union bound.
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof follows almost verbatim the steps in the proof of Lemma
6. Fix i ∈ N . For θ > 0 consider the process
{
M jt (θ) : t ≥ 1
}
, defined as




1 {i ∈ Su} [θ(Zuj − pj(Su, µ))− φju(θ)]
)
j ∈ {i, 0} ,




exp(θ(Zuj − pj(Su, µ)))
}
= logE {exp(−θpj(Su, µ)) (exp(θ)pj(Su, µ) + 1− pj(Su, µ))} .
One can verify that M jt (θ) is an Ft-martingale, for any θ > 0 and j ∈ {i, 0} (see §2.3 for
























Zuj − pj(Su, µ)
)
1 {i ∈ Su} ≥ Ti(t) , Ti(t) ≥ n
}
.
Let ψ(t) denote the choice made by the t-th customer. Using the above one has that







1 {i ∈ Su} (Zuj − pj(Su, µ)− )
)















1 {ψ(u) = j , i ∈ Su} (φju(2θ)− 2θ)
)











1 {ψ(u) = j , i ∈ Su} (φju(2θ)− 2θ)
)
; Ti(t) ≥ n
})1/2
,
where; (a) follows from Chernoff’s inequality; (b) follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequal-
ity and (A.22); and (c) follows from the properties of M jt (θ). Note that φ
j
s(·) is continuous,
φjs(0) = 0, (φ
j
s)′(0) = 0, and φjs(θ) → ∞ when θ → ∞, for all s ≥ 1 . This implies that
there exists a positive constant c() < ∞ (independent of n), and a θ∗ > 0, such that






Zuj − pj(Su, µ)
)




E {exp(−2c()Ti(t)); Ti(t) ≥ n}
≤ exp(−c()n).






Zuj − pj(Su, µ)
)
1 {i ∈ Su} ≤ −Ti(t) , Ti(t) ≥ n
}
≤ exp(−c()n).
The result follows from the union bound.
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Appendix B
Proof of Results in Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Main Results
Proof of Theorem 5. For X ⊂ X and t ≤ T define Ti(t,X) as the number of times ad i




1 {i ∈ Su , Xu ∈ X} ,




1 {Xt ∈ X} .
Similarly, define ti(l,X) as the index of the user for which ad i is displayed by the l-th time
on the set X,
ti(l,X) := inf {t ≥ 0 : Ti(t+ 1, X) = l} , l ≥ 1.
For i ∈ N , define Oi(B) as the set of user profiles for which ad i belongs to the optimal
ad-mix. That is
Oi(B) := {x ∈ X : i ∈ S∗(B, x)} .
Similarly, define Θi as the set ad-factor matrices for which ad i has the same mean
utility values for profiles in Oi(B), but it is optimal for a broader set of profiles, leaving
ad-factors of every other ad intact. That is,
Θi :=
{
M ∈ Rd×N : Oi(B) ⊂ Oi(M) , M−i = B−i , M>i x = β>i x , ∀x ∈ Oi(B)
}
.
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We will use EMpi and PMpi to denote expectations and probabilities of random variables,
when the ad-mix policy pi ∈ P ′ is used, and ad factors are given by the matrix M ∈ Rd×N .
For x ∈ X , let Ii,x(B‖M) denote the Kullback-Leibler divergence between F (· − β>i x) and




[log(dF (u− β>i x)/dF (u−M>i x))]dF (u− β>i x).
This quantity measures the “distance” between PBpi and PMpi . We assume that 0 < Ii,x(B‖M) <
∞ for all x ∈ Oi(B)c and M ∈ Θi (this is the case for most commonly used distribution
functions). Fix an ad i ∈ N for which Θi 6= ∅ and consider a matrix M ∈ Θi. For n ≥ 1






i − β>i Xti(l,X))/dF (U ti(l,X)i −M>i Xti(l,X))).
Note that Li(·) is defined in terms of utility realizations that are unobservable to the retailer.
Define δ(M,X) as the minimum (relative) optimality gap when ad factors are given by the
matrix M and the user profile belongs to X ⊆ X .
δ(M,X) := inf {1− r(S,M, x)/r(S∗(M,x),M, x) : S ∈ S , x ∈ X} .
Fix α ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (0, 1). For any consistent policy pi one has that, for any  > 0,
Rpi(T,M)
≥ δ(M,∆i)EMpi {T (T,∆i)− Ti(T,∆i)}
≥ δ(M,∆i)
(






(1− ) log T











(1− ) log T
Ki(B‖M) , T (T,∆i) > (1− ρ)qiT )
}
,
where ∆i := Oi(M)\Oi(B), qi := P {Xt ∈ ∆i} andKi(B‖M) := max {Ii,x(B‖M) : x ∈ Oi(β)c}.





(1− ) log T
Ki(B‖M) , T (T,∆i) > (1− ρ)qiT )
}
= o(Tα−1). (B.1)






(1− ) log T
Ki(B‖M) , Li(Oi(B)
c, Ti(T,Oi(B)
c)) ≤ (1− α) log T ,
T (T,∆i) > (1− ρ)qiT
}
.




















dF (U ju −M>j Xu)








dF (U iti(n,Oi(B)c) −M>i Xti(n,Oi(B)c))






≥ exp(−(1− α) log T )PBpi {γi} .
From (B.1) one has that PBpi {γi} = o(Tα−1). It follows by (B.1) that as T →∞
PBpi {γi} ≤ PMpi {γi} /Tα−1 → 0. (B.2)
Indexed by n, Li(Oi(B)c, n) is the sum of finite-mean independent random variables, which
is in turn the sum of |Oi(B)c| sums of at most n identically distributed random variables.
By the strong law of large numbers (SLLN).
lim sup
n→∞
max {Li(Oi(B)c, l) : l ≤ n}
n
≤ Ki(B‖M) PBpi − a.s..
(Otherwise one can find at least one x ∈ Oi(β)c such that its asymptotic average contri-
bution to Li(Oi(B)c, n) is greater than Ki(B‖M).) This result says that the log-likelihood
function grows no faster than linearly with slope Ki(B‖M). This implies that
lim sup
n→∞









Ki(B‖M) log T ,
Li(Oi(B)c, Ti(T,Oi(B)c)) > (1− ) log T , T (t,∆i) > (1− ρ)qiT )} = 0.
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Ki(B‖M) log T , T (T,∆i) > (1− ρ)qiT )
}
= 0.












PBpi {T (T,∆i) ≤ (1− ρ)qiT )} ≥ 1.
By Hoeffding’s inequality one has that
lim
T→∞
PBpi {T (T,∆i) ≤ (1− ρ)qiT} ≤ lim
T→∞
exp(−2(ρqi)2T ) = 0,



































where (a) follows from the non-optimal ad-mixes contributing at least δ(µ,Xt) to the regret
on period t, and (b) follows by assuming non-optimal ads for any given profile are always
tested in batches of size C. Thus
T∑
u=1
1 {Su 6= S∗(B,Xu)} ≥
T∑
u=1

























Taking Ki := δ(B,Oi(B)
c)/(C Hi(B)) gives the desired result.
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Proof of Lemma 1. From (3.6) we have that
Ppi
{






Zti = 1|Xt = x , i ∈ St
}
Ppi {i ∈ St|Xt = x} g(x)





−1 1 {i ∈ St}
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xt = x
 g(x),
for all i ∈ N , where g(x) := P {Xt = x}. The same way one can show that
Ppi
{







−1 1 {i ∈ St}
∣∣∣∣∣∣Xt = x
 g(x).
With this we have that
Epi
{∑t−1




s=1 1 {Xs = x , i ∈ Ss , Zs0 = 1}
} = ∑t−1s=1 Ppi {Xs = x , Zsi = 1}∑t−1
s=1 Ppi {Xs = x , i ∈ Ss , Zs0 = 1}
= exp(β>i x).
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix x ∈ X . Solving for S∗(B, x) amounts to find the highest value





exp(µi(x))(wi − λ) ≥ λ
holds. It is easy to see that such value is λ∗ = r(S∗(B, x), B, x). With this value at
hand one can find S∗(B, x) by selecting the C ads with the highest (positive) values for
exp(µi(x))(wi − λ∗).
For each ad i ∈ N with wi > λ∗, one can select µi(x) big enough so i becomes one
of the C most attractive ads, i.e., i is potentially optimal (by definition). This implies
that N (x) = {i ∈ N : wi ≥ r(S∗(B, x), B, x)}. The Lemma follows directly from this last
observation.
Proof of Theorem 6. We begin by stating a series of side lemmas, whose proofs are
deferred to Appendix B.2. For purposes of this proof, let P denote probability of random
variables when the ad-mix policy pi = pi(w, κ) is used, and the matrix of ad features is given
by B.
Our first side lemma provides an upper bound on the estimation error as a function of
the number of samples used for computing such estimates.
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Lemma 8. For i ∈ N and n ≥ 1 we have that for any  > 0 and k ≥ 0
P
{∣∣∣exp(β>i x)− exp((βˆni )>x)∣∣∣ >  , Ti(τ(n), y) ≥ k , y ∈ En−1(i)} ≤ c1() exp(c2()k),
for finite positive constants c1() and c2(), for all x ∈ span
{
En−1(i)
} ∩ X .
The next lemma establishes that in order to recover the optimal display S∗(B, x) for a
given profile x ∈ X , it is sufficient to solve the static optimization problem (3.2) using an
estimate matrix Bˆ, as long as that estimate is sufficiently close to B.
Lemma 9. For any x ∈ X and M ∈ RN×d one has that ∑
i∈S∗(B,x)∪S∗(M,x)
2wi
∣∣∣exp(M>i x)− exp(B>i x)∣∣∣ < ξ
 ⊆ {S∗(B, x) = S∗(M,x)} , (B.4)
where ξ := min {δ(B, x)r(S∗(B, x), B, x) : x ∈ X}.
For n ≥ 1 define the event Θn(S, x, ) :=
{∑
i∈S 2wi
∣∣∣exp(β>i x)− exp((βˆni )>x)∣∣∣ > },
for x ∈ X , S ∈ S and  > 0. The next lemma bounds the probability of Θn(S, x, ) for two
specific S.
Lemma 10. Consider S ∈
{
S∗(Bˆn, x), S∗(B, x)
}
. For any  > 0 and x ∈ X ,
P {Θn(S, x, )} ≤ KX () τ(n)−cX ()κ,
for n ≥ n := inf {n ≥ 0 : κ log τ(n) < n+ 1}, and finite positive constants cX (), and KX ().
The proof is divided in four steps. Step 1 provides auxiliary results. Step two establishes
a bound on the probability of making errors when trusting the estimate parameters for
solving the static problem. Step 3 bounds the amount of exploration conducted throughout
the execution of the algorithm. Finally, step 4 uses the results of step 2 and 3 to bound the
total regret of the algorithm.
Step 1. We begin by establishing a bound on the probability of changing the set of profiles
generating the estimation sets. Let ξw be the minimum distance between ad margins and
the optimal expected revenue, uniformly across profiles. That is,
ξw := inf {|wi − r(S∗(B, x), B, x)| : x ∈ X , i ∈ N} .
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By Assumption A3 we have that ξw > 0. For n ≥ n and i ∈ N , one has that for  > 0,














Θn(S∗(Bˆn, x), x, ξw/2)
}
+ P {Θn(S∗(B, x), x, ξw/2)}
)
(c)
≤ 2 |X |KX (ξw/(2‖w‖∞))τ(n)−cX (ξw/(2‖w‖∞))κ,
where (a) follows the definition of ξw, (b) follows from the proof of Lemma 9, and (c) follows
from Lemma 10. Using this result, one obtains that for n > n,
P
{X ni 6= X n−1i , for some i ∈ N} ≤ ∑
i∈N
P
{X n−1i 6= X (i)}+∑
i∈N
P {X ni 6= X (i)}
≤ 2 |N | |X |KX (ξw/2)τ(n− 1)−κcX (ξw/2). (B.5)
Step 2. Now, we establish a bound on the probability of making an error when solving
the static optimization problem using the parameter estimates. Fix n > n; from Lemma 9
and (B.5) one has that, for any x ∈ X ,
P
{










Θn(S∗(Bˆn, x), x, ξ/2)
}
+ P {Θn(S∗(B, x), x, ξ/2)}
≤ 2KX (ξ/2)τ(n)−cX (ξ/2)κ. (B.6)
Step 3. We now provide a bound on the amount of exploration performed during the
execution of the algorithm. Let I(n) the amount of exploration performed between periods
τ(n) and τ(n+ 1), and define the event Ξ :=
{X ni = X n−1i = X (i), i ∈ N}. We have that
E {I(n)} = E {I(n)1 {Ξ}}+ E{I(n)1{X ni 6= X (i) or X n−1i 6= X (i), for some i ∈ N}} .
(B.7)
We now establish upper bounds for both terms on the right-hand-side of the above. We
have that












|X | |N |2 d(n+ 1)
)
KX (ξw/2) (τ(n− 1))−cX (ξw/2)κ ,
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where (a) follows from (B.5). We now focus on bounding the first term on the right-hand-
side of (B.7). For that, define Ii(n) as the amount of exploration on performed between
τ(n) and τ(n + 1), associated to i ∈ N . Note that τ(n) − τ(n − 1) ≥ τ(n)(1 − exp(−2/κ)
for n ≥ n. We have that







rank {X (i)}P {Ξ, Ti(τ(n), x) ≤ n for some x ∈ O(i)}+∑
i∈N
rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}P {Ξ, Ti(τ(n) > n, i ∈ O(i)}+
d |N | (n+ 1)O(exp(−τ(n)),
for n ≥ n, where the last term above, derived from applying Hoeffdings inequality, subsumes
the possibility of not collecting the required amount of experimentation between τ(n − 1)
and τ(n). Fix i ∈ N . For each x ∈ O(i) one has that
P {Ξ, Ti(τ(n), x) ≤ n} ≤ P
{











1 {Xt = x} ≤ n |N |
+ P{S∗(Bˆn−1, x) 6= S∗(B, x)}
(b)
≤ O(− exp(τ(n)) + 2KX (ξ/2)(τ(n− 1))−cX (ξ/2)κ,





rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}+ 4
(
|X | |N |2 d(n+ 1)
)
KX (ξw/2) (τ(n− 1))−cX (ξw/2)κ∑
i∈N
rank {X (i)} |O(i)|
(
O(exp(−τ(n)) + 2KX (ξ/2)(τ(n− 1))−cX (ξ/2)κ
)
. (B.8)
Step 4. Now, we combine the results from the previous steps to bound the regret associated
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The first term above represents the regret coming from offering the approximate solution to
the static optimization problem, assuming one is to present such solution to every customer.
The second term bounds the amount of exploration during the execution of the algorithm.
Note that all elements in the right hand side of (B.8) define convergent series in n (but the






rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}
)
κ log T + K˜,
for some finite and positive constant K˜, independent of T . Similarly, all elements in (B.6)





S∗(Bˆn, x) 6= S∗(B, x)
}
≤ K˘,
for some finite and positive constant K˘, independent of T , for all x ∈ X . Combining the




rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}
)
κ log T +K,
for a suitable chosen finite and positive constant K, independent of T . The result follows
from defining K := K˘ + K˜, κ := 2/cX (ξw/2) and Ki := rank {X (i) \ span {O(i)}}, i ∈
N .
B.2 Proof of Auxiliary Results
We begin by stating and proving a couple of intermediate results.










1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥  Ti(t, x) , Ti(t, x) ≥ n
}
≤ 2 exp(−c()n),
for j ∈ {i, 0} and a positive constant c() <∞.
1From proof of Lemma 10 one has that cX (ξw/2) ≤ cX (ξ/2) by construction.
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Proof of Lemma 11. The proof follows almost verbatim the steps in the proof of Lemma
2 in [Saure and Zeevi, 2011]. Fix i ∈ N and x ∈ X . For θ > 0 consider the process{
M jt (θ) : t ≥ 1
}
, defined as




1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x} [θ(Zuj − pj(Su, µ))− φju(θ)]
)




exp(θ(Zuj − pj(Su, B, x)))
}
:= logE {exp(−θpj(Su, B, x)) (exp(θ)pj(Su, B, x) + 1− pj(Su, B, x))} .
One can verify that M jt (θ) is an Ft-martingale, for any θ > 0 and j ∈ {i, 0} (see Section




















Zuj − pj(Su, B, x)
)
1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x} ≥ Ti(t, x) , Ti(t, x) ≥ n
}
.
Using the above one has that







1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x} (Zuj − pj(Su, B, x)− )
)















1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x} (φju(2θ)− 2θ)
)











1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x} (φju(2θ)− 2θ)
)
1 {Ti(t, x) ≥ n}
})1/2
,
where; (a) follows from Chernoff’s inequality; (b) follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequal-
ity and (B.1); and (c) follows from the properties of M jt (θ). Note that φ
j
s(·) is continuous,
φjs(0) = 0, (φ
j
s)′(0) = 0, and φjs(θ) → ∞ when θ → ∞, for all s ≥ 1 . This implies that
there exists a positive constant c() < ∞ (independent of n), and a θ∗ > 0, such that
φjs(2θ∗)− 2θ∗ < −2c() for all s ≥ 1. Using this we have that
P {ξj} ≤ E {exp(−c()Ti(t, x))1 {Ti(t, x) ≥ n}} ≤ exp(−c()n).
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Zuj − pj(Su, B, x)
)
1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x} ≤ −Ti(t, x) , Ti(t, x) ≥ n
}
≤ exp(−c()n).
The result follows from the union bound.
Lemma 12. For i ∈ N and n ≥ 1 we have that for any  > 0, k ∈ N+
P
{∣∣∣exp(β>i x)− exp((βˆni )>x)∣∣∣ >  , Ti(τ(n), x) ≥ k} ≤ c1() exp(c2()n),
for finite positive constants c1() and c2(), for any x ∈ En−1(i).
Proof of Lemma 12. Define ρ as half the minimum probability of no-click over all possible




min {p0(S,B, x) : S ∈ S, x ∈ X} .
Define the event Ξ :=
{∣∣∣exp(β>i x)− exp((βˆni )>x)∣∣∣ >  , Ti(τ(n), x) ≥ k}. Fix i ∈ N and





i 1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}∑t−1
u=1 Z
u
0 1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}
,
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hence one can write






(Zu0 − E {Zu0 }) 1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}







(Zu0 − E {Zu0 }) 1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}







i 1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}∑t−1
u=1 Z
u
0 1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}
− exp(β>i x)
∣∣∣∣∣ >  , Ti(t, x) ≥ k ,∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
u=1









(Zui − Zu0 exp(β>i x))1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}









(Zui − E {Zui })1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}







(Zu0 − E {Zu0 })1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}






















where: (a) follows from Lemma 11 and from the fact that∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
u=1









(Zu0 − E[Zu0 ])1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}
∣∣∣∣∣
≥ % Ti(t, x),
when
∣∣∣∑t−1u=1(Zu0 − E[Zu0 ])1 {i ∈ Su, Xu = x}∣∣∣ ≤ % Ti(t, x); and (b) follows from the fact that
E {Zui } = exp(β>i x)E {Zu0 }, for all u ≥ 1 such that i ∈ Su and Xu = x. For  > 0 define
c˜() := min
{










From above one have that
P
{∣∣∣exp(β>i x)− exp((βˆni )>x)∣∣∣ >  , Ti(t, x) ≥ k} ≤ 6 exp(−c˜()k).
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Proof of Lemma 8. Since x ∈ span{En−1(i)}, one has that x = ∑y∈ En−1(i) αyy, for
some set α :=
{
αy : y ∈ En−1(i)
}
. Suppose
∣∣∣exp(β>i y)− exp((βˆni )>y)∣∣∣ < /d for all y ∈
En−1(i), then













≤ c3(, x, En−1(i))
∑
y∈ En−1(i)
∣∣∣exp(β>i y)− exp((βˆni )>y)∣∣∣ ≤ ,
for a finite positive constant c3(, x, E





i ) is locally Lipschitz for z ∈ Rd+, for any α. For  > 0 define
c¯() = max {c3(, x, S) : x ∈ X , S ⊆ X , 1 ≤ |S| ≤ C} .
It is easy to see that c¯() is finite and positive for all  > 0.
Define Ξ =






{∣∣∣exp(β>i y)− exp((βˆni )>y)∣∣∣ > ε , Ti(τ(n), y) ≥ k} (a)≤ 6 d exp (−c˜(ε) k) ,
where ε := /(d c¯()), and (a) follows from Lemma 12.
Proof of Lemma 9. From proof of Lemma 2 one sees that, for any M ∈ RN×d,∑
i∈S
exp(M>i x)(wi − r) ≥ r, (B.2)
for all S ∈ S and x ∈ X , for r ≤ r(S∗(M,x),M, x). In particular, the above holds as an





∣∣∣exp(M>i x)− exp(L>i x)∣∣∣ .












exp(B>i x) (wi − (r(S∗(M,x),M, x)−∆(M,B))) .
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Since ∆(M,B) < r(S∗(M,x),M, x), the above and (B.2) imply that
r(S∗(M,x), B, x) ≥ r(S∗(M,x),M, x)−∆(M,B). (B.3)
Inverting the roles of M and B above one gets
r(S∗(B, x),M, x) ≥ r(S∗(B, x), B, x)−∆(B,M).
Combining these two equations one obtains
r(S∗(M,x), B, x) ≥ r(S∗(B, x), B, x)−∆(B,M)−∆(M,B).
From this one concludes that, if ∆(M,B) + ∆(B,M) < δ(B, x)r(S∗(B, x), B, x), then
S∗(M,x) = S∗(B, x). The above implies that
{S∗(B, x) 6= S∗(M,x)} ⊆ {∆(M,B) + ∆(B,M) ≥ ξ} .
The result follows from noting that




∣∣∣exp(M>i x)− exp(B>i x)∣∣∣ .



















{∣∣∣exp(β>i x)− exp((βˆni )>x)∣∣∣ > ε ,






























for all i ∈
S∗(Bˆt, x), for all x ∈ X , and (b) follows from noting that κ log τ(n) < n+ 1, for n > n, and
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from a direct application of Hoeffding’s inequality to the first term on the right-hand-side.
By construction one has that
τ(n)− τ(n− 1) ≥ τ(n)(1− exp(−2/κ)),





S∗(Bˆn, x), x, 
)}
≤ K˜2(ε)τ(n)−c2(ε)κ,
for all n ≥ n˜, for some finite constant n˜.
For Θn(S∗(B, x), x, ), the argument above holds only if x ∈ span{En−1(i)} for all
i ∈ S∗(B, x), which is required to apply Lemma 8. Next we prove that is indeed the case,
with high probability. For i ∈ S∗(B, x) we have
P
{








were (a) follows from (B.3) and the definition of ξ2, and (b) follows from the fact that
τ(n− 1) ≥ τ(n) exp(−2/κ) for n ≥ n. Using this result, we have that for x ∈ X ,











≤ K˜2(ε)τ(n)−c2(ε)κ + CK˜3(ξ/2)τ(n)−c2(ξ/2)κ,
where the last inequality follows from (B.6) and the arguments leading to (B.5). The results
follows from defining KX () := K˜2(ε) + CK˜3(ξ/2) and cX () := min {c2(ε), c2(ξ/2)}.
2Lemma 9 defines ξ as the minimum optimality gap across profiles.
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Appendix C
Proof of Results in Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs for Section 4.4
Proof of Proposition 1. For any e ≥ 0, by the definition of an(e) and λn(e), one has
that for any assortment a in an(e),∑
i∈a
νi(pn,i)(pi − ci − λn(e)) = λn(e)(1 + e).






νj(pj − cj − λn(e))
}
> λn(e)(1 + e
′).
Since both λ 7→ maxAn∈Sn
{∑
j∈An νj(pj − cj − λ)
}






νj(pj − cj − λ)
}
> λ(1 + e′)
for all λ in a neighborhood of λn(e). Noting that the left-hand-side above is decreasing in
λ and the right-hand-side is increasing in λ, it is necessarily the case that λn(e
′) > λn(e).
This completes the proof of part i.).
Proof of part ii.) Fix e, e′ such that 0 ≤ e′ < e and define ∆λ := λn(e′)− λn(e), which
is positive by part i.). Let a′ be any best response to an assortment with attractiveness e′,
i.e., a′ ∈ an(e′). Then, recalling the definition of the θi’s in (4.5) and the discussion that
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followed, it is necessrily the case that
θi(λn(e
′)) ≥ θj(λn(e′)) for any i ∈ a′, j ∈ Nn \ a′. (C.1)
Also, since θi(λ) = νi(pn,i)(pn,i − ci − λ) in the case of exclusive products, one has that for
all a ∈ an(e), for any i ∈ a, j ∈ Nn \ a,
θi(λn(e
′)) + νi(pn,i) ∆λ = θi(λn(e)) ≥ θj(λn(e)) = θj(λn(e′)) + νj(pn,j) ∆λ. (C.2)
Combining (C.1) and (C.2), we conclude that for any pair (a, a′) ∈ an(e)× an(e′), for all i
in a \ a′ and j in a′ \ a, νi(pn,i) ≥ νj(pn,j).
For any given λ ∈ R+, all assortments a in Sλ consist only of products with non-
negative values of θi(λ). Since θi(λ) is strictly decreasing in λ for all products, higher
values of λ translate into fewer products with non-negative θi(λ). Thus, the cardinality of
the assortments in Sλ is non-increasing in λ, i.e., |a| ≤ |a′| for any a ∈ Sλ and any a′ ∈ Sλ′ ,
for λ > λ′. Since λn(e′) > λn(e), one has that |a′| ≤ |a|, for any a′ in an(e′) and a in an(e).
This in turns implies that
∣∣a′ \ a∣∣ = ∣∣a′∣∣− ∣∣a ∩ a′∣∣ ≤ |a| − ∣∣a ∩ a′∣∣ = ∣∣a \ a′∣∣ .
Observing that νi(pn,i) > 0 for all i ∈ Nn, one has that∑
i∈a\a′
νi(pn,i) ≥
∣∣a \ a′∣∣min{νi(pn,i) : i ∈ a \ a′}




















for all a in an(e) and a
′ in an(e′). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7. For any retailer n, consider the set {En(A) : A ∈ An} of all possible
attraction levels corresponding to assortments, and denote those levels by e1 < e2 < ... <
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ekn . Let Zn = {e1, ..., ekn} denote the ordered set of those levels. In addition, for any attrac-
tion level em offered by firm m, let Yn(e
m) = {En(a) : a ∈ an(em)} denote the set attractive-
ness levels corresponding to best responses to em. Finally, let Y (e1, e2) = (Y1(e
2), Y2(e
1))
denote the correspondence from Z1×Z2 into Z1×Z2. Now, note that Z1×Z2 is a non-empty
complete lattice and that Proposition 1 ii.) implies that Y (e1, e2) is a non-decreasing cor-
respondence. These two facts, in conjunction with the fixed point result of Topkis (1998),
Theorem 2.5.1, imply that Y (e1, e2) admits a fixed point in Z1 × Z2. Selecting the assort-
ments that correspond to the attractiveness levels associated with this fixed points yields
an equilibrium in assortment decisions and the proof is complete.
We now comment on the fact that the reasoning above extends to the case of an arbitrary
number of retailers. Indeed, when there are N ≥ 2 retailers, one can define Y (e1, . . . , eN ) =
(Y1(e− e1), . . . , YN (e− eN )), with e :=
∑N
i=1 ei. By using Proposition 1 one can prove that
Y (e1, . . . , eN ) is a non-decreasing correspondence from Z1× . . .×ZN into itself, where Zn is
defined as in the two-retailer case. Since Z1× . . .×ZN is a non-empty complete lattice one
can again use the fixed point result of Topkis (1998), Theorem 2.5.1 to establish existence
of an equilibrium in assortment decisions.
Proof of Proposition 2. Following the argument in the proof of Theorem 7, Topkis
(1998), Theorem 2.5.1 also yields that the set of fixed points of Y (e1, e2) is a nonempty
complete lattice relative to ≤ (component-wise). Hence there exist a fixed point (e1, e2)
such that en ≤ e′n, n = 1, 2, for all fixed points (e′1, e′2) of Y (·). From proposition 1 i.)
and noticing that fixed points of Y (·) map to assortment equilibria, retailer n prefers an
equilibrium involving the attractiveness pair (e1, e2) as it minimizes em. This applies for
both n, thus both retailers prefer the same equilibrium.
We now comment on the fact that the reasoning above extends to the case of an arbitrary
number of retailers. Indeed, following the reasoning on the proof of Theorem 7, Topkis
(1998), Theorem 2.5.1 establishes the existence of a fixed point (e1, . . . , eN ) such that en ≤
e′n, n = {1 . . . , N}, for all fixed points (e′1, . . . , e′N ) of Y (·), where N is the number of
retailers. The result would then follow from the fact that
∑




k for all fixed
points (e′1, . . . , e′N ) of Y (·), hence retailer n prefers (e1, . . . , eN ) and this applies to all n.
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Proof of Theorem 8. For n = 1, 2 and e ≥ 0, let Rn(e) denote the set of attractiveness
levels corresponding to best responses of retailer n when retailer m offers an assortment
with an attractiveness of e. That is,
Rn(e) := {En(a) : a ∈ an(e)} .
We observe that the number of fundamentally different equilibria is bounded above by∑
e∈E2 |R1(e)|. We next provide a bound on this sum. Define E2 := {e ∈ E2 : |R1(e)| > 1}.














|R1(ej)|+ |E2 \ E2| .
Note that for any pair (ei, ej) with i 6= j, part ii.) of Lemma 1 implies that
|Rn(ei) ∩Rn(ej)| ≤ 1.
In addition, the latter result, in conjunction with the fact that |R1(ej)| > 1 for all j ∈
{1, ..., k} implies that |R1(ej) ∩R1(ei)| = 0 for any j < i + 1 and i, j in {1, ..., k}. Hence∑k
j=1 |R1(ej)| ≤ |E1|+ |E2| − 1. We deduce that∑
e∈E2
|R1(e)| ≤ |E1|+ |E2| − 1 + |E2 \ E2| = |E1|+ |E2| − 1.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove that each condition ensures existence of an equilibrium
separately.
i.) We assume without loss of generality that C ≤ |S|, that r = 1 and that the products
are indexed so that ν1(p1) ≥ ν2(p2) ≥ . . . ≥ ν|N |(p|N |).
Let A1 = {1, ..., C} consist of the set of C best products. Let A2 denote the best
response of retailer 2 to A1. We establish that (A1, A2) is always an equilibrium.
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Step 1. We first establish that in the configuration (A1, A2), the profit generated
by retailer 1 satisfies λ1 ≤ 1/2. We argue by contradiction. Suppose for a moment that
λ1 > 1/2. Let E(An) denote the attractiveness of assortment An, i.e., E(An) =
∑
i∈Ai νi(1−
(1/2)1{i ∈ Am}). The condition λ1 > 1/2 can be rewritten as
E(A1)
1 + E(A1) + E(A2)
> 1/2.
This implies that E(A1) > 1 + E(A2). Using the latter, we would have that
λ2 =
E(A2)















where (a) follows from the facts that E(A2) ≤
∑C
i=1 νi and x 7→ x/(1 + x) is increasing on
[0,+∞). However, this is a contradiction with the fact that A2 is a best response to A1.








by simply offering products {1, ..., C}. We conclude that it must be the case that λ1 ≤ 1/2.
Step 2. We now establish that no retailer has any incentive to deviate from (A1, A2).
Case 1: A2 ∩ A1 = ∅. In such a case, we have that for retailer 1, θi(λ1) = (r − λ1)νi ≥
rνi/2 ≥ rνj/2 for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 and hence retailer 1 has no incentive to deviate from
A1 given that retailer 2 offers A2. Hence (A1, A2) is an equilibrium.
Case 2: A2∩A1 6= ∅. For all products i ∈ A1 \A2, note that θi(λ1) = (r−λ1)νi ≥ θj(λ1)
for all j ∈ S \A1.
Consider now i ∈ A1 ∩ A2 and suppose that there is a product j /∈ A1 such that,
θj(λ1) > θi(λ1) = rνi/2. If j /∈ A2, then this would imply that θi(λ2) = rνi/2 ≥ θj(λ2).
However, λ1 ≥ λ2 and hence θj(λ1) ≤ θj(λ2) ≤ rνi/2 = θi(λ1), which is a contradiction.
If j ∈ A2, then we would have θj(λ1) = rνj/2 > θi(λ1) = rνi/2, i.e., νj > νi, or j < i.
However, since i ∈ A1, one must have i ≤ C and this would imply that j < C, which
contradicts the fact that A1 = {1, ..., C} by construction.
We conclude that in case 2, retailer 1 has no incentive to deviate from A1 and (A1, A2)
is an equilibrium.
The above establishes the existence of an equilibrium when condition i.) is satisfied.
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ii.) Suppose now that Cn ≥ |S|, n = 1, 2 and that p1,i = p2,i for all i ∈ N . We exhibit an
equilibrium by restricting attention to cases where both retailer offer all common products.
Noting that any best response to Am will include all common products, retailer n solves for










νi(pi − ci)/2 ≥ λn(1 + em).
Let a′n(em) denote the set of optimal assortments. One needs to find a pair of assortments
(A1, A2) such that A1 ∈ a′1(E2(A2)) and A2 ∈ a′2(E1(A1)), which reduces to a problem of
assortment selection with exclusive products. Existence of such pair can be proven as in
proof of Theorem 1.
C.2 Proofs for Section 4.5





















in the sense that optimal values for both problems are equal, and a sequence of decisions
achieves profits that converge to the supremum in (4.2) if and only if such a sequence
achieves profits that converge to the supremum of the left-hand-side of (C.3) when λ is
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It is possible to verify that the inner-supremum above is attained by any sequence converging














The result follows by substituting the above in (C.3).
Proof of Lemma 4. We establish the result by contradiction. Suppose that (A1, p1, A2, p2)
is an equilibrium such that |A1| < C1.
Let λ1 denote the profits achieved by retailer 1. Select i in N1 \A1 (which is non-empty
since C1 ≤ |N1| by assumption). Note that, through (4.12), it is necessarily the case that
θi(λ1) ≥ 0. The latter follows from the fact that p∗1,i is chosen to maximize νi(p)(p−ci−λ1)
for p ∈ [ci, p2,i] (note that it is always the case that p2,i ≥ ci in any equilibrium).
Case 1 : θi(λ1) > 0. In such a case, retailer 1 could strictly increase its profits by adding
product i to its assortment, contradicting that (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium.
Case 2 : θi(λ1) = 0. In such a case, analyzing (4.12), it must be that i ∈ A2 \ A1. In
addition, the fact that θi(λ1) = maxci≤p≤pm,i νi(p)(p−ci−λ1)+λ1νi(p2,i) ≥ νi(p2,i)(p2,i−ci)
implies that p2,i = ci. Retailer 2 could strictly increase its profits by removing product i
from its assortment. This, again, contradicts that (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium.
We conclude that in any equilibrium, both retailers necessarily offer full-capacity assort-
ments and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4. Lemma 4 implies that retailers offer full-capacity assortments
and these need to be in the set of Cn-popular assortments for retailer n = 1, 2. Hence,
the attractiveness of assortments is uniquely defined for any equilibrium, implying that
all equilibria are equivalent. Suppose that (λ1, λ2) is a solution to (4.15), then λn solves
(4.14) when retailer m sets pm,i := ci +
1
α + λm, and selects Am ∈ P˜m(Nm, Cm), hence
An ∈ P˜n(Nn, Cn) with pn,i := ci + 1α + λn is a best response to retailer m’s action. We
conclude (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium. We complete the proof by showing that (4.15)
always has a unique solution.
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF RESULTS IN CHAPTER 4 148
Let Λn denote the unique solution to Vne
−αλn = λn and note that the profit achieved
by firm n always lies in [0,Λn]. Let Yn(λm) ∈ [0,Λn] denote the unique solution to
Vne
−αλn = λn(1 + αVme−αλm) and define Y (λ1, λ2) := (Y1(λ2), Y2(λ1)). By the implicit







(1 + α Vme−λm α)(1 + αYn(λm))
.
From the above we observe that 0 ≤ JY (λ1, λ2) < 1 for all (λ1, λ2) ∈ [0,Λ1]× [0,Λ2] where
JY (·) denotes the Jacobian of Y (·). We deduce that Y (·) is a contraction from [0,Λ1]×[0,Λ2]
into itself and hence the its admits a unique fixed point (see Judd (1998), Theorem 5.4.1).
The proof is completed by noting that (λ1, λ2) solves (4.15) if and only if it is also a fixed
point of Y (·).
We now comment on the fact that the reasoning above extends to the case of an arbitrary
number of retailers. Indeed, when there are say, N ≥ 2 retailers, firms will still offer full-
capacity assortments in equilibrium and again one can reduce the search for equilibria to
settings where each firm selects a constant margin across products, or equivalently a value











One can now define Yn(λ−n) as the above solution and Y (λ1, ...., λN ) = (Y1(λ−1), ....YN (λ−N )),
where λ−n = (λ1, ..., λn−1, λn+1, ..., λN ). Y is differentiable on [0,Λ1]× ...× [0,ΛN ] and such
that















j=,...N, j 6=n Vje−λj α)(1 + αYn(λ−n))
< 1.
On obtains that Y is a contraction and hence admits a unique fixed point.
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume, without loss of generality, that |N1| > C1 and suppose
(A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium.
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Suppose that A1 ∩ A2 6= ∅. Necessarily, p1,i = p2,i = ci for all i ∈ A1 ∩ A2 (since
otherwise, one of the retailers could benefit by an infinitesimal decrease in price for product















From (4.12), one has that θi(λ1) > 0 for all i ∈ N1 \A2, and since p1,i = ci for i ∈ A1 ∩A2,
one concludes that θi(λ1) = 0 for such products. Therefore the expression above cannot be
maximized at A = A1, since retailer 1 could substitute i with a product in N1 \ A2 that
s/he does not currently offer. This contradicts that (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium. We
deduce that one must have A1 ∩A2 = ∅
Now, suppose An ∩ Nm 6= ∅ for both n = 1, 2. Let jn denote the product in N1 ∩ N2







n,j − cj) : j ∈ An ∩Nm
}
.




)(p∗m,jm − cjm) ≥ νjn(p∗n,jn)(p∗n,jn − cjn). This corresponds to a case where
product jm contributes a higher amount to the profits of retailer m than what product jn
contributes to the profit of retailer n. We next show that retailer n offering jm instead jn





n,jm − cjm) + (νjm(p∗m,jm)− νjm(p∗n,jm)) λn
(a)
≥ νjm(p∗m,jm)(p∗m,jm − cjm)
≥ νjn(p∗n,jn)(p∗n,jn − cjn) > θjn(λn),
where (a) follows from the fact that p∗n,i is selected to maximize νi(p)(p − ci − λn) for
p ∈ [ci, p∗m,i]. The above contradicts the optimality of An in maximizing the left-hand-side
of (4.11) (since retailer n could increase its profits by offering product jm instead of jn and
pricing it just below p∗n,jm). This contradicts that (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium. Hence,
necessarily An ∩Nm = ∅ for some n = 1, 2. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 9. From Lemma 5 one has that equilibria must be contained in CE1∪
CE2 when |Nn| > Cn for some n ∈ {1, 2}. Equivalence of the equilibria in this setting
follows directly from the statement in part i.), that we prove next.
Part i.) Consider a candidate (A1, p1, A2, p2) in CE1 ∩ CE2. It is necessarily the case that
An ⊂ Nmn , for n = 1, 2. Then, from (4.12) one has that θi(λ) = ν˜ie−λα for all i. Therefore
the popular set An maximizes the left-hand-side of (4.11) when retailer m offers Am, for
n = 1, 2. Hence (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium.
Now, suppose CEn \ CEm 6= ∅ for n = 1, 2. We will show that one cannot find equi-







2 ) ∈ CEn \ CEm for n = 1, 2 that constitute equilibria. For each element,
let (λn1 , λ
n
2 ) denote the corresponding equilibrium profits.
Let j be the index of the most attractive product in N1 ∩ N2 (i.e., j = argmax{ν˜i :
i ∈ N1 ∩ N2}, and jn be the index of the least attractive product in Amn (i.e., jn =
argmin {ν˜i : i ∈ Amn }).
Case I : Ann ∩Nm 6= ∅ for n = 1, 2. In such a case, it must be that ν˜j ≥ ν˜jn , for n = 1, 2.
Suppose λ12 ≤ λ11. Let us analyze the θi values associated with j and j2 for retailer 2.
From (4.12) one has that
θj (λ
1
2) = ν˜j e
−λ12 α + λ12 ν˜j αe




2 α = θj
2
(λ12).
This implies that retailer 2 would benefit from substituting product j
2
by product j in its
assortment (this would strictly increase the quantity being maximized on the left-hand-side






2) is an equilibrium.
Suppose λ12 > λ
1
1. Then, recalling the discussion that followed Proposition 4 it is neces-
sarily the case V 12 > V
1
1 . This, in conjunction, with the inequalities V
2
2 ≥ V 12 and V 11 ≥ V 21
implies, again through the discussion that followed Proposition 4, that λ22 > λ
2
1. One can








Case II : Ann ∩Nm = ∅ for some n = 1, 2. Suppose that it is the case for retailer 1. Since we






2) is an equilibrium, then it must be the case that A
1
2 is contained
in P˜2(N2, C2). In addition, given that (A11, p11, A12, p12) belongs to CE1 \ CE2, one must have
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A12∩N1 6= ∅. However, this contradicts the fact that A12 ⊂ N 12 , which holds by construction.






2) cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
Part ii.) a). By Lemma 4 one has that the only possible equilibrium involves An = Nn
for n = 1, 2. Also, one must have that pn,j = cj for all j in N1 ∩ N2 and n = 1, 2. From













for n = 1, 2. The arguments presented in the proof of Proposition 4 are valid to prove that
(N1, p1,N2, p2) constitutes the unique possible equilibrium, where
pn,i =
 λn + ci + 1α i ∈ Nn \ Nm,ci otherwise,
for n = 1, 2, and (λ1, λ2) is the unique solution to (C.4). In addition, it is clear that
(N1, p1,N2, p2) is indeed an equilibrium.
Part ii.) b). Suppose (A1, p1, A2, p2) is an equilibrium. Lemma 4 implies that |An| = Cn
for n = 1, 2. Hence An ∩ (N1 ∩ N2) 6= ∅ for n = 1, 2. However this contradicts the second
result of Lemma 5. We deduce that no equilibrium can exist.
The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose first that a∩Nn 6= ∅ for some a in P˜m(Nm, Cm). Con-






2 ) in CEn \ CEm. By similar arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 9 part i.) (Case I), one has that retailer m will find a profitable deviation (by
substituting the least attractive product in Anm (in terms of the ν˜i) by product j). Hence,
no element of CEn \ CEm can be an equilibrium.
Suppose now that no popular assortment a in P˜m(Nm, Cm) overlaps with Nn. This
implies that Amm ∩ Nn = ∅ for each candidate (Am1 , pm1 , Am2 , pm2 ) in CEm \ CEn. For such a
candidate to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that Amn belongs to P˜n(Nn, Cn). In
addition, the fact that Amn ∩Nm = ∅ implies that the candidate belongs to CEm∩CEn. This
contradicts the fact that the candidate belongs to CEm \CEn. This completes the proof.
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C.3 Minimum Margins Setting
In this section, we consider the setting where the retailers solve problem (4.2) subject to
the additional constraints that pn,i ≥ ci + ri, i = 1, ..., S, i.e., there is a minimum profit
margin ri > 0 for product i. In particular, retailer n solves
sup
An∈Sn, pn,i≥ci+ri, i∈A
{pin(An, pn, Am, pm)} . (C.5)
We next outline the key steps that can be taken to analyze equilibrium behavior.
Best response correspondence and equivalent problem formulation. Proceeding in






i∈A\Am,i∈A∩Am : pm,i 6=ri+ci

















+ λ+ ci, pm,i
}}
, i ∈ A,
and where it is assumed that pm,i :=∞ if i is not in Am. Note that maximizing prices are
set in a similar form as in the original setting, with a correction to account for the minimum
margin constraint.
In particular, any assortment that solves (C.6) will enable retailer n to achieve the
supremum in (C.5) when prices converge to p∗n (strictly) from below.
As in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, one can analyze the set of best response assortments for a












n,i − ci − λ) + λ νi(pm,i) if i ∈ Nn ∩Am , pm,i 6= ri + ci
νi(ri + ci) ri/2 if i ∈ Nn ∩Am , pm,i = ri + ci.
One can solve for Sλ by selecting the products with highest positive values for θi(λ) (with a
maximum of Cn products). Note that the expression is similar to (4.12), except that now,
one needs to account for the fact that one cannot price below ci + ri.
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Discussion of the case of exclusive products. When N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, problem (C.6)
can be further simplified (similarly to what was done in Section 4.5.1), which enables one to
establish a parallel result to Proposition 1 on the monotonicity of best response assortment
attractiveness. In turn, this would allow one to prove existence and ordering of equilibria. It
is worth noting that even though the w-based ranking does not depend directly on Am, as in
Section 4.5.1, it does now depend on the specific value of λ. This means that {Sλ : λ ∈ R}
may contain assortments with different attractiveness, opening the possibility of having
multiple equilibria that yield different profit levels. This behavior is more in line with the
case of exogenous prices, analyzed in Section 4.4.1.
More specific results can be obtained for example, when the minimum margins are
equal across products for both retailers (i.e., a minimum profit margin rn is imposed on all
products i ∈ Nn, n = 1, 2). In such a case, it is possible to establish that there exists a
unique equilibrium (in the fundamentally different sense), by building on the analyses in
Sections 4.4.1 and 4.5.1.
When retailers have both exclusive and common products, while one can still prove that
both retailers will necessarily offer full-capacity assortments in equilibrium, following the
lines of the proof of Lemma 4, it is not possible anymore to ensure that their offerings will
not overlap in equilibrium. In addition, in sharp contrast with the results of Section 4.5.2,
there will be cases where the number of equilibria grows exponentially with the display
capacities. As an illustration, one can verify that the setup of Example 4 in Section 4.4.2
(where one allows retailers to select prices) falls into that category when there is a uniform
minimum margin on all products that is greater than (4/3)α.
